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This dissertation explores the significance of ritual inoperativity for political theology. 
Drawing from representative interpreters of biblical/traditional sources, contemporary 
philosophical reflection, and practical analysis of rituals, this study argues that rituals such as 
Sabbath, vigil, shmita, and fiesta paint a unique image of human identity and authority in the 
world. This image is starkly opposed to the common political-theological framework in which 
God is defined through action, and human beings are similarly defined as action-producing 
beings. In contrast, ritual inoperativity depicts God’s identity and authority as one who gives rest 
or “lets be.” For this reason, human identity and authority should follow a similar model. This 
study argues that this perspective of political power could be enormously important for 
addressing the most significant political challenge in the contemporary world: climate change. It 






What is the value of doing nothing? 
Tersely put, that is the question this dissertation seeks to answer. Of course, “doing 
nothing” is a bit of an over-simplification. My focus is not on sloth, mindless wandering, or the 
various types of unproductive diversion that occupy human attention in all cultures. Naturally, 
anthropologists have a rightful interest in investigating such matters, and they are significant in 
their own way.1 But my interest is in what I will call “ritual inoperativity,” specifically the kind 
that emerges in Jewish and Christian traditions, usually in the form of the Sabbath day (and 
similar and related phenomena such as the shmita or sabbatical year, night vigils and fiestas).2 
To be more specific, what follows will focus on the value of such rituals for political 
theory. This could seem counterintuitive. To some, Sabbath is a private practice, interesting to 
researchers because of its “high cost” as a religious activity, but hardly overtly relevant to the 
political world.3 Although many theologians have recently paid attention to the influence of 
 
1 Such investigations usually fall into the category of “leisure studies.” For an overview of this field see 
Ken Roberts, Leisure in Contemporary Society (Oxfordshire: CABI, 2006). See also John T. Haworth, Work, 
Leisure, and Well-Being (London: Routledge, 1997).  
 
2 I will use the term “ritual inoperativity” or just “inoperativity” frequently in this dissertation, even though 
most of the time I will be talking about Sabbath in particular. The reason for this term is that I want to emphasize 
that the ritual qualities of Sabbath are not limited to Sabbath alone, but extend into other rituals. Furthermore, it is 
possible that the investigation of inoperativity developed here could be applicable to other religious rituals with 
which I am less familiar, such as those found in Hinduism, Buddhism, or Shinto. 
 
3 On the significance of Sabbath as a “high cost” religious activity (that is, one which take up a large 
amount of time and commitment) see Karl G. D. Bailey and Arian C. B. Timoti, “Delight or Distraction: An 






doctrines on political paradigms,4 fewer have focused on how doctrines interact with rituals and 
practices that together correlate with political worldviews. This dissertation seeks to partly fill 
that void by offering a political theology of a unique category of religious activity, inoperativity. 
The following chapters will show how Christian and Jewish practices of inoperativity unveil a 
perception of God’s relationship to humans and humans’ relationship to each other that is 
politically weighted. 
By “politically weighted” I refer to the fact that when we engage in particular religious 
practices oriented to God (or, as philosopher Jean-Yves Lacoste puts it, “the Absolute”) we are 
saying something about how divine authority functions (because the origin of the ritual is 
grounded in some kind of liturgy, or “service” to divine authority). We are also at the same time 
saying something about human identity, because rituals model how humans are supposed to exist 
in the world.5 
 
4 I refer here to the burgeoning field known as “political theology.” Although there is extensive debate as to 
the precise definition of political theology, most theologians functioning in this area frame their work as a reaction 
to mid-twentieth century theorist Carl Schmitt’s claim that “all the modern concepts of the state are secularized 
theological concepts.” See Carl Schmitt, Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty, trans. 
George Schwab (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1985), 36. This seems to imply that ways of thinking about God have 
direct impact on political concepts, and therefore that theological/ritual ideas are not isolated from political affairs 
but are the “code” underwriting them, even if covertly. Reflection on Schmitt’s work has led to recent developments 
of this idea from a variety of thinkers. See, for example,  Hent De Vries and Lawrence E. Sullivan, eds., Political 
Theologies: Public Religions in a Post-Secular World (New York: Fordham University Press, 2006); Paul W. Kahn, 
Political Theology: Four New Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty (New York: Columbia University Press, 
2011); Saul Newman, Political Theology: A Critical Introduction (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2018), and Catherine 
Keller, Political Theology of the Earth: Our Planetary Emergency and the Struggle for a New Republic (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 2018). 
 
5 The idea that attention to ritual is essential for political theology has been noted by John Thatamanil, 
“How Not to Be a Religion: Genealogy, Identity, Wonder,” in Common Goods: Economy, Ecology, and Political 
Theology, ed. Melanie Johnson-DeBaufre, Catherine Keller, and Elias Orega-Aponte (New York: Fordham 
University Press, 2015), 54-72. Despite this recognition, subsequent essays in this volume pay surprisingly little 
attention to the significance of rituals. Perhaps this is a result of the bifurcation within the field of religious studies 




These two aspects of ritual—human identity and authority—are the centerpieces of 
politics. They also feed into each other with a kind of circularity. To know what human beings 
strive to be will convey important information about how they should be governed. Conversely, 
the type of authority exercised over human beings will influence their identity. What this means 
is that rituals reside at the roots of human conceptions of politics and government. Studying 
rituals of inoperativity such as Sabbath is therefore immensely important for framing any kind of 
political theology.  
The central argument of this dissertation consists of two closely related points: First, I 
claim that certain rituals of inoperativity—primarily Sabbath—disclose a conception of God’s 
absolute power in which this power functions by passivity. In other words, rather than exercising 
control, God “lets be.” At first, this may sound like nothing more than standard modern deism—
the enlightenment perspective in which God creates the world and then steps back to let it run 
itself. However, the difference is established by my second point: “Letting be” frames a key 
element of human identity as well. Humans participate in the inoperative authority of God by 
virtue of their status as imago Dei. This means that human beings are not defined by their 
production, or ability to manipulate and control the world. These concepts of identity and 
authority are latent within the Sabbath ritual (as well as the other analogous rituals I will 
analyze).  
To explicate this understanding of inoperativity, I will draw on three primary approaches: 
biblical traditions, contemporary philosophy, and practical engagement with rituals. Of course, 




they provide unique angles for addressing the common question: How does doing nothing impact 
politics? These categories also correspond to the first three chapters of this dissertation. 
Chapter 1 addresses the theology of inoperativity that arises from reflection on biblical 
traditions. In order to draw on this vast trove of resources (a historical/systematic task that could 
take volumes of its own) I will focus on the work of two theologians whose reflections utilize 
this material in related fashion. These are the Christian theologian Jürgen Moltmann and the 
Jewish theologian Abraham Joshua Heschel. Reflecting on texts from the Christian Old and New 
Testaments, and particularly on the Genesis creation stories, Moltmann arrives at a theology of 
the Sabbath in which God’s inoperativity forms the basis for the human imago Dei. Heschel, 
utilizing both biblical texts and concepts from rabbinic tradition, presents an image of Sabbath 
that curbs “spatial covetousness,” returning human beings from the realm of material production 
to the eternal utterance of time. Together, these thinkers lay a foundation for thinking of human 
inoperativity as a key to human identity through participation in divine inoperativity. 
Chapter 2 investigates developments of this idea in contemporary philosophy, focusing in 
particular on two thinkers for whom inoperativity is a central theme, Jean-Yves Lacoste and 
Giorgio Agamben. Lacoste argues that through inoperative rituals such as the night vigil, human 
beings implicitly develop a conception of the Absolute as non-necessity, or excess of being. By 
these rituals, human beings exist with the Absolute in a state of rest. Agamben, probing the same 
idea from a more overtly political angle, differentiates between two types of inoperativity. A 
sovereign form of inoperativity maintains the apparatus of power, while another “messianic” 




arguments show that inoperativity plays a major role in either maintaining or upending political 
structures. 
Moving beneath the broad level of abstract reflection on inoperativity, chapter 3 
evaluates two contrasting—though complementary—approaches to specific practices. The 
selected examples are early-twentieth century Jewish philosopher Rav Kook’s work on shmita 
(the sabbatical year) and contemporary Catholic theologian Roberto Goizueta’s approach to 
popular rituals in Latina/o religion. Kook’s advocacy for the heter mekhira (the partial 
suspension of the sabbatical year) demonstrates the practical idea that inoperative rituals must be 
able to suspend themselves to produce the context for freedom and greater inoperativity. In other 
words, they must be oriented toward an end or goal. Goizueta makes what initially appears to be 
the opposite argument. Focusing on Latina/o rituals such as the fiesta, Goizueta claims that 
inoperative rituals must not be framed as a form of poiesis, or productive action, but must remain 
praxis—a form of life in themselves. Despite the apparent contrast between these two practical 
angles, this chapter argues that they expose two sides of liberating ritual inoperativity. To create 
life, it must be truly inoperative. 
Chapter 4 draws together the insights of the previous chapters into a political ethic of 
inoperative ritual, seeking to show the significance of inoperativity for the most significant 
political problem of the current age: climate change. This chapter shows that the climate crisis is 
intricately related to the two key aspects of political theology: identity and authority. The chapter 
subsequently argues that ritual inoperativity (specifically Sabbath) alters these conceptions 
dramatically. Through Sabbath keeping, human beings frame themselves as beings whose value 




type of authority over nature that models the divine “letting be.” A political/theological practice 
of Sabbath could therefore be enormously important for addressing climate change. 
The concluding chapter moves into even more practical detail, outlining practical aspects 
(and challenges) of a potential “climate-healing Sabbath.” In order to be effective in addressing a 
broad-level ecological crisis, such a Sabbath must incorporate communal life as means for 
transforming conceptions of human identity. Communities must also practice it as an intentional 
act of authority defiance, understanding it as a ritual of resistance against the powers of perpetual 
production. This chapter also explores the real challenges a climate-healing Sabbath may face. 
In the end, the research laid out here should give religious communities that practice 
Sabbath or other inoperative rituals a new impetus for celebrating these events. It may also give 
individuals or communities who have never considered inoperative rituals a greater appreciation 
for the beauty and power of doing nothing. What is written here should also stimulate more 
research into the significance of inoperativity. In addition to the boldly inoperative rituals such as 
Sabbath and shmita investigated in this research, further reflection will show that countless other 
practices within religions contain elements of intentional uselessness. Perhaps the research 
contained in this dissertation will help to remove the pejorative connotation of “useless,” 






BIBLICAL TRADITIONS AND INOPERATIVITY 
JÜRGEN MOLTMANN AND ABRAHAM JOSHUA HESCHEL 
To start exploring the implications of ritual inoperativity for political theology, it makes 
sense to begin with texts and their interpretations. Of course, this is not the only way a study of 
any given element in political theology could begin. It is not the case that texts are the sole 
foundation of religious communities and their practices. The situation may be rather like a circle 
or spiral, in which texts, communities, and practices mutually give rise to each other. One could 
begin with any of these three elements and move from there to exploring the others. However, 
because communities usually appeal to texts as the basis for their own self-understanding, it 
seems natural in a study on the theology of inoperativity to begin with textual traditions that deal 
with inoperativity. 
Because this study focuses primarily on a shared Christian and Jewish ritual of 
inoperativity—the Sabbath—this chapter will address two important modern interpreters of the 
theology of the Sabbath from Christian and Jewish traditions, respectively. Why have I chosen to 
examine these thinkers, and not the numerous others? There are two reasons. Firstly and most 
straightforwardly, these two thinkers are unrivaled in the significance of their work on Sabbath 
in modern theology. Moltmann’s God in Creation and Heschel’s The Sabbath: Its Meaning for 
Modern Man contain classic treatments of Sabbath which other works often draw from. My 




theologies of Sabbath—grounded in somewhat similar ancient texts. This demonstrates a strong 
pattern of agreement between the two traditions on the political implications of inoperativity. 
Secondly, political concerns are important for the works of both thinkers. Neither of them 
shies away from directly applying textual theology to political questions. Although, as we will 
see, Heschel was more politically active than Moltmann has been, both thinkers establish clear 
links between their theological ideas and their political problems. These links will be important 
for developing my own theory of how ritual inoperativity impacts political theology. 
Although Heschel’s work predates Moltmann’s, in what follows I will address the latter 
first. Biblical and theological reasons ground this methodological choice. Moltmann’s work 
utilizes core texts (specifically the account of God’s rest in Genesis 2:1-3), that Heschel does not 
engage with formally, but rather assumes as crucial background. Heschel also utilizes elements 
from Jewish traditions that Moltmann does not use—so in a sense we can say that Heschel’s 
theology goes beyond Moltmann’s. My approach to each of these thinkers will be to first lay out 
essential aspects of their method for approaching inoperativity and how the concept of 
inoperativity plays a role in their thought. Subsequently, I will explore the ways in which their 
understanding of inoperativity impacts political-theological concepts. 
Jürgen Moltmann 
As one of the central figures in Protestant theology in the twentieth and twenty-first 
centuries, Moltmann’s work covers vast categories. He is noted especially for his reflections on 
suffering and theodicy, ecclesiology, the doctrine of the Trinity, and ecology.1 Obviously all of 
 
1 On suffering and theodicy see Jürgen Moltmann, The Crucified God: The Cross of Christ as the 
Foundation and Criticism of Christian Theology, trans. R.A. Wilson and John Bowden (New York: Harper and 




these areas connect in various ways to political theology. As I will argue, a particular conception 
of inoperativity is at the core of Moltmann’s political theology. This notion enables him to 
redefine the nature of the person in crucial ways. In what follows, I will begin by explaining 
Moltmann’s method for interpreting Christian texts on inoperativity, after which I will be able to 
offer a brief account of how Moltmann understands inoperativity within his interpretive 
framework. This will provide critical background for an analysis of the political implications of 
Moltmann’s theoretical work. 
Method 
Moltmann approaches Biblical texts with an eschatological framework. In other words, 
he reads Christian texts (including the texts about the Sabbath) with a presupposition that they 
not only reveal truths about the human past, but also about the human future. This theme 
emerges early in Moltmann’s work, beginning with his groundbreaking Theology of Hope, in 
which he argues for the centrality of the future in Christian theology. Against previous 
theological trends from Schweitzer to Bultmann, which portrayed eschatology as an aspect of 
Christian faith that must be left behind, Moltmann places the vibrant expectation of the early 
Church at the foundational level of theological reflection. “The eschatological is not one element 
of Christianity,” he says, “but it is the medium of Christian faith as such, the key in which 
everything in it is set, the glow that suffuses everything here in the dawn of an expected new 
 
York: Harper and Row, 1977). On the doctrine of the trinity, see Moltmann, The Trinity and the Kingdom of God 
(San Francisco: Harper and Row, 1981). On ecology see Moltmann, God in Creation: An Ecological Doctrine of 





day.”2 As Richard Bauckham observes, this anticipation of a future world does not negate the 
significance of the present world in Moltmann’s thought.3 Rather, anticipation paves the way for 
improving the present world so as to lead it into its future. 
This methodological emphasis on anticipation allows Moltmann to re-evaluate two 
concepts of tradition, at work in both progressive and conservative political philosophies. The 
first he calls the “classical” approach to tradition.4 In this approach, history looks backward to a 
primal authority invested in the “ancients,” whose wisdom and insight are unrepeatable. These 
traditions are like vaults of legendary artifacts—glorious but stale.5 Moltmann contrasts the 
classical tradition model with what might be called the “prophetic” model (though Moltmann 
gives it no title). This is the approach to tradition Moltmann finds in the literature of the Hebrew 
Bible. “In Israel,” says Moltmann, “it was not a primaeval mythical event that was handed down 
and called to mind in principio, but a historic event, and one which determined the nature, the 
life, the path and the history of Israel.”6 The people of ancient Israel looked to the past not to 
revere it or uphold it as the age of exaltation, but to see in it the anticipation of God’s actions in 
the future.7 Borrowing a term from Gerhard von Rad, Moltmann calls this “an eschatologizing of 
 
2 Jürgen Moltmann, The Theology of Hope: On the Ground and Implications of Christian Eschatology, 
trans. James W. Leitch (London: SCM Press, 1967), 16. 
 
3 Richard Bauckham, The Theology of Jürgen Moltmann (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1995), 83. 
 
4 See Moltmann, The Theology of Hope, 296. 
 
5 According to M. Douglas Meeks, it was precisely this tendency to give religion a “backward” stance that 
motivated Moltmann to formulate his forward looking theology of hope. See M. Douglas Meeks, Origins of the 
Theology of Hope Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1974. 
 
6 Moltmann, The Theology of Hope, 297. 
 
7 As Jeremy Wynne puts it (summarizing Moltmann’s contribution), “Certainly the past remains important 




the way of thinking in terms of tradition.”8 Traditions, in this approach, are proclamations of past 
events that shake the present and pull in the future.  
However, it is crucial to nuance what it means to herald future changes. Not all 
eschatological expectation is legitimately Christian, according to Moltmann. In his recent Ethics 
of Hope Moltmann delineates several categories of eschatological thinking that influence 
believers’ actions in perverse or (at least) less than ideal ways.9 These categories include 
“apocalyptic eschatology,” which morbidly delights itself with the destruction of the world, and 
also “separatist eschatology,” which laments the corruption of the world but seeks to pull away 
from the world rather than engage it positively. Both of these eschatologies result in what 
Charles Strozier calls “endism”—an apocalyptic tendency that directs all positive thinking to the 
end of time, and never within time itself.10 These views emphasize “waiting” for the future, 
rather than “hastening” the future.11 
 
As the prophet said by the Lord, ‘Do not remember the former things, or consider the things of old. I am about to do 
a new thing’ (Isa. 43:18-19).” See Jeremy Wynne, “Serving the Coming God: The Insights of Jürgen Moltmann’s 
Eschatology for Contemporary Theology of Mission,” Missiology 35, no. 4 (2007): 437-452, 439. 
 
8 Moltmann, The Theology of Hope, 298. See also Gerhard von Rad, Old Testament Theology, vol. 1, trans. 
D.M.G. Stalkner (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), 106-122. 
 
9 Jürgen Moltmann, Ethics of Hope, trans. Margaret Kohl (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2012), 15-17. 
 
10 See Charles B. Strozier, Apocalypse: On the Psychology of Fundamentalism in America (Boston: Beacon 
Press, 1994). Similar criticisms of this framework have been made by Catherine Keller, Apocalypse Now and Then: 
A Feminist Guide to the End of the World (Boston: Beacon Press, 1996). 
 
11 Of course, Anabaptist theologians such as John Howard Yoder and Stanley Hauerwas would counter 
Moltmann by claiming that they are not passively waiting for the parousia of Christ, but are hastening its coming by 
living in communities that realize the future world in the present. Perhaps Moltmann overlooks tangible ways in 
which various Anabaptist activists have put themselves to work in transforming the world. For an account of the 
diversity of political approaches in one Anabaptist group see Ross Thomas Bender, The People of God: A 





Against these invalid or insufficient eschatologies, Moltmann posits “transformative 
eschatology.” He finds this model vividly displayed in Martin Luther King’s famous 1963 “I 
Have a Dream” speech, as well as in numerous other of King’s speeches.12 Obviously, King’s 
work was eschatological. The realities King envisioned in his speeches were incredible and 
improbable. But these improbable hopes did not result in passivity or foolhardy mania, but in 
diligent work to bend the future “arc of the moral universe” into the present.13 This attitude of 
“pulling in the justice of the future” is the type of thinking to which Moltmann gives the 
adjective “messianic.”14 According to this definition of this much-debated term, supposedly 
messianic concepts or practices can be tested in the present world by examining their ethical 
outcomes. Moltmann interprets the visions of second Isaiah, as well as Jesus’ teachings in the 
Sermon on the Mount, as rubrics for evaluating the merits of any messianic hope. Paraphrasing 
Isaiah and Amos’s famous “swords into ploughshares” text, Moltmann offers a neat formula: 
The principle behind this ethics of hope is: 
--not to turn swords into Christian swords 
--not to retreat from the swords to the ploughshares 
--but to make ploughshares out of swords.15 
 
12 Moltmann addresses King’s work in Ethics of Hope, 35-37. 
 
13 Moltmann places all of King’s work in the background of future hope. He focuses especially on King’s 
use of the language of the Hebrew prophets, especially Isaiah: “In order that ‘all flesh’—that is, all the living—may 
see the glory of God ‘together’, the mountains must be made low and the valleys must be raised up, so that in human 
history equal living conditions for everyone are created, together with a life-furthering community of human beings 
with all living things on earth” (Moltmann, Ethics of Hope, 36). However, one could argue against Moltmann’s 
literal reading of King’s prophetic imagery. Perhaps King’s language was merely symbolic, and not truly contingent 
on a future realization of a messianic hope. Further research needs to be done to determine the role of the future in 
King’s work. 
 
14The term “messianic” can be incredibly problematic, partly because there is an enormous diversity of 
possible meanings for this term. Hence, it is important to specify what Moltmann means by it. He is specific in his 
definition: “By ‘messianic’ I mean in this connection a present already gripped and determined by the eschatological 
future” (Moltmann, Ethics of Hope, 38). In my own work, this is also the definition that I will use. 
 





This is a transformative eschatology. The Christian who holds a transformative eschatology 
cannot let go of the reins of history, but neither can such a person operate them in the same way 
as a typical sovereign.16 
We can summarize Moltmann’s approach to Christian sources by saying that Moltmann 
reads these sources in a transformative-eschatological way. In other words, he uses Christian 
texts to pull central ideas of how a Christian is to anticipate a new world. One of these central 
ideas is the concept of inoperativity. 
Moltmann’s Understanding of Inoperativity 
Due to the fact that, in Moltmann’s method, Christian traditions are not simply cultural 
artifacts but dramatic depictions of God’s role in the present and future, it should not be 
surprising that the Genesis accounts of God’s creative activity take a central place in Moltmann’s 
understanding of redemption and sovereignty. Here I will not evaluate all the details of 
Moltmann’s interpretation of the Genesis origin stories, or examine the exegetical work on which 
they are based. I only want to point out a few key aspects of Moltmann’s theology of creation 
that are relevant to his understanding of inoperativity. 
Turning to Moltmann’s classic work God in Creation, we find the following striking 
observation: “It is impossible to understand the world properly as creation without a proper 
discernment of the Sabbath.”17 Moltmann bases this statement on the fact that in the Biblical 
 
 
16 Catherine Keller argues that Moltmann’s eschatology features a vision of sovereignty that draws its very 
source from God, meaning that God is not merely the model, but in effect the actual actor behind human sovereignty 
in the renewed earth. See Catherine Keller, “The Last Laugh: A Counter-Apocalyptic Meditation on Moltmann’s 
Coming of God,” Theology Today 54, no. 3 (1997): 381-391.  
 




account of creation in Genesis, God performs the work of creation “for the sake of the 
Sabbath.”18 Sabbath is not an appendix to creation, or merely a symbol of creation. It is the 
future or telos of creation. The world exists for the purpose of Sabbath-keeping. 
Moltmann argues that this concept of Sabbath in the creation texts portrays a vision of the 
God-world relationship that is much different from that of most modern theology. Because 
theologians and preachers have focused on the six days of creation and have neglected the 
seventh day, God has been viewed “as the one who in his essential being is solely ‘the creative 
God’ as Paul Tillich says.”19 If human beings are created in the image of this kind of God, then it 
follows that human beings are true to themselves only by creating. While Moltmann does not 
deny the value of human work and creativity, he argues that it is a travesty to reduce human 
existence—or the existence of nature at large—to creative production. 
To show why this reductionism is problematic, Moltmann explores the implications of 
God keeping a Sabbath. This unusual theological idea communicates that God comfortably 
abides with and alongside creation, not merely in front of or behind creation.20 Moltmann uses 
these spatial prepositions to convey that God’s Sabbath is a communal rest. Sabbath is not God’s 
escape from creation. Nor is it a result of God’s being weary. It is instead a fulfillment of God’s 
goal to be present in the community of creatures. Moltmann struggles for language to describe 
this intimate process: 
 
 
18 Moltmann, God in Creation, 277. 
 
19 Moltmann, God in Creation, 276. 
 





By ‘resting’ from his creative and formative activity, he allows the beings he has 
created, each in its own way, to act on him. He receives the form and quality their 
lives take, and accepts the effects these lives have. By standing aside from his 
creative influence, he makes himself wholly receptive for the happiness, the 
suffering, and the praise of his creatures. . . The God who rests in the face of his 
creation does not dominate the world on this day: he ‘feels’ the world; he allows 
himself to be affected, to be touched by each of his creatures.21 
 
This language of affectation and feeling connects Sabbath to Moltmann’s doctrine of the Trinity, 
in which God exists as mutual, egalitarian fellowship of Father, Son and Spirit. In the context of 
his theory of the Trinity, Moltmann observes that “fellowship does not subject but allows others 
to be themselves,” implying therefore “openness to one another, sharing with one another and 
respect for one another.”22 Following Karl Rahner, Moltmann dissolves any qualitative 
separation between the immanent Trinity and the economic Trinity, thereby indicating that the 
fellowship of God’s triune existence corresponds to God’s true inner nature.23 The upshot of this 
theological argument is that God’s fellowship existence is also the way God “rules” the world.24 
 
21 Moltmann, God in Creation, 279. 
 
22 Jürgen Moltmann, History and the Triune God: Contributions to Trinitarian Theology, trans. John 
Bowden (London: SCM Press, 1991), 57. 
 
23 On Rahner’s theology of the Trinity see Karl Rahner, The Trinity, trans. Joseph Donceel (New York: 
Herder & Herder, 1970). On Moltmann’s tacit reliance on Rahner see Andrew K. Gabriel, “Beyond the Cross: 
Moltmann’s Crucified God, Rahner’s Rule, and Pneumatological Implications for a Trinitarian Doctrine of God,” 
Didaskalia 19, no. 1 (2008): 93-111. 
 
24 Moltmann is not alone in advocating for this view of God. Catherine Mowry LaCugna, in her 
monumental God for Us: The Trinity and Christian Life (San Francisco: HarperCollins, 1991), has shown that a 
Trinitarian conception of God leads to a revised understanding of hierarchy as well. LaCugna’s work is heavily 
influenced by the Cappadocian Fathers, whose conception of the Trinity as mutual indwelling (perichoresis) seems 
to negate hierarchy. On this see Yves Congar, “La monotheisme politique et la Dieu Trinite,” Nouvelle Revue 
Theologique (1981): 3-17. Her insights also draw upon the work of theologians such as John Zizioulas, whose work 
also presents an understanding of personhood which is inherently relational, rather than static and self-enclosed (see 
John Zizioulas, Being as Communion (Crestwood, NY: St. Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 1985). See also Walter 
Kasper, The God of Jesus Christ (New York: Crossroad, 1984), 290. Other theologians who have made these 
connections include Leonardo Boff, Trinity and Society (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis, 1988); Juan Luis Segundo, Our 
Idea of God (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis, 1974);  Margaret Farley, “New Patterns of Relationship: Beginnings of a Moral 




Given this connection between the Trinity and Sabbath, we might say that for Moltmann, 
Sabbath is a window into the practical meaning of Trinitarian life—non-hierarchical being-with-
others. Although Moltmann himself never connects God’s Sabbath-keeping with a Trinitarian 
concept of God, he confirms this correlation when he asserts that “creation is God’s work, but 
the Sabbath is God’s present existence. His works express God’s will, but the Sabbath manifests 
his Being.”25 In other words, Sabbath is God’s way of being in relation to the world, a way of 
being that is intrinsically relational.26 
This type of inoperativity describes not only God’s being; it also describes God’s future 
for the world. Using language from Franz Rosenzweig, Moltmann affirms that Sabbath is 
simultaneously the “feast of creation” as well as the “feast of redemption.” The Jewish story of 
creation is for Moltmann a “prophetic tradition”—its point is not to recall a mythic legacy or 
provide a scientific account of origins. Instead, it charts a path for the future, awakening hope for 
God’s trajectory in history. As Geiko Müller-Fahrenholz points out, creation theology, for 
Moltmann, is essentially redemption theology.27 The Sabbath rest of God therefore discloses the 
 
(Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1983). Numerous theologians have taken different theological routes to subverting 
hierarchy, for a broad overview see Sally McFague, Models of God: Theology for an Ecological, Nuclear Age 
(Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1987). 
 
25 Moltmann, God in Creation, 280.  
 
26 The idea that God’s being present with human beings is inherently relational and liberative is also central 
to the work of Elizabeth Johnson, who defines the divine name as “I shall be there, as who I am, shall I be there for 
you,” thus conveying that “to be mean to be with and for others, actively and concretely engaged on their behalf” 
See Elizabeth A. Johnson, She Who Is: The Mystery of God in Feminist Theological Discourse (New York: 
Crossroad, 2002), 241. 
 
27 Müller-Fahrenholz calls creation in Moltmann’s thought “God’s messianic project.” See Geiko Müller-
Fahrenholz, The Kingdom and the Power: The Theology of Jürgen Moltmann, trans. John Bowden (London: SCM 





destiny of the world. Moltmann suggests that the redemption of the world will occur as a 
repetition of the Genesis account: 
Heaven and earth, the visible and the invisible, will be created anew, so that they 
may become the cosmic temple in which God can dwell and come to rest. Then 
the presence of God will fill everything, and the powers of chaos and annihilation 
will be driven out of creation. That is the all-pervading cosmic indwelling of God, 
the Shekinah. Towards that indwelling God’s creation Sabbath already pointed. 
The true creation is not behind us but ahead of us.28 
 
On this account, the human celebration of Sabbath is an anticipation of a new world governed by 
a Sabbatical mentality. 
What is this “Sabbatical mentality”? The key to answering this question is to recall that in 
Moltmann’s interpretation, God’s rest on the Sabbath is performed with human beings and the 
natural world. This distinguishes Moltmann’s God from the withdrawn God of deism.29At one 
point, Moltmann points out that his idea of God’s Sabbath keeping has some commonality with 
the deistic notion of a God who creates the world and then retreats into inoperativity.30 This God 
gives space for the world by leaving the world alone. One might assume that a vision of a 
disinterested, withdrawn God would result in a politics of liberty, in which sovereigns would 
allow maximal freedom to their subjects. In many ways, this is precisely what the Enlightenment 
 
28 Moltmann, Ethics of Hope, 129. 
 
29 Of course, it is difficult to say that all deism portrayed God as physically “withdrawn.” Deistic 
theologians tended to place God at a distance from creation, but this did not necessarily imply that they viewed God 
as disinterested or uninvolved. One could argue that deism was an attempt not to describe God’s being, but to 
describe nature without the aid of God, and to describe religion without recourse to the supernatural. In this sense, it 
was a methodology more than a particular doctrine. For an example of this see John Toland’s classical work of deist 
philosophy, Christianity Not Mysterious (New York: Garland Publishing, 1984). Voltaire’s work also shows this 
tendency. See Voltaire, God and Human Beings, trans. Michael Shreve (Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 2010). 
 





deists such as Locke and Jefferson were aiming at.31 Moltmann points out that a detachment 
between sovereign and subject can sometimes lead to exploitation of the latter by the former.32 
Moltmann carefully distinguishes the God of Sabbath from the deistic God. The God of 
Sabbath issues an invitation to the world to participate actively in God’s rest. The Genesis 
creation story thereby affirms the independent integrity and freedom of creation, but also seeks 
to draw it into the peaceful community of divine presence. The God of Sabbath is deeply 
enmeshed with creation, yet is not a coercive force within creation.33 A world governed with a 
Sabbatical mentality, then, is one where sovereignty is externalized (as in Hobbes) but neither 
arbitrary nor coercive (as is definitely not in Hobbes). Sabbath is a sovereign action of divine 
liberation. 
Moltmann finds this liberating dynamic in Jesus’ healings on the Sabbath in the New 
Testament. By healing on the Sabbath, Jesus replicates the divine Sabbath keeping of Genesis by 
giving rest to ill persons. Although Christian interpreters have often depicted Jesus as offering a 
“higher ethic of love” that eliminated or subordinated the Sabbath command, Moltmann notes 
 
31 On Locke’s views on religion and liberty see John Locke, Writings on Religion, ed. Victor Nuovo (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2002). Critical overviews on Locke’s perspective on the relationship between deism 
and human freedom can be found in John Marshall, John Locke: Resistance, Religion and Responsibility 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994) as well as in James M. Byrne, Religion and the Enlightenment: 
From Descartes to Kant (Louisville: Westminster John Knox Press, 1997). On Jefferson’s views on deism and 
religious freedom see Henry Wilder Foote, The Religion of Thomas Jefferson (Boston: Beacon Press, 1963) and also 
Susan Jacoby, Freethinkers: A History of American Secularism (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2004), 43-46. See 
also Michael O’Brien, “The American Experience of Secularisation,” in Religion and the Political Imagination, ed. 
Ira Katznelson and Gareth Stedman Jones (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 132-149. 
 
32 Moltmann shows how this relates to ecological concerns in God for a Secular Society, 76. 
 
33 This, according to Poul Guttesen, is the hallmark of the “regime change” depicted in Moltmann’s vision 
of the new earth and also the central focus of the book of Revelation. See Poul F. Guttesen, Leaning into the Future: 
The Kingdom of God in the Theology of Jürgen Moltmann and the Book of Revelation (Eugene, OR: Pickwick 





that Jewish rabbinic tradition agreed with Jesus that the “Sabbath was made for man, not man for 
the Sabbath.”34 On this view, Sabbath and the love ethic are not opposed, but complimentary. 
Sabbath exists to liberate human beings from material constraints that suppress life. Because 
both Jesus and most Jewish traditions hold this point, Moltmann argues that Jesus’ Sabbath 
conflicts reflect an intra-Jewish interpretive situation, rather than a Christian-versus-Jewish 
situation. 
However, this does not mean that Jesus’ Sabbath observance contributes nothing new to 
an understanding of inoperativity. According to Moltmann, what Jesus proclaims through his 
Sabbath behavior is not “a higher ethic” but “the imminent kingdom of God, whose unparalleled 
closeness he authenticates through the signs of the messianic age.”35 Moltmann cites Matthew 
10:7-8, according to which Jesus introduced this messianic age with particular actions: “The 
blind receive their sight, and the lame walk, the deaf hear, and the dead are raised up, and the 
poor have the kingdom promised to them.”36 By doing these actions on the Sabbath, Jesus takes 
the future-pointing trajectory of the Sabbath and brings it to completion. Thus, according to 
Moltmann, “Jesus never ‘transgressed’ the Sabbath commandment, and he certainly never made 
it ‘a matter of indifference.’”37 What Jesus did do was take Sabbath a step further than some of 
his contemporaries—he began to keep it as an anticipation of the kingdom of God, in which 
everything in the world would be put right, including blind eyes and crippled spines. This is 
 
34 See Moltmann, God in Creation, 291. 
 
35 Moltmann, God in Creation, 291. 
 
36Cited in Moltmann, God in Creation, 291. 
 





liberative inoperativity, because it is a herald of the kingdom which draws all nations into its 
jurisdiction, and is relevant to both Jews and Gentiles.38 
Political Implications 
Once one realizes the significance of Sabbath in Moltmann’s theology, it becomes easy to 
find reverberations of Sabbatical logic in other places in his work. In the context of political 
theology, Moltmann’s vision of Sabbath as a depiction of the future world holds a direct 
connection to ethics, especially the area of human rights. 
Moltmann’s interest in human rights might seem odd for someone so focused on 
eschatology. Rights-talk is usually associated with an emphasis on origins, because rights are 
often grounded in on accounts of societal development—even if they are intentionally mythical, 
such as Hobbes’ pre-Leviathan world, Rousseau’s world of the noble savage, or Rawls’ proto-
historical “original position.”39 However, because Moltmann employs an anticipative 
 
38 Moltmann seems to waffle between allowing for a Gentile “liberty towards the law” reflected in the 
Sabbath behavior of Jesus, and an opposite affirmation of the law revealed in that same behavior. Ultimately, I think 
he sides with the latter view, according to which Jesus was expanding and uplifting the Sabbath law. This is 
especially clear in the following paragraph: “Jesus preached no Gentile Christian freedom from the Sabbath. What 
he proclaimed was the messianic fulfillment of the Israelite ‘dream of completion.’ He did not profane the law and 
the cult. He did not abolish the Sabbath in favour of good works and good working days. On the contrary, he raised 
working days into the messianic festivity of life, of which Israel’s Sabbath is a unique foretaste. Jesus’ proclamation 
of the imminent kingdom makes the whole of life a Sabbath feast” (Moltmann, God in Creation, 292). 
 
39 For a critical examination of how an account of origins plays a role in Hobbes’ understanding of rights 
see Norberto Bobbio, Thomas Hobbes and the Natural Law Tradition, trans. Daniela Gobetti (Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press, 1993). On Rousseau’s understanding of rights see Jean-Jacques Rousseau, The Social Contract, 
trans. Maurice Cranston (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1968). On the “original position” see John Rawls, A Theory of 
Justice (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 1971). It is significant that for both liberal neo-Kantian views on rights, as 
well as for natural law views, theories of origins take on a prominent function. On the connection between human 
rights and natural origins in the natural law context see Michael Zuckert, The Natural Rights Republic: Studies in the 
Foundation of the American Political Tradition (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1996); Otto Gierke, 
Natural Law and the Theory of Society: 1500 to 1800, trans. Ernest Barker (Boston: Beacon Press, 1957).  For an 
overview of natural rights theories and their various foundations see Leo Strauss, Natural Right and History 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953) as well as Richard Tuck, Natural Rights Theories: Their Origin and 





eschatology, rather than simply a laissez-faire expectation of future change, what he says about 
the future also pertains to the roles and responsibilities of human beings now. This approach is 
parallel in many ways to a natural law ethic, only instead of “acting in accordance with their 
nature” human beings must “act in accordance with their future.” However, Moltmann insists 
that the future of human beings is also their true nature, because “the image of God is their real 
future.”40 
Because human beings are destined for perfect correlation to the image of God, they 
possess inherent and inalienable dignity. The image of God is therefore the ground of human 
rights. This is a common theological argument.41 Moltmann, however, revises it dramatically by 
pointing out that the image of God is not an aspect of inherent human nature, nor is it a 
mysterious future reality that was lost during the fall and awaits restoration. Rather, “the image 
of God is human beings in all their relationships in life.”42 Ton van Prooijen argues that 
Moltmann’s depiction of God’s resting has expansive implications in Genesis 2:1-3: “God also 
rests in his creation.”43 In other words, the image of divine rest is a functional depiction of God’s 
 
40 Jürgen Moltmann, On Human Dignity: Political Theology and Ethics, trans. M. Douglas Meeks 
(Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1984), 22. 
 
41 See, for example, Christopher J.H. Wright, Human Rights: A Study in Biblical Themes (Bramcote: Grove 
Books, 1979); Paul Marshall, Human Rights Theories in Christian Perspective (Toronto: Institute for Christian 
Studies, 1983); James M. Gustafson, Ethics from a Theocentric Perspective, vol. 1 (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1981); Richard Harries, “Human Rights in Theological Perspective,” in Human Rights for the 1990’s: Legal, 
Political, and Ethical Issues, ed. Robert Blackburn and John Taylor (New York: Mansell, 1991); John Warwick 
Montgomery, Human Rights and Human Dignity (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1986); and David Hollenbach, Justice, 
Peace, and Human Rights: American Catholic Social Ethics in a Pluralistic World (New York: Crossroad, 1988).  
 
42 Moltmann, On Human Dignity, 23. 
 
43 Ton van Prooijen, Limping but Blessed: Jürgen Moltmann’s Search for a Liberating Anthropology 





action in the world. The image of God means that human beings “are persons before God and as 
such capable of acting on God’s behalf and responsible to him.”44 Therefore, rest or inoperativity 
is integral to understanding how a human being exists as imago Dei. If denied rest, the human 
being is denied a fundamental aspect of the image of God, and is therefore denied a fundamental 
right. 
For Moltmann, this means that human beings must not only be inoperative at times, but 
that rest must also become part of work. This point becomes clear in Moltmann’s discussion of 
“the right to meaningful work.” In his work On Human Dignity, this right is the first concrete 
human right he analyzes. Such privileging of labor-ethics initially appears odd, because most 
books on human rights begin with “the right to life” or “the right to avoid bodily harm.”45 
Moltmann certainly values these rights, but his account focuses on work because—as shown 
above—rights are grounded in the human enactment of the image of God, which is a functional 
image. In order for human beings to manifest God’s image, they must be given the opportunity to 
act meaningfully (of course, a perceptive logician would immediately recognize that this 
presumes the rights to life and evasion of bodily harm—but those points would go without 
saying). 
 
44 Moltmann, On Human Dignity, 23. 
 
45 The epitomic example of this is the United Nations General Assembly’s Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, which begins with the rights to life, liberty and the security of persons. For an overview see William A. 
Edmundson, An Introduction to Rights (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 105-107. Other examples 
of theoretical works that downplay the right to meaningful work include Tibor R. Machan, Individuals and Their 
Rights (LaSalle, Il: Open Court, 1989) and Loren Lomasky, Persons, Rights, and the Moral Community (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1987). For surveys of different theoretical approaches to specific human rights see Michael 
Freeman, Human Rights (Cambridge: Polity, 2004) and Jack Donnelly, Universal Human Rights in Theory and 





What is “meaningful work”? Moltmann points out that much work is done simply for the 
sake of survival, to gather sustenance and construct shelter. Moltmann notes that it is possible to 
construe such work as neither fulfilling in itself, nor a particularly “creative” act—it simply 
continues biological processes. Especially in ancient times, human existence had to be “wrested” 
from a hostile environment, and as Moltmann puts it, “this struggle itself was not true life but 
only its precondition.”46 In many ancient cultures, this was the only definition of “work” 
available. Consequently, work was devalued, and those who did not have to work (such as rulers 
or elite classes) would intentionally avoid degrading themselves in “common labor.” Work was 
base, but rest was divine. 
Moltmann points out that the Christian (and Jewish) Scriptures do not accept this 
paradigm. In Genesis, God’s creative activity does not reduce God’s position in the hierarchy of 
the cosmos, or make God less virtuous. Rather, God’s glorious identity is rooted in God’s 
willingness to work for human liberation.47 God’s work is noble, and human beings should 
model God in their work. However, for Moltman, God’s work can only be properly understood 
as virtuous when linked with God’s rest. This is because godly work is participation in the innate 
goodness of created being—goodness that can only be appreciated from the vantage point of rest. 
In this way, rest redefines the concept of “meaningful work”: 
Work is thus meaningful not because it alone provides the meaning of life, but 
precisely because it is limited by the goal of rest and joy in existence. The 
Sabbath does not simply interrupt work. Rather, work is understood and defined 
through the Sabbath. There is more to this ordered relationship of work days and 
 
46 Moltmann, On Human Dignity, 38. 
 
47 Per Moltmann: “Certainly, Yahweh is no subordinated worker-god. Rather, he is the slave-freeing God, 





holidays than just mutual boundaries. Work day and Sabbath lie also on the same 
temporal level. They concern the same people. They are not divided between 
human beings and gods or between slave and free. Therefore, they also overflow 
into each other and affect each other.48 
 
God does not produce for the sake of production. God creates because God wishes to take joy in 
God’s creation. It is this joy that brings purpose and vitality to work, and without it work would 
be nihilistic endeavor, no matter how materially productive it might be. For this reason, as 
Darrell Cosden notes, Moltmann’s theology of work is deeply opposed to utilitarian 
reductionism.49 
Because God’s creation-work forms the model for human work, Sabbath also stands as 
the criterion for dignified human labor. It is not that human beings must have a Sabbath so that 
they can go back to productivity more effectively. Rather, work exists to make Sabbath more 
effective. Moltmann’s logic leads to an important ethical conclusion: “Therefore human work 
cannot consist only in acting for purpose and usefulness. It must also encompass freedom for 
self-presentation and thus playfulness.”50 In other words, human work must be Sabbatical as well 
as materially fruitful. As Cosden puts it, Moltman offers “a picture of work seasoned with the 
Sabbath; that is, a dynamic combination of the producing and presenting aspects of work.”51 
 
48 Moltmann, On Human Dignity, 41. 
 
49 See Darrell Cosden, A Theology of Work: Work and the New Creation (Milton Keynes, UK: Paternoster, 
2004), 58-61. Cosden criticizes Moltmann’s anti-utilitarian perspective on work because it appears to leave aside the 
meaningful experiences human beings find in working for their own survival. Such work is “forced” in a sense, but 
it appears to be qualitatively different from labor that is forced by arbitrary rulers. 
 
50 Moltmann, On Human Dignity, 41. 
 





Work, Moltmann says, should have “not only production value but also existence value.”52 
Workers who absorb themselves in their own creative existence may find pleasure in their work, 
but if this work is incompatible with a sense of purpose for life as a whole (not merely the 
working parts), it is inhumane. 
What does a truly meaningful, Sabbatical type of work look like? Obviously, such work 
must have purpose and constructive creativity. But beyond those basic criteria, according to 
Moltmann, such work must be free, because any type of work that a person is forced to do could 
not allow that person to model God’s free creation. No one, on this account, should be forced to 
work.53 The implications of this concept for service industries and forms of unpleasant labor 
(garbage collecting, sewage maintenance, etc.) would rattle the senses of most Western 
capitalists. Such societies take it for granted that people will not do sweaty, exhausting, or dirty 
types of work unless they are provoked by economic necessity. Although slavery is de jure 
banned in Western societies, these societies maintain many basic functions via circumstantially-
forced labor, which is perhaps formally but not materially different from slavery.  
A Sabbatical perspective on work would also mean forming communities in which 
productivity and work-success do not create hierarchy, as Meeks has pointed out.54 Such 
 
52 Moltmann, On Human Dignity, 41. 
 
53Moltmann says: “No one has to justify himself through work. No one has to demonstrate her right to 
existence through work! No one has to realize himself through work. Were that true, then the unemployed would 
have no rights and the handicapped no reality. Only if this dehumanizing inward or outward compulsion to work is 
removed can there be a right to work for every person according to his or her abilities” (Moltmann, On Human 
Dignity, 54). 
 
54 M. Douglas Meeks, “The Future of Theology in a Commodity Society,” in The Future of Theology: 






communities would counteract the tendency of production to create sovereign control. Of course, 
the extent to which they could impact the overall nature of sovereignty in a capitalist world 
remains open to investigation. 
Summary 
Moltmann’s theological reading of Sabbath-texts offers a view of inoperativity that 
reframes the person’s relationship to sovereign governance. Inoperativity, for Moltmann, 
represents the form of God’s sovereignty over history. On his account, inoperativity provides an 
eschatological key to understanding the future of the world, as well as a tool for bringing that 
world into the present. In anticipation of that world, Christians live in a Sabbatical way, and 
participate in politics and culture in which Sabbath is the aim. This leads to a politics of giving 
rest to human beings. The practical result, as I have briefly shown, is a different theological 
anthropology—one that impacts the politics of labor. 
Moltmann’s work suggests that rituals of inoperativity can entirely reorient 
understandings of the person, altering typical conceptions of the person’s relationship to time. 
This anthropology is not only found in Christian texts. Similar concepts are also drawn from 
texts in the Jewish tradition by a thinker who—although he never engages Moltmann’s work—
authors remarkably parallel insights. 
Abraham Joshua Heschel 
Writing to Jewish communities in the Western world (principally in America), Heschel 
seeks to present a religious philosophy that addresses the complexity of Jewish life in this 
diverse and ethically-ambiguous world. A significant part of Heschel’s religious philosophy 




draws on the Hebrew Bible in his exploration of Sabbath. However, he also uses sources from 
Jewish midrash, rabbinical commentary, and other popular textual traditions. In what follows I 
will give a brief account of Heschel’s theological method, followed by an explanation of how 
Heschel understands the significance of Sabbatical inoperativity in the context of religious texts. 
Then, I will show how this understanding politically influences his anthropology.  
Method 
Heschel’s approach to Jewish tradition focuses on applying the philosophical meaning of 
ancient texts to modern life.55 Specifically, Heschel aims to identify ways in which Jewish 
sources speak to questions about the human person.56 Like Moltmann, therefore, Heschel 
employs a hermeneutic aimed at creating a practical anthropology. This point is essential for 
understanding how Heschel’s understands the meaning of inoperativity. Heschel draws from 
biblical and other textual traditions in order to articulate a view of inoperativity which is 
simultaneously a view of human nature.  
Heschel’s understanding of inoperativity is found mainly in his book The Sabbath: Its 
Meaning for Modern Man.57 Despite its small size, this book holds mammoth status among 
modern theologies of Sabbath. Part of its uniqueness stems from its creative straddling of genres. 
 
55 According to Sherwin, one of the hallmarks of Heschel’s work is his “continuing effort to emphasize the 
meaningfulness of Judaism’s message for modern man” demonstrated in his work on the Sabbath and Jewish prayer. 
See Byron L. Sherwin, Abraham Joshua Heschel (Atlanta: John Knox Press, 1979) 2-3. For Heschel’s work on 
prayer see Abraham Joshua Heschel, Man’s Quest for God: Studies in Prayer and Symbolism (New York: Scribner, 
1954). 
 
56 As Shai Held points out, “the elemental link between the nature of the God we believe in and the vision 
of the good life we espouse is critical for understanding Heschel’s project as a writer and thinker.” Shai Held, 
Abraham Joshua Heschel: The Call of Transcendence (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2013), 7. 
 






It is equal parts poem, philosophical treatise, midrashic interpretation, and theological 
exhortation. But what makes it worth attending to most of all is its attempt to place Sabbath 
squarely in the realm human self-understanding. Heschel does not argue for Sabbath-keeping as 
a response to divine command, although he does not oppose such purely religious approaches to 
Sabbath. Instead, he begins by interrogating human existence, exploring the complex relation 
between space and time in human life. His goal is to show how Sabbath connects to the lived 
reality of all persons, not just Jews (or Sabbatarian Christians). Specifically, Heschel connects 
Sabbath to human life under the sovereign hegemony of American capitalism. 
Heschel’s understanding of the Sabbath pivots on the idea of an economic relationship 
between time and space. As he states at the beginning of The Sabbath, “In technical civilization 
we expend time to gain space.”58 Human beings, he argues, inhabit both time and space, but in 
the development of technical civilization we have placed primary value on space as the 
dimension of ultimate value. Time, rather than being appreciated for itself, is subjected to the 
purpose of space-mastery. In this way, human beings create a deep existential discordance: “Life 
goes wrong when the control of space, the acquisition of things of space, becomes our sole 
concern.”59 
According to Heschel, this discordance has reached a point where human beings have lost 
an awareness of time altogether. Through our emphasis on the realm of space, through our 
building projects, artworks, bodily enhancements, and even literary pursuits, we have created a 
 
58 Heschel, The Sabbath, 3. 
 





culture in which nothing matters without a spatial dimension. When time passes without a spatial 
accomplishment, we call this “time wasted,” because time’s only value is in service to space. 
Heschel calls this paradigm “thinginess.”60 Thinginess signifies the sense that time is merely the 
“shell” in which things exist, and thus is “unvaried, iterative, homogeneous.”61 Through our all-
encompassing thinginess we who live in western contexts have—quite literally—lost track of 
time. 
In contrast to the space-obsessed Western world, Heschel claims that the “Bible is more 
concerned with time than with space.”62 Heschel demonstrates this by referencing the Jewish 
yearly festivals and feast days, which commemorate spatial events (the Exodus from Egypt, for 
example), but do so by “hallowing” the specific times in which those events occurred.63 The 
Sabbath is the pinnacle of the various Biblical time-celebrations, not only because it occurs 
weekly, but also because it celebrates creation (“remember the Sabbath day to keep it holy . . . 
for in six days the Lord created heaven and earth . . .”). Thus, to the extent that the day 
“commemorates” something, it is existence itself, or rather “being as such” that is 
commemorated. “It is a day on which we are called to turn from the results of creation to the 
mystery of creation; from the world of creation to the creation of the world.”64 In his imperative 
 
60 “The result of our thinginess is our blindness to all reality that fails to identify itself as a thing, as a 
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to recall time as the commemoration of creation, Heschel seems to echo Martin Heidegger’s 
allegation that western philosophy has largely forgotten the significance of Being (in contrast to 
beings).65 This parallel is significant, for although Heidegger argues that our obsession with the 
technical mastery of beings has drawn us away from the profound significance of Being as 
such,66 he offers no practical corrective to this modern tendency. Heschel’s concept of the 
Sabbath could very well be the practical solution to Heidegger’s philosophical problem—
namely, that through the sacred time of Sabbath we come to truly understand Being. 
Heschel’s understanding of the Sabbath as the antithesis of Western culture’s apotheosis 
of space is not merely philosophically important. At several points, Heschel asserts that our 
infatuation with space not only confuses our understanding of the world, but also dominates and 
oppresses our lives, for “six days a week we live under the tyranny of things of space.”67 We are 
“captivated”—literally held captive—by the world of space, to the point where time frightens us. 
“Most of us seem to labor for the things of space. As a result we suffer from a deeply rooted 
dread of time and stand aghast when compelled to look into its face.”68 The perverse dynamic 
Heschel describes here is reminiscent of traumatic bonding—the infamous “Stockholm 
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Syndrome”—in which hostages become devoted to their captor. Western culture refuses to 
recognize that time is not the problem; it is the thinginess which perversely dominates our time 
that creates our angst. Heschel therefore argues that a life dominated by things is fundamentally 
inauthentic: “Things, when magnified, are forgeries of happiness, they are a threat to our very 
lives; we are more harassed than supported by the Frankensteins of spatial things.”69 
These “Frankensteins” hold power over us because we have turned them into idols, as 
Ken Koltun-Fromm argues in his reading of Heschel.70 According to Koltun-Fromm, the 
domination of “thinginess” distorts properly functioning human vision, forcing us to impute 
divinity to the spatial realm, and thereby legitimizing its totalitarianism. This distortion can be 
rightly labeled idolatry, because “idolatry arises from seeing divinity in physical things. The 
primitive gaze, as a mode of gaining technical control of space, stops at the object, as it were, 
and discovers God therein.”71 Koltun-Fromm argues further that Heschel’s work on the Sabbath 
must be seen as a critique of the latent idolatries of American Judaism, which experienced 
remarkable material advancement in the 1950’s.72 In Heschel’s perspective, Jewish Americans at 
this time were in danger of losing their spiritual foundations by installing property and currency 
as their paradigm for meaning. The Sabbath would stand as a guard against this subtle divinizing 
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70 Ken Koltun-Fromm, “Vision and Authenticity in Heschel’s The Sabbath,” Modern Judaism 31, no. 2 
(May 2011): 142-154. 
 
71 Koltun-Fromm, “Vision and Authenticity,” 145. 
 
72 “Jews could certainly enjoy the fruits of American capitalism, democracy, and geographical security, but 
they were to live among this material wealth as they searched for spiritual meaning in time. Heschel seeks to deflect 
an ‘enslavement to things’ that seduces Jews into desiring only physical delights, which blinds them to the ineffable 





of spatial reality—a seductive temptation to well-off Americans. The Sabbath would restore true 
spiritual vision by pointing through spatial reality to the ultimate significance of things.  
Heschel’s Understanding of Inoperativity 
Sabbatical inoperativity, in Heschel’s view, saves human beings from the tyranny of 
space by transforming our perspective on human nature. This seems like a lot to ask of a simple 
day-off work. Heschel is fully aware that institutions of regular rest from labor are not foreign to 
any culture, not even the blitzing business world of capitalist America. We must rest, or sacrifice 
our long-term productivity. Hence, we have company retreats, summer vacations, and bean-bags 
at Silicon-valley business headquarters. In this quotidian sense, therefore, one might say that 
nearly every healthy American practices Sabbath in some form. Heschel notes that Philo 
defended the Sabbath against its Roman detractors (who used it to inveigh against supposed 
Jewish indolence), by appealing to this utilitarian aspect of Sabbath. Philo argued that “a 
breathing spell enables not merely ordinary people, but athletes also, to collect their strength with 
a stronger force behind them to undertake promptly and patiently each of the tasks set before 
them.”73 Under this paradigm, in which the Sabbath is simply a weekly “breather,” Heschel’s 
lofty interpretation of the Sabbath seems unduly flamboyant. 
Heschel responds to Philo’s trivializing apologetic for the Sabbath by pointing out that 
for Philo, “Sabbath is represented not in the spirit of the Bible but in the spirit of Aristotle.”74 
Leisure taken for the sole purpose of enhancing labor is not wrong or unnecessary, but it is not 
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Sabbatical at all in Heschel’s sense. The Bible and Jewish tradition, Heschel argues, depict the 
Sabbath not as a means to an end (further work), but as an end in itself. “Man is not a beast of 
burden, and the Sabbath is not for the purpose of enhancing the efficiency of his work,” Heschel 
asserts.75 Appealing to the biblical creation story in which the Sabbath concludes creation, 
Heschel argues that metaphorically and literally, the Sabbath is the “end” of creation.76 This is a 
point similar to Moltmann’s. Work serves to make way for rest; not the other way around. 
However, Heschel goes further than Moltmann: For the former, not merely work but all of time 
and even reality itself exists for the sake of Sabbath. In Heschel’s succinct words: “The Sabbath 
is not for the sake of the weekdays; the weekdays are for the sake of Sabbath.”77 
For a culture trapped in the domination of spatial things, this concept of Sabbath seems 
frustratingly backward, even nihilistic. How can activity (which is the only category of “the real” 
in a capitalist society) exist for the purpose of non-activity? Heschel’s answer is that the Sabbath 
is not the cessation of activity, but activity in a different mode; it is a celebratory construct; a 
“palace in time which we build.”78 We cease from spatial labor on the Sabbath because such 
labor is not the ultimate telos of human beings. The Sabbath thus asserts (or rather, assumes) that 
human beings are eternal in nature and that there is a “beyond” which human beings must 
experience and celebrate. Heschel’s understanding of the Sabbath thus seems to imply that 
although a human being could work endlessly in the spatial realm without Sabbath, such a person 
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would not attain the fullness of what it is to be human; she or he would lack “the climax of 
living.”79 Just as a queen does not receive her highest sovereignty until she moves into her 
palace, so human beings do not attain their full potential until they enjoy the Sabbath. 
Because the Sabbath is where we encounter our ultimate purpose as eternal beings, 
Heschel notes that the goal of the Sabbath must permeate all of life. Throughout his book, he 
recounts the rabbinic tradition of “love for the Sabbath,” anthropomorphizing it as a bride and a 
queen, or even a king, which is long awaited and welcomed with jubilance.80 Such metaphorical 
improvisation is possible because the Sabbath cannot be seen as a parenthetical block of time, 
but as a venue for participating in humanity’s eternal being. Heschel explains, “To name it 
queen, to call it bride is merely to allude to the fact that its spirit is a reality we meet rather than 
an empty span of time which we choose to set aside for comfort or recuperation.”81 The custom 
of vigorous preparation for the arrival of Sabbath, of cleaning the house, cooking exorbitant 
meals, and dressing festively on Friday evenings (all practices still common in some Jewish and 
Seventh-day Adventist communities), reflects Heschel’s notion of the Sabbath as an exalted 
guest, or even a messenger or representative of the divine. 
To welcome this divine guest, or to construct this “palace in time,” seems therefore to do 
more than exercise a religious ritual (if a “religious ritual” is defined as a means to a religious 
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experience of some sort, the likes of which may vary between religions and cultures).82 
Heschel’s framework indicates that the Sabbath is indispensible for all human fulfillment. It is 
not a culturally or religiously localized practice, as if it were merely “for the Jews” or “for the 
Christians”—it is the condition of the possibility of full humanity for everyone. As Morton 
Fierman observes, in his work on the Sabbath Heschel “has introduced to us a veritable 
prescription for living, an itinerary for life, indeed a spiritual map for humanity.”83 For Heschel, 
then, the biblical traditions of Sabbath thus present a theological anthropology—a way human 
beings are supposed to be in the world. 
Thus far, Heschel seems to idealize anthropological concepts that Moltmann also uses. 
Human being should not exist as pure producers (homo faber), but should exist as persons for 
whom production exists. However, Heschel takes the anthropological significance of 
inoperativity even further by defining elements that suggest ways in which human beings are 
supposed to exist as inoperative sovereigns. This is clear in several places in Heschel’s work. 
One of the most revealing is Heschel’s discussion of the Friday evening service called kabbalat 
Shabbat. Heschel introduces this service with a striking claim: “The Sabbath is the presence of 
God in the world, open to the soul of man.”84 The Friday evening service, then, is the moment 
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when God’s presence enters the world. However, Heschel points out that the term kabbalat 
Shabbat has two meanings: 
The term kabbalah denotes the act of taking an obligation upon oneself. The term 
in this sense has the connotation of strictness and restraint. Yet kabbalah in its 
verbal form means also: to receive, to welcome, to greet. In the first meaning it is 
applied to a law; in the second, to a person. The question arises, in what meaning 
is the word kabbalah used when applied to the word Shabbat?85 
 
Heschel is here interrogating the very essence of Sabbath, which is also the essence of 
God.86 Because the Sabbath is divine presence, to understand what happens in the kabbalat 
Shabbat is to understand the nature of divine presence. So, then, is it a legal entity or a 
personal/spiritual entity? Heschel is clear: 
The answer is, it means both; it has both a legal and a spiritual meaning; they are 
inseparable from one another. The distinction of the Sabbath is reflected in the 
twin meanings of the phrase kabbalat Shabbat which means to accept the 
sovereignty as well as to welcome the presence of the day. The Sabbath is a queen 
as well as a bride.87 
 
The Sabbath is legal, represented by the ruling sovereign or queen. At the same time, it is a 
bride—a personal presence. Here Heschel makes seismic theo-political claim: The Sabbath-
keeper experiences God as a sovereign and as spouse. Perhaps one could collapse these two 
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images into a concept of bridal sovereignty. The Sabbath keeper accepts God’s sovereignty in 
the same way as one would accept the intimacy of a romantic partner. 
This intimate quality of divine sovereignty is Sabbatical inoperativity. If, according to 
Heschel’s analysis, the Sabbath is the day in which the eternal mode of existence prevails, and 
God is enthroned in the palace of time, the dynamics of Sabbath reveal the nature of divine 
sovereignty in an unparalleled way. God’s sovereign authority is typically grounded in both her 
creation and sustaining of the world; thus, Heschel argues that the Sabbath is the means by which 
God performs this sustaining task: “In the language of the Bible the world was brought into 
being in the six days of creation, yet its survival depends upon the holiness of the seventh day. 
Great are the laws that govern the processes of nature. Yet without holiness there would be 
neither greatness nor nature.”88 Keep in mind that this is the holiness in which God does nothing. 
The dynamics of control and production are not at play. God simply exists with creatures in the 
mode of bridal companionship, and this is the nature of her sovereignty. Following the same 
logic, then, we could say that human beings are only truly sovereign over each other or over the 
world when they exist Sabbatically, in a state of inoperativity. Mutual companionship or “being-
with” becomes the image that defines human sovereignty. 
What does this sovereignty look like? Heschel’s bridal sovereignty image strongly 
emphasizes the concept of reciprocity. He uses a midrash featuring Rabbi Shimeon ben Yohai to 
make this point. The rabbi observed that the first six days of creation are an even number; they 
match each other in three neat pairs. Only the seventh day is left alone. Hence, “After the work 
 





of creation was completed, the Seventh day pleaded: Master of the universe, all that Thou has 
created is in couples; to every day of the week Thou gavest a mate; only I was left alone. And 
God answered: The Community of Israel will be your mate.”89 Although it is certainly proper to 
speak of Israel needing the Sabbath, Heschel argues it is more primary to speak of the Sabbath 
needing Israel. 
With all its grandeur, the Sabbath is not sufficient unto itself. Its spiritual reality 
calls for companionship of man. There is a great longing in the world. The six 
days stand in need of space; the seventh day stands in need of man. It is not good 
that the spirit should be alone, so Israel was destined to be a helpmeet for the 
Sabbath.90 
 
The idea that Sabbath needs humanity should be read in the light of one of Heschel’s main 
overarching theological themes: God needs and craves humanity as well.91 This is not a 
dominating craving, but a craving for human liberation. The Sabbath is thus a moment of divine-
human reciprocity.92 Once again, this same logic must apply to human beings. We are only 
sovereign when we exist with others in reciprocal, mutual relationships, in which we desire the 
liberation of others. 
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This idea that God exercises Sabbatical sovereignty by desiring human liberation 
connects with one of Heschel’s main practical points about the effects of Sabbath on human 
nature: it counteracts the oppressive effects of coveting. Reflecting on the Decalogue, one might 
notice a disjunction between the Sabbath command and the later command to refrain from 
coveting. Israel is told to “keep” the Sabbath day holy. Keeping, or guarding, suggests covetous 
desire. But then, Israel is told, “you shall not covet.” In true rabbinic fashion, Heschel claims that 
“we must seek to find a relation between the two ‘commandments.’”93 The interpretive synthesis 
he presents is stunning. The Decalogue’s injunction against coveting pertains to things of space: 
the text says “you shall not covet” your neighbor’s house, wife, servant, livestock or “anything” 
belonging to the neighbor. However, the command itself seems pointless on its own, for “we 
know that passion cannot be vanquished by decree.”94 Desires cannot be negated by will. 
Heschel points out that “the tenth injunction would, therefore, be practically futile, were 
it not for the ‘commandment’ regarding the Sabbath day to which about a third of the text of the 
Decalogue is devoted, and with is an epitome of all other commandments.”95 Desires cannot be 
negated; they can only be ousted from the psyche by other desires. The Sabbath command 
provides the means by which the coveting command is to be executed, because it directs 
covetous desire to time rather than space. Heschel writes: 
Judaism tries to foster the vision of life as a pilgrimage to the seventh day; the 
longing for the Sabbath all days of the week which is a form of longing for the 
eternal Sabbath all the days of our lives. It seeks to displace the coveting of things 
 
93 Heschel, The Sabbath, 90. 
 
94 Heschel, The Sabbath, 90. 
 





in space for coveting the things in time, teaching man to covet the seventh day all 
days of the week. God himself coveted that day, He called it Hemdat Yamim, a 
day to be coveted. It is as if the command: Do not covet things of space, were 
correlated with the unspoken word: Do covet things of time.”96 
 
Why is coveting space problematic, but coveting time is not? As I have shown, space for Heschel 
is the realm of control and domination. Spatial entities control us, and we seek to control them in 
return. In our modern era we own technology, but we know that our technology also owns us. 
Covetousness of space is always connected to a drive for conquest and sovereignty—a nation 
seeks to preserve its sovereignty over land in order to prevent outsiders from using that land, or 
to manipulate the inhabitants of the land for particular purposes.  
But covetousness of time is categorically different. To see why, consider the moral 
difference between the propositions, I need you and I need time with you. The first proposition is 
compatible with a variety of meanings, some of them potentially dominating (imagine a boss 
saying, “I need you . . . to do something for me”). The second proposition suggests a much 
different attitude. Presumably the speaker wants to elicit a response from the listener, perhaps to 
do something concrete such as take a walk by the lake or go on a shared vacation. But the key 
feature of the sentence is that it conveys a desire for the listener’s free response. The speaker 
does not want the recipient of the proposition to be forced to spend time. The speaker wishes for 
reciprocity—it is as if the speaker were saying, “I want to spend time with you, time that you 
also want to spend with me.” Of course, it is conceivable that the speaker could, out of 
frustration, seek to acquire the coveted time with the listener through manipulation or outright 
 




coercion. Survivors of sexual harassment know this all too well. But intrinsically, the wish itself 
conveys a craving for mutuality, expressed through the freedom of the other. 
Heschel’s analysis of Sabbatical coveting suggests that this is how sovereign power 
works. If God covets the Sabbath, it is because God desires the freedom of God’s creation. God 
does not want to possess human beings, but to possess time with human beings. This God uses 
space, but does not covet it. This is how, for Heschel, God transcends creation.  
Political Implications 
Heschel’s theology of inoperative sovereignty has powerful implications in a Western 
capitalist world whose entire existence seems predicated on spatial covetousness. Sovereignty in 
this world focuses on matters of material acquisition, and the “state of exception” proclaimed in 
this world always pertains to spatial or material concerns. Thus, although Heschel’s Sabbatical 
understanding of the person may seem to be a theological abstraction, it is not without explicit 
political reverberations.  
One of the central political areas in which Heschel applied his political theology was that 
of racial justice. In the 1950’s and 60’s, Heschel joined the fight for civil rights for African 
Americans, forming a friendship with Martin Luther King, Jr. and speaking openly about the 
“monstrosity” of racial inequality.97 Of course, Heschel’s primary ethical motivation for 
speaking on behalf of desegregation was the moral demand of equality. He argued that all human 
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beings are created in the image of God, and thus deserve equal rights. But Heschel also 
recognized that America’s failure to provide equal rights stemmed from another political-
theological problem: Spatial covetousness. Religious people in America had modeled themselves 
on a deity who made certain spatial claims but seemed oblivious to the realities of injustice in 
history. Against this theology, Heschel argued in his speech on “Religion and Race” that God’s 
creative sovereignty seeks human beings who will create righteousness in the temporal domain:  
Life is clay, and righteousness the mold in which God wants history to be shaped. 
But human beings, instead of fashioning the clay, deform the shape. God needs 
mercy, righteousness; His needs cannot be satisfied in space, by sitting in pews, 
by visiting temples, but in history, in time. It is within the realm of history that 
man is charged with God’s mission.98 
 
Americans, by preserving God’s sovereignty over space, but neglecting God’s concern with 
time, had created an idol useful to white interests. This spatially-covetous God could be confined 
to churches and synagogues and kept away from the struggles for racial justice in the streets of 
Selma or Birmingham. At the same time, such a deity could serve as the perfect model for the 
sovereign white segregationist. After all, the various forms of white racism—red-lining, hyper 
imprisonment of blacks, separate-but-equal schools—were (and are) the results of coveting 
spaces. The deity that was needed to protect these spaces had been euphemistically described by 
pro-segregationist preachers as far back as James Henley Thornwell and Robert Lewis Dabney 
as a “God of order” who monitored the use of these spaces and ensured white domination over 
them.99 Heschel, by contrast, believed in a God concerned with realities realized in history—
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righteousness, mercy, and justice. This God could neither be kept out of certain spaces (as 
apathetic white liberals who refused to assist in the civil rights movement tried to do), nor used 
as the pretext for spatial domination (as white supremacist Christians tried to do). In other words, 
this was the liberating God of Sabbath. 
Another social issue Heschel addressed with a Sabbatical approach was the problem of 
(literal) space-domination. In the late 1960’s Heschel became skeptical of the billions of dollars 
spent on space research. He held no animosity to astronomy as such, and he faulted none of the 
scientists who sought to discover life on Venus or Mars, or stage multiple lunar landings. 
However, he recognized that the political urge for a conquest of space sprang not from mere 
curiosity and desire for wisdom, but from a claim to sovereignty. “We are exploring space,” 
Heschel said, “not so much to seek scientific truths or because we are motivated by ennobling 
philosophic insight, but largely because space exploration has political and military value for the 
state.”100 Heschel noted that the Johnson administration planned to invest more than $5 billion in 
space research, but only $1 billion in the war on poverty.101 This arose from spatial covetousness, 
predicated on a theology of spatial sovereignty that was ultimately idolatrous, creating a type of 
science that had become a deity in itself.102 Heschel’s moral challenge to space research thus 
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arose from a Sabbatical political theology—a vision of sovereignty which promotes not the 
grasping of more space, but the “letting be” of human beings.  
Heschel’s Sabbatical political theology was perhaps most strikingly at play in his 
response to the Vietnam War. Heschel realized that this war emerged from spatial 
covetousness—the poverty and susceptibility to communism in South Vietnam had been 
produced by colonial exploitation.103 Moreover, Heschel observed that the American government 
refused to end the hopeless war in part because of national egoism: “Our government seems to 
recognize the tragic error and futility of the escalation of our involvement but feels that we 
cannot extricate ourselves without public embarrassment of such dimension as to cause damage 
to America’s prestige.”104 In other words, the war was maintained by a particular vision of 
sovereignty—and it was not Sabbatical sovereignty. 
In speaking out against America’s corrupt violent and corrupt approach to sovereignty in 
Vietnam, Heschel at one point directly appealed to the biblical vision of sovereign power, using 
a passage that does not mention Sabbath, but directly displays its underlying logic: 
When President Johnson expressed to veterans his consternation at the fact that so 
many citizens protested against his decisions in Vietnam, in spite of his authority 
as President and the vast amount of information at his disposal, I responded, at the 
request of John Cogley of the The New York Times, that when the Lord was 
considering destroying Sodom and Gomorrah, Abraham did not hesitate to 
challenge the Lord’s judgment and to carry on an argument with Him whether His 
decision was just. Can it be that the Judge of the entire universe would fail to act 
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justly? For all the majesty of the office of the President of the United States, he 
cannot claim greater majesty than God Himself.105 
 
Here the sovereignty of the American government stands in sharp contrast to that of Abraham’s 
God—a deity who acts only for the sake of justice and mercy, not conquest. Notice that 
Heschel’s approach specifically models human sovereignty on its divine counterpart, but not in a 
way that uses the latter as a pretext for magnifying the former. Since God is a sovereign who 
curtails sovereignty by listening to Abraham, President Johnson should also curtail his own 
sovereignty and listen to criticism. Although Heschel does not mention Sabbath in this passage, 
his approach clearly proceeds from a Sabbatical political theology. 
Summary 
Heschel uses Jewish textual traditions to access a profound understanding of 
inoperativity—one that establishes an anthropology that counteracts the tendency for human 
beings to define themselves by spatial acquisition and spatial control. In Heschel’s view, 
Sabbatical inoperativity demonstrates that persons are meant to exist for and with others, as 
agents who exercise sovereignty through letting be. This theological anthropology is grounded in 
a view of God as one who also exercises sovereignty in a Sabbatical mode. God “lets us be” 
not—of course—as one who does not care about us (deism) but as a God who passionately 
desires human freedom.  
The Sabbath textual traditions Heschel employs therefore establish an anthropology that 
opposes the “spatial covetousness” that marks many modern conceptions of the human being. 
Heschel’s own practical work in political activism reveals that his own opposition to spatial 
 




covetousness was the basis for his prophetic critiques of racism, war, and economic injustice. For 
Heschel, this inoperative or Sabbatical mentality is how an authentic concept of political justice 
emerges from Jewish tradition. 
Conclusion 
Together, via their respective interpretations of Christian and Jewish textual resources, 
Moltmann and Heschel offer a powerful theoretical framework for understanding how 
inoperativity can inform political theory. They do so by each contributing elements of an 
inoperative anthropology—a way of viewing the human being that de-centers production and 
spatial acquisition. Because “the personal is political,” alterations in anthropology will also 
change politics in specific in possibly dramatic ways. Moltmann suggests one important way in 
which an inoperative anthropology grounded in biblical texts could influence a political 
paradigm—by changing the way we view labor. For his part, Heschel subtly applies his 
inoperative anthropology to a variety of issues, all of which he views as grounded in an 
anthropology of spatial covetousness. These issues include racial injustice, the U.S. involvement 
in Vietnam, and even the immoral prioritizing of outer-space acquisition at the expense of 
America’s poor. At first glance, Heschel’s political views on these issues may seem to have 
nothing to do with Sabbath or inoperativity. But a close examination reveals that they are deeply 
intertwined. 
Moltmann’s and Heschel’s work hints at a way forward between political paradigms of 
control and subjugation (often expressed as benevolent paternalism) on one hand and apathetic 
laissez-faire approaches on the other. A politics of inoperativity, grounded in a vision of God’s 




themselves and others by working for the sake of being, rather than being for the sake of 
working. Both totalitarian and libertarian political paradigms seek to maximize material output 
as the ultimate aims of society. An inoperative politics, however, rests on an image of humanity 
in which persons exceed these production-oriented criteria. What this means in detail I will 
explain in chapter four. 
There are key differences between Moltmann and Heschel, however; and these 
differences are illuminating. At a basic level, Heschel’s theology of Sabbath is more developed 
because he appeals to textual resources that Moltmann does not use (traditional Jewish sources). 
More importantly, however, there seems to be a massive difference in the way Moltmann and 
Heschel view temporality and the future. Heschel’s work does not appeal to any type of 
eschatology in explaining the significance of Sabbath. Heschel, as I have shown, views Sabbath 
as simply a “temple in time”—a way of seeing eternity in the present (although he does offer 
eschatological hints in his work, these strands of thinking do not play a major role). Moltmann, 
by contrast, centers Sabbath in eschatological time. Yet they arrive at similar views of the 
significance of Sabbath.  
It is almost as if Moltmann moves toward the same view by approaching time from 
different vantage points. Heschel looks at the Sabbath and through it views eternity. Moltmann, 
with his future-oriented perspective, looks at eternity and through it views the Sabbath. Both thus 
end up seeing inoperative time as the way the world should be—a prescription for ethical 
politics. 
The fact that two thinkers who operate with such different hermeneutics can arrive at 




interfaith dialogue on the meaning of inoperativity within Jewish and Christian traditions. One of 
the most glaring differences between Judaism and Christianity has to do with time and 
eschatology. Christianity asserts that the Messiah has come, and Judaism rejects this claim. 
Disagreements over the nature of the Messiah and the Messiah’s role in time are therefore at the 
core of the theological distinction between Judaism and Christianity. Nevertheless, Sabbath as 
“messianic time”—which is to say, time that pulls future justice into the present—could be a 
time in which the two communities experience the same phenomenon. Sabbath could be a 
theological and ritual meeting point for these communities, possibly a time for a shared 
existence. More research needs to be done on the interreligious significance of Sabbath for 
Jewish and Christian communities. 
 The fact that two thinkers from different traditions arrive at a similar political theology 
of Sabbath also suggests that inoperativity has a significance that transcends religious categories 








INOPERATIVITY IN PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES 
JEAN-YVES LACOSTE AND GIORGIO AGAMBEN 
Thus far, we have seen that the religious traditions of Judaism and Christianity offer a 
rich field of reflection for the political meaning of inoperativity. However, inoperativity has not 
only been a conceptual resource for traditional theologians like Heschel and Moltmann. Modern 
philosophers, too, have pondered ways of thinking about human beings from the perspective of 
inoperative rituals. This chapter analyzes two key thinkers who utilize inoperativity as a central 
motif in their thought: Jean-Yves Lacoste and Giorgio Agamben. Both of these thinkers find 
inoperativity to be a central concept in creating a new form of political thought. Lacoste explores 
inoperativity “from below” by doing a detailed phenomenology of liturgical acts that involve 
non-action. Agamben, on the other hand, approaches inoperativity from an overarching 
standpoint that attempts to investigate “life” itself, suggesting that inoperativity could be a means 
of changing the political conceptions of life that uphold Western political theory. 
The following discussion will explore Lacoste’s and Agamben’s contributions to a theory 
of inoperativity. Together, they offer mutually complimentary insights into inoperativity, with 
Agamben complicating a core idea Lacoste offers. 
Lacoste’s Phenomenology of Inoperativity 
Unlike Agamben, whose work spans vast categories and whose method is sometimes 
seemingly inscrutable (see below), Lacoste focuses intensely on the phenomenology of religious 
worship, or liturgy. According to Lacoste, liturgy displays inoperativity as one of its central 
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features. In the following three sections, I will outline the methodological background for 
Lacoste’s work on inoperativity, describe Lacoste’s understanding of inoperativity, and finally 
explain its implications for an understanding of Sabbath and sovereignty. 
Method 
The philosophical understanding of inoperativity Lacoste builds draws upon on a long 
lineage of continental thought. Several thinkers throughout the twentieth century use 
inoperativity as a key concept. Georges Bataille describes inoperativity as the self-limiting that 
sovereign powers must use in order to preserve power.1 Drawing on Bataille’s concept of 
inoperativity, Jean-Luc Nancy formulates a notion of an “inoperative community” based on the 
open space or “borderlands” between finite singular beings.2 Against the idea that community 
consists in an aggressive “coming together” of such beings through vigorous “political will” (as 
in various totalitarian movements), Nancy finds community as formed through the very absence 
of such efforts. This type of community arises as human beings let each other exist freely. The 
community dwells together without a telos or operative goal. This concept of inoperativity is 
radically expanded in a response to Nancy’s work written by Maurice Blanchot.3 Likewise 
drawing on Bataille, Blanchot, agrees with Nancy that community forms only through the 
 
1 See Georges Bataille, “Le temps de la revolte,” in George Batailles—Essential Writings, ed. Michael 
Richardson (London: SAGE Publications, 1998), 191; Georges Bataille, Literature and Evil, trans. Alastair 
Hamilton (London: Calder & Boyers, 1973), 134. On this idea of sovereign self-limiting see also Georges Bataille, 
The Absence of Myth, trans. Michael Richardson (London: Verso, 1994), 272-274. Bataille envisions a sovereign 
who does not work, and by doing so maintains control of the work of others. For another example of this type of 
inoperativity see Georges Bataille, The Accursed Share, Volume III: Sovereignty, trans. Robert Hurley (New York: 
Urzone Books, 1993), 247-249. 
 
2 Jean-Luc Nancy, The Inoperative Community, ed. Peter Connor (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota 
Press, 1991). 
 





absence of work, or inoperativity. However, Blanchot goes even further, arguing that the 
acceptance of being in a community is “bound to an equivalent refusal or rejection” of 
community, because to belong to a community “means nearly immediately to form a counter-
group, to renounce it violently.”4 Blanchot implies that real community requires forceful 
distancing of oneself from others, not in order to truly become distant and lonely, but in order to 
preserve the space between persons and resist the urge to mindless conformity that 
simultaneously creates and destroys communities. 
While these thinkers explore inoperativity by analyzing social interactions, Lacoste takes 
a different approach. His theory of inoperativity emerges from an account of human beings’ 
interactions with God in the context of worship. In his major work, Experience and the Absolute, 
Lacoste describes how inoperativity plays a central role in liturgical experience.5 Lacoste 
distinguishes liturgical experience from “religious experience,” which he claims is too easily 
categorized in post-Schleiermacher theology as simply a realm of feeling.6 Liturgy is an action, a 
structure of human involvement with the world. Religious experience tends toward an 
assessment of internal dispositions and psychological states, neither of which directly concern 
Lacoste. By focusing precisely on the liturgical, rather than the “religious” or “sacred,” Lacoste 
compliments and also distances himself from other phenomenologists of religion.7 In an 
 
4 Blanchot, The Unavowable Community, 12. 
 
5 Jean-Yves Lacoste, Experience and the Absolute: Disputed Questions on the Humanity of Man, trans. 
Mark Raftery-Skehan (New York: Fordham University Press, 2004). 
 
6 Lacoste, Experience and the Absolute, 2. 
 
7 This is not to suggest that other philosophers working in phenomenology ignore liturgy. Some who have 
engaged with liturgical themes include Jean-Louis Chretien, “The Wounded Word: Phenomenology of Prayer,” in 
Phenomenology and the ‘Theological Turn’: The French Debate, ed. Dominique Janicaud (New York: Fordham 
University Press, 2000), 147-175; and Michel Henry, I Am the Truth: Toward a Philosophy of Christianity, trans. 
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important essay, Lacoste argues that the human experience of God (in the phenomenological 
sense) is not what happens during transcendent experiences, because human beings do not grasp 
God immediately, but instead are placed before God—God is a “limit” of their experience.8 
Because “liturgy” means being before the Absolute as the maximal limit of human 
experience, the word “worship” is not broad enough to encapsulate what liturgy means for 
Lacoste. He defines the term as “the logic that presides over the encounter between man and God 
writ large.”9 In other words, worship is not simply an isolated encounter with a numinous reality 
(a discrete worship-experience), but a confrontation of a person’s total self with the Absolute. By 
distancing himself from theologians of worship-experience (such as Schleiermacher or Otto), 
Lacoste intends to escape the type of theology that views human beings as living “shells” of 
monadic engagements with the divine. He also, like Jean-Luc Marion, wants to avoid depicting 
 
Susan Emanuel (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2003). For an overview of phenomenological approaches 
to religion and liturgy see J. Aaron Simmons and Bruce Ellis Benson, The New Phenomenology: A Philosophical 
Introduction (London: Bloomsbury, 2013), 157-176. For an example of a rejection of phenomenological methods 
that utilize liturgy see Nathan R. Kerr, “From Description to Doxology: The Dogmatic Bases of Christian Vision,” 
in Transcendence and Phenomenology, ed. Conor Cunningham and Peter M. Candler (London: SCM Press, 2007), 
174-200. 
 
8 Lacoste asserts that the very nature of transcendence prohibits it from being “felt” in the way non-
transcendent objects are felt: “I may feel something, I may feel the transcendental conditions of experience (‘that is, 
what Heidegger calls the ‘world’), I may be affected by the world while hearing this or that, but I cannot both feel 
myself as being-in-the world and feel some transcendent entity.” See Jean-Yves Lacoste, “Perception, 
Transcendence and the Experience of God,” in Transcendence and Phenomenology, ed. Conor Cunningham and 
Peter M. Candler (London: SCM Press, 2007), 1-20. Here Lacoste argues specifically with William Alston, who 
alleges that “Christian Mystical Experience” is analogous to sense perception. See William P. Alston, Perceiving 
God: The Epistemology of Religious Experience (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1991). On Lacoste’s 
distancing himself from the phenomenologists of religion see Jean-Yves Lacoste, “Phenomenology and the 
Frontier,” in Quiet Powers of the Possible: Interviews in Contemporary French Phenomenology, ed. Tarek R. Dika 
and W. Christ Hacket (New York: Fordham University Press, 2016), 188-210. 
 




God as a phenomenon like any other.10 Lacoste follows Heidegger in understanding human 
beings as embedded in a world of action, even before they can isolate individual human 
experiences.11 “The world has already taken possession of Dasein prior to any conscious action 
or awareness,” Lacoste explains.12 For this reason, Lacoste strives to consider religious actions 
themselves, not merely the particular emotions or actions they evoke. 
Because human beings exist in and through action, analysis of religious action reveals a 
unique form of existence as well. Looking at what people do in worship displays what they are. 
This logic is not merely confined to the human realm. In an analogical way, religious action 
speaks to God’s form of existence, because God’s being is disclosed in the human/divine nexus 
portrayed in liturgy. Indeed, as Kevin Hart points out, Lacoste follows a long stream of Catholic 
thought (influenced notably by Karl Rahner and Henri De Lubac) in which reality itself is 
“graced” such that all human experience is experience of God, though not as if God were a 
datum within experience.13 Hence, although the ostensible purpose of Experience and the 
 
10 For an example of Marion’s work in phenomenology that attempts to avoid this tendency see Jean-Luc 
Marion, Being Given: Towards a Phenomenology of Givenness, trans. Jefferey L. Kossky (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 2002). 
 
11 Heidegger posits that human being is “being-there” (Dasein), which means that existence involves not 
eternal traits imprinted on the core of human reality, but on actions and various forms of involvement with the 
world. For his introduction of this key concept see Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. John Macquarrie and 
Edward Robinson (New York: Harper & Row, 1967), 78-90. For overviews of the concept of Dasein see Wayne 
Martin, “The Semantics of ‘Dasein’ and the Modality of Being and Time,” in The Cambridge Companion to 
Heidegger’s Being and Time, ed. Mark A. Wrathall (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 100-128; and  
Nate Zuckerman, “Heidegger and the Essence of Dasein,” Southern Journal of Philosophy 53, no. 1 (2015): 493-
516. 
 
12 Lacoste, Experience and the Absolute, 11. Of course, this point is open to the objection that the world of 
action does impact “internal” experience, and so perhaps Lacoste is excessively one-sided and reactionary to focus 
heavily on action and not on traditional religious experience. Lacoste seems to anticipate this critique, and 
immediately grants it: “There is, of course, no being-in-the world that is not reflected in a consciousness. 
 
13 Hart writes: “To dwell liturgically is not just one option out of many for human beings; it is our essential 
possibility because—and here Lacoste is close to Henri de Lubac—we are always and already oriented towards 
God.” See Kevin Hart, “Religious Experience and the Phenomenality of God,” in Between Philosophy and 
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Absolute is highly philosophical, Lacoste cannot avoid raising theological questions also, 
because any attempt to understand the human act of worship will involve implications about the 
God who is worshipped. In Lacoste’s framework, this is the essential link between philosophy 
and theology. Both fields, he argues in his later work From Theology to Theological Thinking, 
are the results of the interpretation of life, and thus must inevitably coincide.14 To interpret lived 
experience is the purpose of phenomenology. But since lived experience unavoidably includes 
worship, phenomenology cannot elude theology (and vice versa).15 Liturgy is thus a datum 
meriting close theological evaluation, particularly because it is the locus of everything pertaining 
to what it means to be human, and also everything connected to what human beings can know 
about God. 
As a microcosm of the totality of human existence, liturgy unveils much more about 
human existence than phenomenology has realized. Although liturgical activity encompasses 
only a small aspect of human life—perhaps taking up merely a few hours a week for even the 
 
Theology: Contemporary Interpretations of Christianity, ed. Lieven Boeve and Christoph Brabant (Burlington, VT: 
Ashgate, 2010), 142. Hart argues that Lacoste turns in a different direction than Rahner, because the former 
interprets “orientation toward God” not as experience of God, but rather as experience of being in the place of Christ 
in relation to God. See Kevin Hart, “The Liturgical Reduction,” Josephinum Journal of Theology, 15, no. 1 (2008): 
41-66. 
 
14 Jean-Yves Lacoste, From Theology to Theological Thinking, trans. Chris Hackett (Charlottesville: 
University of Virginia Press, 2014). 
 
15 At times, Lacoste seems to situate himself as a thinker aimed at a fusion of theology and philosophy (for 
example, in the first few chapters of Experience and the Absolute). However, at other points Lacoste indicates that 
he is looking to supersede the confines of either discipline, attempting to do something that cannot be easily 
categorized. This is especially clear in his La phénoménalité de Dieu: Neuf études (Paris: Seuil, 2008). Lacoste’s 
method here, as Joeri Schrijvers observes, involves asking not what God is (theology) nor how human beings know 
God (philosophy of religion) because neither of these pursuits are truly possible. Instead, the question for Lacoste is: 
What is a human being before God? That is to say, how does God appear to human beings? This sounds like an 
epistemological question, but it is not. God cannot be an object for epistemological analysis, because such analysis 
would presume to encapsulate and control the object of knowing. See Joeri Schrijvers, “God and/in Phenomenology: 
Jean-Yves Lacoste’s Phenomenality of God,” Bijdragen, International Journal in Philosophy and Theology, 71, no. 




most religious people—its massive significance cannot be ignored.  Liturgy reflects human 
beings greatest struggles to apprehend the beyond in their experience of reality. Because these 
struggles are never resolved, liturgy appears fruitless in certain respects. However profound their 
rituals may be, human beings never grasp the Absolute through liturgy. Perhaps the best analogy 
for this experience is one that Jean-Louis Chretien also employs to describe prayer: Jacob’s 
wrestling with the angel in the book of Genesis.16 Jacob does not win the wrestling match (he 
gets his hip dislocated—a fairly damning occurrence in any martial contest), and thus is not able 
to possess or control the divine. The worshipper encounters a simultaneous presence and distance 
of the divine. 
For Lacoste, this distance from the divine is accompanied by a simultaneous distance 
from the world. Thus, though liturgy is a diversion from pressing worldly realities, it is 
nevertheless a diversion that does not hide us from the world, but expands the boundaries of our 
world. This is because the experience of the Absolute is not separable—but is distinguishable—
from other categories of experience.17 We may encounter liturgical elements in many parts of our 
lives, but not in such a way that the liturgical element dissolves completely. Because of this 
uniqueness, liturgy distracts the human being from regular life, but not in a way that 
 
16 Jean-Louis Chretien, The Unforgettable and the Unhoped For, trans. Jeffery Bloechl (New York: 
Fordham University Press, 2002), 122. 
 
17 At one point, Lacoste distinguishes the presence of the Absolute from the presence of discernible objects 
by claiming that we encounter it not as a “presence” (as in the case of something that is “there”) but as a 
“presencing” (“en acte de présence”). See Jean-Yves Lacoste, Recherches sur la parole (Leuven: Peeters, 2015), 




impoverishes or negates the significance of that life.18 This element of Lacoste’s liturgical 
analysis is essential for understanding the role of inoperativity. 
Lacoste’s Understanding of Inoperativity 
According to Lacoste, liturgy is both useless and vital at the same time. “We have better 
things to ‘do’ than pray, and when we pray we actually ‘do’ nothing,” Lacoste admits. “But the 
world from which liturgy diverts us is not a world over which goodwill reigns, and, at bottom, it 
is this world from which we must take leave, in a meantime, so as to discover our responsibilities 
in the world.”19 The futility of liturgy is for Lacoste the essence of its importance, and what 
makes it fit strangely into an otherwise production-oriented society. Furthermore, grasping this 
futility is crucial because it is only way we can understand our being-in-the-world completely. 
This essential uselessness of liturgy is what Lacoste calls “liturgical inoperativity.” He 
appeals to the phenomenon of the night vigil as an example. When keeping a night vigil, a 
worshipper is deliberately unproductive. Night is usually reserved for sleep, which is technically 
a form of productivity (because the worker needs sleep in order to continue working well). But, 
as Lacoste argues, the night vigil “is neither a time of salaried work (negotium) nor a time 
appropriate for leisure (otium), for which “free” days would be better suited than sleep-deprived 
nights.”20 By participating in a night vigil the worshipper acts in a strictly unnecessary way 
 
18 As Joeri Schrijvers notes, “Liturgical experience is constituted through an exodus from the Heideggerian 
world and earth. The liturgical reduction, then, places everything which keeps the human being at a distance from 
God (namely the world, the earth, and history) ‘there’ or existing only for God—coram Deo.” See Joeri Schrijvers, 
An Introduction to Jean-Yves Lacoste (Surrey: Ashgate, 2012), 143. 
 
19 Lacoste, Experience and the Absolute, 73. 
 
20 Lacoste, Experience and the Absolute, 80. Lacoste uses the term “leisure” here in a pejorative sense, to 
describe everyday human diversions. However, it is important to point out that worship itself can be a form of 
“leisure” as Josef Pieper points out. According to Pieper, there are legitimate forms of leisure focused on the 
construction of the genuinely human, as well as “sham forms of leisure with their strong family resemblance to want 
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(unnecessary from the perspective of being in the world). In other words, the worshipper simply 
exists in a state of nothingness, analogous in many ways to St. John of the Cross’s “nocturnal 
experience.”21 
This nothingness or lack of necessity in the night vigil is also displayed in the fact that, in 
Western society, such ritual activities are essentially free. That is to say, no one can be truly 
compelled by anyone—divine or human—to keep a night vigil or observe a religious activity of 
a similar type. Although Lacoste does not explore the phenomenological significance of religious 
freedom in Experience and the Absolute, his analysis seems to presuppose it, for the simple 
reason that a worshipper who was fulfilling an obligation to the deity by performing the liturgical 
act would be demoting the deity from a position as the Absolute to one in whom there could be 
deficiencies or dependencies. A liturgy done before the Absolute, then, cannot be conceived as a 
means to obtaining a divine return of some type, since the logic inherent in such an act would 
contradict the idea of an Absolute itself. This is why the idea that God needs or benefits from 
human praise is not a praiseworthy way of speaking about God.22 Similarly, compulsion from 
 
of leisure and to sloth (in its old metaphysical and theological sense).” See Josef Pieper, Leisure: The Basis of 
Culture, trans. Alexander Dru (New York: Pantheon Books, 1964), 48. Pieper defines leisure as “everything which, 
without being merely useful, is an essential part of a full human existence” (Pieper, Leisure, 49). Under this 
definition, Lacoste’s night vigil would also constitute leisure. 
 
21 Lacoste himself makes a clear connection between inoperativity and the nocturnal experience in “De la 
phénoménologie de l’esprit à la Montée Du Carmel,” Revue Thomiste 97, no. 1 (January-March 1989): 5-37.  John 
of the Cross describes this nocturnal experience as a type of aridity in which the soul seeking God should renounce 
earthly affections. See John of the Cross, Ascent of Mt. Carmel, trans. E. Allison Peers (Mineola: Dover, 2008). 
Throughout his works, Lacoste appeals to John of the Cross’ work frequently. Perhaps this is because the Spanish 
mystic relies heavily on themes of emptiness and absence, while also emphasizing a simultaneous presence of 
God—a paradoxical tension that also characterizes Lacoste’s work. On this see Matthew David Farley, “Jean-Yves 
Lacoste on John of the Cross: Theological Thinker Par Excellence,” Modern Theology 32, no. 1 (January 2016): 3-
19. 
 
22 This is one of the odd factors about biblical poetry, which praises God and yet is “unnecessary.” Paul 
Ricoeur has noted this unnecessary element within the domain of parables as well as Psalms. See Paul Ricoeur, 
“Philosophy and Religious Language,” Journal of Religion 54 (1974): 71-85; and “Biblical Hermeneutics,” in 
Semeia 4: Paul Ricoeur on Biblical Hermeneutics, ed. John Dominic Crossan (Decatur, GA: Society of Biblical 
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human authorities to bow before the Absolute would be woefully self-defeating. In a strict sense, 
in order to maintain its integrity, liturgy must be without purpose—decidedly inoperative. 
This sounds like an irresolvable paradox, and Lacoste struggles to articulate its meaning. 
What are the implications of the idea that the human relationship to the absolute is characterized 
by inoperativity? One thing becomes immediately clear: In liturgy the worshipper reveals that 
her/his being is not summed up by activity or production. Lacoste connects this existential reality 
with the language of rights: 
Once our inevitable allocation of work, whose distribution is necessary, 
foreseeable, and commonplace, has been completed, and once our daytime duties 
have been fulfilled, the decision to keep vigil proves that we remain in possession 
of a fundamental right: that of proving, by the content we give to our vigil (which 
we can spend doing philosophy, writing poetry, or praying—and many other 
things besides), the surplus of meaning we give to our humanity.23 
 
For Lacoste, liturgy intentionally contradicts the tendency to sum up a person’s being by gauging 
that person’s productivity, suggesting that we have a “right” not to be defined in this way. In 
other words, human beings have a right to a “surplus” of meaning.24 
Lacoste suggests that this surplus of being could stem from the very nature of the 
Absolute. Boldly, he claims that the non-necessity of the liturgy is “the same as that in which the 
Absolute is itself not necessary.”25 In other words, the God of the night vigil is not the God of 
 
Literature, 1975). See also Christina Gschwandtner, “Toward a Ricoeurian Hermeneutics of Liturgy,” Worship 86, 
no. 6 (2012): 482-505. 
 
23 Lacoste, Experience and the Absolute, 79. 
 
24 Lacoste, Experience and the Absolute, 81. 
 




necessary action (actus purus)—or, least, this God cannot be fully reduced to such action.26 At 
first glance, there appears to be irony in Lacoste’s use of the term “Absolute” to describe God, 
for if the Hegelian “Absolute” is anything at all, it is certainly necessary.27 But the paradoxical 
“unnecessary Absolute” captures a bold insight from the phenomenology of liturgy: The 
worshipper encounters God, but this God is not the static form of “pure actuality” often 
attributed to Neo-Scholasticism. This God is both less and more than pure actuality. Between the 
categories of “unnecessary” and “Absolute” is the “excess” of the inoperative God. Lacoste’s 
framing of the worshipper as existing in a state of excess is similar to Marion’s depiction of the 
subject as purely a “recipient” (adonné) of “saturated phenomena” that always overwhelm or 
exceed the subject’s intention.28 Perhaps the key difference between Lacoste and Marion is that 
the latter attempts to place the subject in a middle place between pure passivity and active 
engagement with the given, whereas the former places the worshipper in a position of pure 
passivity before the inoperativity of the Absolute.29 For Lacoste, there is no sense in which the 
 
26 The idea that God’s being is unnecessary or “beyond the necessary” is a point Lacoste derives from 
Eberhard Jungel, God as Mystery of the World, trans. Darrell Guder (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1983). 
 
27 Although what this means for Hegel can certainly be disputed. On the similarities and differences 
between Aquinas’s and Hegel’s understanding of the necessity and actuality of God see Emilio Brito, Dieu et l’etre 
d’apres Thomas d’Aquin et Hegel (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1991), 114-133. 
 
28 See Jean-Luc Marion, In Excess: Studies of Saturated Phenomena, trans. Robyn Horner and Vincent 
Berraud (New York: Fordham University Press, 2002). See also Marion’s treatment of excess in Being Given: 
Toward a Phenomenology of Givenness, trans. Jeffrey L. Kosky (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2002). 
 
29 Marion writes, “Reception implies, indeed, passive receptivity, but it also demands active capacity, 
because capacity (capacitas), in order to increase to the measure of the given and to make sure it happens, must be 
put to work—work of the given to receive, work on itself in order to receive.” See Marion, In Excess, 48. Marion’s 
insistence that experiencing the excess of the given requires work at first seems to contradict his idea of revelation as 
“pure given”—a point Shane Mackinlay argues is a major flaw of his work. See Shane Mackinlay, Interpreting 





worshipper may grasp or actively engage the Absolute in worship.30 Worship is simply an 
experience of being before a phenomenon of overflowing grace. Lacoste sums up the theological 
implications of this understanding of liturgy: “Liturgy will perhaps be able to offer us the bread 
necessary to life. But it first offers us the wine of the kingdom.”31 
This “wine”—an unnecessary surplus—is not a side benefit or epiphenomenon of liturgy, 
as if the worshipper were truly aiming at some concrete social or psychological goal of worship 
but ended up with a happenstance ritual treat.32 This “wine” is a surplus of nothing—it is an 
experience of an absence.33 The worshipper does not experience a thing or element of sense 
perception upon which to act. One simply exists in a state of beholding, without grasping or 
 
30 Although Lacoste seems to insist on this point, there is an obvious sense in which Lacoste would 
probably admit an active role for the worshipper in encountering the Absolute. After all, worshippers do show up to 
liturgies, and must actively choose inoperativity. Perhaps this is a way in which Lacoste might be led to agree with 
Marion’s claim for a level of activity in the reception of the gift (see footnote 29, above). 
 
31 Lacoste, Experience and the Absolute, 82. 
 
32 As Schrijvers notes, the one who prays (in Lacoste’s interpretation) “has an experience of ‘praying 
despite everything’ even if this prayer does not grant the one praying what he or she wants or desires.” See Joeri 
Schrijvers, “Introduction,” Modern Theology 31, no. 4 (October, 2015): 638-640. Schrijvers’s comment points to a 
challenge for Lacoste, which is how to explain forms of worship which seem to deliberately attempt to enact certain 
outcomes (the most obvious of which is the act of praying “for” something or someone). Lacoste’s analysis appears 
to suggest that these types of liturgy could only be idolatrous (because they would claim to grasp or modify the 
Absolute in some way), yet this is not how Christian tradition has understood them. Perhaps the only way to 
understand such liturgies is to frame them as attempts to align oneself with the Absolute, thus creating changes in 
the world, but not by virtue of productive operations. 
 
33 The theme of “excess” as an element of human experience of worship is also a central point in Lacoste’s 
Étre en danger (Paris: Cerf, 2011). By this “excess” Lacoste means an element that cannot be accounted for, a 
beyond that is still experienced by its absence. As Robyn Horner points out, this excess bears significant similarity 
to what other philosophers have understood to be “the gift”—which Jacques Derrida argues is also the presence of 
an absence (because a gift entails more than its own being). See Robyn Horner, “What Does the Gift Reveal?” 
Louvain Studies 39 (2015-16): 315-336. See also Jacques Derrida, Given Time. 1: Counterfeit Money, trans. Peggy 
Kamuf (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994); The Gift of Death, trans. David Willis (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 2007). Another key thinker who explores the gift as unaccounted-for excess is Jean-Luc Marion; see 
his “On the Gift,” in God, the Gift, and Postmodernism, ed. M. Scanlon and John D. Caputo (Bloomington: Indiana 





manipulating that which is beheld. In many ways, this mirrors Aquinas’ vision of the ultimate 
end of human worship. Notwithstanding Aquinas’s description of God as pure act, his 
description of the ultimate goal of human existence in the exitus-reditus format of history is a 
form of inoperativity—the beatific vision—in which the human being accomplishes nothing 
except existing in the incomparable beauty and goodness of the divine.34 It would constitute an 
eisegesis to say that Aquinas depicts human beings as made to “do nothing,” but in a sense, this 
must be true.35 Lacoste merely adds a simple deduction: God’s being must also reflect this 
ultimate inoperativity. 
The act of praising God in liturgy also reflects divine inoperativity. It is obvious that God 
does not need human adoration. Of course, there is always a luring superstition which asserts that 
praise will please the deity, resulting in various useful blessings. Yet in its institutionalized form, 
praise persists despite the fact that human beings recognize its uselessness. This parallels the fact 
that the early Christian movement recognized the ineffectiveness of temples in housing God, yet 
continued to pray at the temple.36 
 
34 See W.J. Hankey, God in Himself: Aquinas’ Doctrine of God as Expounded in the Summa Theologiae 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987), 136-142. 
 
35 William J. Hoye argues that for Aquinas, the purpose of the beatific vision is not one more dynamic 
action but rather the summing up of all action in the perfection of existence. This means that the human being in the 
beatific vision becomes united with God, not merely observing but participating in the divine existence. See William 
J. Hoye, Actualitas Omnium Actuum: Man’s Beatific Vision of God as Apprehended by Thomas Aquinas 
(Meisenheim am Glan: Verlag Anton Hain, 1975), 145-146. 
 
36 See Acts 7:48-50 vis-à-vis Acts 2:46. The tension in these passages may not be as pronounced as it first 
appears. As Ben Witherington observes, Stephen’s speech in Acts 7:48-50 does not rail against the temple itself, but 
against a distorted view of the temple which made it a means to possess God’s presence. This critique of temple 
worship was not anti-Jewish, but well in line with the precedents of the Jewish prophets such as Isaiah and Ezekiel. 
See Ben Witherington III, The Acts of the Apostles: A Socio-Rhetorical Commentary (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 
1998), 261-263. See also Robert Tannehill, The Narrative Unity of Luke-Acts: A Literary Interpretation, vol. 2 





Lacoste does not immediately and seamlessly move into the social/political implications 
of inoperativity. His goal is simply to examine inoperativity at the heart of the phenomenon of 
worship. One looks in vain through Lacoste’s corpus to find the type of political speculations one 
might find in other thinkers such as Blanchot or Nancy. 
Yet by making inoperativity central to the experience of the Absolute, Lacoste’s work 
entails a massive shift in the topology of political theology. This is because it relocates the 
fulcrum of God’s ruling action. Usually, theologies of divine action speak of God as acting upon 
the world as a moving agent, whether an unmoved one (Aristotle) or one who is moved upon by 
the world to some degree (process theology). These frameworks all raise the question of a 
“causal nexus” of divine action on the world. Deistic accounts of divine causality place this 
causal nexus far back at the beginning of creation, thereby shrouding it in mystery. Process 
theologians—for whom God’s action on the world is a present reality—find this question more 
pressing, and have offered interesting answers. Philip Clayton, to give one example, posits that 
God’s causal nexus on the world is analogous to that of mind on body.37 However, Lacoste’s 
image of an inoperative sovereignty points toward another option: God’s does not act “on” the 
world as a causal force. Rather, God “lets the world be” from a position at the borderlands of the 
world.38 God does not push the world from above, below, or behind, but accompanies the world 
as a liberating presence. 
 
37 Clayton refers to this as “emergent causality.” See Philip Clayton, Adventures in the Spirit: God, World, 
Divine Action (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2008). See also Philip Clayton, The Problem of God in Modern Thought 
(Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2000). For another process perspective that addresses the problem of the divine causal 
nexus see Charles Hartshorne, Omnipotence and Other Theological Mistakes (Albany: SUNY Press, 1984). 
 
38 Christina Gschwandtner highlights Lacoste’s tendency to describe liturgy as a space where God freely 
makes Godself available, but always as One who respects the limits of the human world, even while subverting 
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God’s sovereignty as non-coercive accompaniment of the world is a political implication 
of inoperative liturgy that also emerges in a fascinating chapter Lacoste writes on monasticism 
and topology.39 This chapter discusses how inoperative liturgy seems to place a worshipper both 
within and without the world.40 A contemplative who sits in a cell establishes an attitude of 
distance from place as such, even while paradoxically inhabiting a very distinct and deliberate 
place. “By dint of consenting to be-there, the recluse actually disposes of place in order to be 
nowhere, or almost nowhere,” Lacoste observes.41 This image is reminiscent of the Jesus’ prayer 
in the Gospel of John, in which he spoke of his disciples being “in the world” but not “belonging 
to the world” (John 17:14-15).42 
 
them: “Liturgy can welcome God’s presence but it does not make it automatic; it welcomes a gift but it does not 
control it.” See Christina Gschwandtner, “The Vigil as Exemplary Liturgical Experience: On Jean-Yves Lacoste’s 
Phenomenology of Liturgy,” Modern Theology 31, no. 4 (October 2015): 648-657. 
 
39 The chapter is called “Place and Nonplace” in Lacoste, Experience and the Absolute, 23-39. 
 
40 According to Joseph Rivera, this in/out paradox that forms the core of Lacoste’s work. It is also, per 
Rivera, an experience that also reflects the nature of the Church, as well as the sacraments. Rivera faults Lacoste (as 
well as Marion and Henry) for using extra-worldly encounter “to minimize rather than celebrate the ineluctable tie 
Christ has to the world itself.” See Joseph Rivera, “Corpus Mysticum and Religious Experience: Henry, Lacoste, and 
Marion,” International Journal of Systematic Theology 14, no. 3 (July, 2012): 327-349. Another thinker who has 
similarly argued that extra-worldly experience should not negate the connection of God to the world is James G. 
Hart, Who One Is: Book 2: Existenz and Transcendental Phenomenology (Dordrecht: Springer, 2009), 544. 
Although I agree that Lacoste’s work can easily lend itself to this problematic interpretation, for reasons I will 
continue to explain I do not think that Lacoste’s point necessarily entails world-negation. Lacoste’s analysis portrays 
the human being in an unstable yet coherent place of encounter with a limit—one which ultimately directs the 
human being back toward the world. 
 
41 Lacoste, Experience and the Absolute, 27. 
 
42 There may be something to this parallel, but not too exactly. Jesus is not talking about phenomenology. 
The term “world” has several meanings in the Johannine literature, some of which refer to groups of people (all 
people and some malevolent people, specifically) and others to ontological aspects of the world (“the things of the 
world” in 1 John 2:15). In part, then, John’s understanding of world could connect with Lacoste’s ontological 
definition of “world.” See Stanley B. Marrow, “Kosmos in John,” The Catholic Biblical Quarterly 64, no. 1 (January 
2002): 90-102. See also Bill Salier, “What’s in a World? Kosmos in the Prologue of John’s Gospel,” The Reformed 




According to Lacoste, this uncanny, dizzying form of inoperativity characterizes Christ’s 
incarnation as well. He points to countless liturgical icons or statues in which the infant Christ is 
depicted holding a globe in his hands, symbolizing the world or the universe.43 There seems to be 
a double paradox here, in that (1) Christ rules the world not as an adult, but as an infant and (2) 
that as an infant Christ was historically within the cosmos, and yet here Christ is depicted 
holding the cosmos from without. These combined paradoxes point toward a fascinating spin on 
the Christus Victor atonement model: Christ conquers the world, but not as the stereotypical 
imperialist who expands the borders of his empire through violent domination. He vanquishes 
the earth not by pushing against its borders, but by negating the opposition between heaven and 
earth. To do this, he “infiltrates” the world, but not as a foreign invader. Entering the world as a 
fully human infant, Christ does not annihilate the powers that establish the “friend/enemy 
distinction,” but instead subverts the concepts of “within” and “without,” uniting mundane 
humanity with extra-cosmic divinity. The result is a political theology in which God’s governing 
force functions through passivity—what Lacoste’s commentator Kevin Hart refers to as a 
“kenotic existence”—and what I would call, in the context of sovereignty, a “letting be.”44 
 
43 Lacoste, Experience and the Absolute, 25. 
 
44 Hart explores the theme of “ontological poverty” in Lacoste, which refers to the state of emptiness that 
the worshipper encounters before the Absolute. “We can properly dwell on earth only beneath the Cross, Lacoste 
insists, for it is there that the disappropriation of death and the disappropriation for God converge and diverge. To 
live merely marked by death is to experience poverty for nothing; yet to divest ourselves of everything so that we 
can live for God is to experience poverty as openness to everything.” See Kevin Hart, “Poverty’s Speech’: On 
Liturgical Reduction,” Modern Theology 31, no. 4 (October 2015): 641-647. This “openness to everything” is the 
positive side of inoperativity that forms the key to ethics. It allows one to renounce the possession of works, and 
thus returning to their proper use. The result is a form of politics that renounces domination, a via crucis. For a 
similar argument see Stanislas Breton, The Word and the Cross, trans. Jacquelyn Porter (New York: Fordham 
University Press, 2002). Obviously there is an enormous overlap here what we have seen Moltmann doing 
(especially in The Crucified God), except that Moltmann pulls his argument from a dogmatic Christian narrative, 





At this point, Lacoste’s notion of inoperativity might appear to be politically quietistic. 
The sovereign simply pulls back, creating tranquility in human affairs by doing nothing. Peace 
on earth comes through nothing happening. But this is not the case, according to Lacoste’s 
summary: “Pursued to its ultimate consequences, the liturgical experience prevents man from 
dwelling peaceably on the earth—but every form of liturgy must learn this lesson.”45 Lacoste 
points to the flip side of liturgical inoperativity: Although it accomplishes nothing (in the worldly 
sense of “use” as production), it is incredibly effective at disrupting and upending political 
processes within the world. Liturgical inoperativity makes the worshipper a foreigner within the 
world, and foreigners—by virtue of their very existence—change the dynamics of a society or 
nation. Because they put themselves outside the regular patterns of human existence, they form 
spaces of disjunction that neutralize the claims society typically makes on a human being.46 “He 
who prays is symbolically nowhere,” Lacoste emphasizes, and for this reason “he refuses to 
participate in the dialectics that make up history; and he declares the phenomenological ground 
of his historiality powerless to determine what he ultimately is.”47 Politics requires identification 
 
45 Lacoste, Experience and the Absolute, 31. 
 
46 Stephanie Rumpza observes that for Lacoste, “the symbolic activity of liturgy interrupts the closure of 
the world to make space for the eschatological arriving from beyond it. This symbolism does not work itself out by 
contradicting or destroying the structures of Dasein, but by ‘subverting’ them from within by a ‘a work of 
overdetermination’. The possibility of this overdetermination can only be realized at a certain cost: violence to the 
order that we take to be essential to humanity. When liturgy attempts to reject the closed-off structures of the world 
in order to place them before God, it can at most live these structures in a deliberate and marginalized way.” See 
Stephanie Rumpza, “The Ascesis of Ascesis: The Subversion of Care in Jean-Yves Lacoste and Evagrius Ponticus,” 
The Heythrop Journal 58 (2017): 780-788, 781. Rumpza’s use of the term “violence” to describe the effects of 
Lacoste’s liturgical reduction may be too strong, although to speak of “rendering inoperative” a structure does seem 
to imply a sort of violence. 
 




with a certain place, time, and productive activity. Liturgical inoperativity takes the worshipper 
out of this matrix, and in doing so creates a governmental problem. 
This problem becomes particularly clear when Lacoste raises the implications of 
inoperative liturgy for Hegel’s famous “master/slave” dialectic.48 For any dialectic of this sort to 
work, the master and slave must occupy distinct spaces. But what happens if those spaces are 
dislocated? This is another way of asking: What happens if master and slave keep Sabbath 
together? This is, after all, precisely what Exodus 20:8-11 and Deuteronomy 5:12-15 envision 
with their stipulation that “you . . . and your male and female slave” must rest. If we apply 
Lacoste’s logic to this mandate, we find that Sabbath does not merely provide a break for tired 
servants. By keeping Sabbath together, master and slave erode the distinction between them, and 
not only for the temporary moment in which they engage in the liturgy. Because they keep 
Sabbath with and before the Absolute, who is also inoperative, they show “their true face” 
through their rest. Sabbath, then, is not an exception to normal human life, but its governing 
principle. The master and slave cannot finish their Sabbath liturgy and continue life as usual. The 
suspension of normal social order made visible in the Sabbath will not let them “resign 
themselves” to the distinction between them; it will haunt the entirety of their social existence, 
 
48 The idea of the master/slave, or lord/bondsman dialectic can be found in G.W.F. Hegel, The 
Phenomenology of Spirit, trans. Michael Inwood (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018), paragraphs 178-196. 
Hegel’s argument is that the master dominates the slave through superior force, yet is dependent on the slave for 
survival, and hence must grow to recognize the slave’s existence, despite simultaneously attempting to suppress and 
marginalize that existence. The dialectic is fundamentally about recognition and the struggle to achieve it. For an 
account of various theories of Hegel’s master/slave dialectic see Philip Moran, Hegel and the Fundamental 
Problems of Philosophy (Holland: Gruner, 1988). The most prominent theorist to emphasize the importance of the 
master/slave dialectic in history is Alexander Kojeve, who postulated that history moves on the basis of the dialectic, 
and ends when the dialectic ends. This interpretation could suggest that a “Sabbath” is another term for the end of 
history, when master and slave keep Sabbath together. I do not have space to pursue this idea here, but it deserves 
further research. See Alexander Kojeve, Introduction to the Reading of Hegel, trans. Raymond Queneau (New York: 




restoring the dignity of the slave and stalking the conscience of the master. This type of reading 
suggests Sabbath could function as one option to the end of history, and the ambiguous “last 
man” heralded by Francis Fukuyama could potentially be a liturgical celebrant.49 
This depiction of the resolution of the master/slave dialectic is radically different from 
Hegel’s. For him, the master attains a free, independent consciousness by subjecting the slave to 
labor, and the slave can only reverse this inequality by “doing”—actively reducing the inequality 
through productive action. “Through work,” Hegel says, “it (the servile consciousness) comes to 
its own self.”50 According to one interpretation, Hegel envisions a scenario in which the slave 
gradually overcomes the inequality simply by virtue of the fact that the slave holds access to the 
natural necessities of survival; the master is dependent on the slave in this sense.51 In another 
interpretation, the slave overcomes the hierarchy by actively resisting it, working negatively to 
topple it.52 Both of these interpretations have in common that the master and slave only achieve 
unity through exertion of force. Lacoste offers an alternative: the master and slave may rest 
together before God. This would not be a unity achieved through the harmonious functioning of 
 
49 Of course, Fukuyama might argue that an era of liberal Sabbath-keeping and night-vigil attendance 
would not provide the thymos, or sense of recognition that human nature craves. This passion for thymos is what 
Fukuyama—following Kojeve—claims is the root of the instabilities and contradictions of liberal capitalism. See 
Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (New York: The Free Press, 1992). Notwithstanding 
Fukuyama’s cynicism, it is interesting to read the final chapters of his famous work with the question of 
inoperativity and ritual in mind. Could ritual have something to offer in addressing the angst of liberal democracy? 
This is an especially relevant question in light of the problem of climate change—a problem rooted in thymos as 
well. The fourth chapter of this work will address this question in part, although I do not have the space here to bring 
Fukuyama into complete dialogue with a theology of inoperativity, as fascinating as that would be. 
 
50 Hegel, The Phenomenology of Spirit, paragraph 195. 
 
51 For a description of this interpretation see J.M. Fritzman, Hegel (Cambridge, UK: Polity, 2014), 39-40. 
 
52 This, of course, would be the interpretation of the “young” or “left” Hegelians. See Rocio Zambrana, 
“Dialectics as Resistance: Hegel, Benjamin, Adorno,” in Hegel and Resistance: History, Politics and Dialectics, ed. 




a machine-like system, but through the peace of rest—submitting to the sovereignty of an 
inoperative God. 
The result of this, of course, is an enormous political obstacle, insofar as politics is 
conducted on the basis of friend/enemy distinctions and up/down hierarchies. Because liturgy 
thrusts the worshipper outside of the regular order of human values, it gives the worshipper a 
perspective that relativizes the boundaries that establish political objectives. In consequence, the 
worshipper cannot return to life as usual. We could perhaps compare this interpretation of 
liturgical inoperativity to “stepping out of a game,” suspending its control over life and meaning, 
and enabling those who go back into the game to do so with fairness and justice.53 
Of course, as Lacoste admits, there are dangers lurking in this politics of inoperativity. 
Such a politics can easily be conducted through the evasion of responsibility. One imagines 
politicians playing golf during national disasters or police officers standing by idly while the 
populace engages in violent outbursts. Could we not say that Pontius Pilate took a “Sabbath” by 
washing his hands and declaring “I am innocent of this man’s blood?” Indeed, per Lacoste, 
liturgical experience can furnish an alibi for those “who dwell on the world without respect for 
liberty, justice, and their promotion.”54 Do we truly want political leaders who keep Sabbath as 
such? 
Lacoste refuses to offer a blithe, commercial-esque response to this objection. The danger 
of irresponsibility in political inoperativity is real. According to Lacoste, “we admit to having no 
 
53
 As Joseph Rivera points out, the liturgical reduction leaves one in a “fragile” and unstable place, because 
through liturgy one has renounced or bracketed the world, only to be faced once again with being in the world. See 
Joseph Rivera, “Toward a Liturgical Existentialism,” New Blackfriars 94, no. 1049 (2012): 79-96. 
 




choice but to confess to a certain liturgical ‘unhappiness’ of consciousness.”55 By this term he 
refers to the phenomenon described by Hegel in which an “endless nostalgia” for an 
“unattainable beyond” creates an inability to realize the “peace of unity.” The theological 
temptation in the face of this objection is to deny that otherworldliness is an aspect of Christian 
liturgy, and Lacoste cannot do this.  
However, Lacoste points toward an outcome of liturgical experience that forbids the 
worshipper from evading the obligations of justice. In liturgy, the worshipper discovers that 
“being-in-the-world and being-before-God are thoroughly intertwined.” Liturgical inoperativity 
causes a participant to become more fully human, not to escape from humanity.56 This is 
because, as Lacoste puts it, “liturgy is the remarkable regional experience in which we do not 
simply engage one characteristic of our being-in-the-world, but its reality in its entirety.”57 There 
is something like Nicholas of Cusa’s “coincidence of opposites” in the phenomenon of liturgy: 
The worshipper turns away from the world, and in doing so is confronted all the more directly 
 
55 Lacoste, Experience and the Absolute, 67. 
 
56 This point addresses a long-standing debate between Lacoste and Emmanuel Levinas. The latter argues 
that human beings are fundamentally oriented toward the infinite not through an orientation toward God (defined as 
the Absolute or infinite), but through an orientation toward the face of the other. Lacoste, obviously, posits liturgical 
experience as the site through which a human being encounters the infinite, without explicit ethical engagement. If 
what I argue here is correct, there is a sense in which these two perspectives are complimentary. The Absolute does 
reveal itself as utter limit, revealed in inoperative liturgy. Yet, this inoperativity thrusts the worshipper back into a 
sense of obligation to the other. For this reason, it is not incorrect to see the world of ethics and the world of 
inoperativity as mutually reinforcing. For Levinas’ views on ethics and the other see Emmanuel Levinas, Totality 
and Infinity, trans. Alphonso Lingis (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1969); Entre Nous: Thinking-of-the-
Other, trans. Michael Smith and Barbara Harshav (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998). For Lacoste’s 
arguments with Levinas see Being and the Absolute, 50, 71-72. As Robert Reed argues, Lacoste may have 
significantly overlooked the fact that his liturgical experience and Levinas’ ethical experience may be different ways 
of speaking about the same reality. See Robert C. Reed, “Experience and the Absolute Other: Why Lacoste Should 
Look Again at Levinas,” Journal of Religious Ethics 44, no. 3 (2016): 472-494. 
 




with the world. Paradoxically, inoperativity could be necessary for genuine action in the world. 
Only from a standpoint in the margins can one truly act—and thus rule—within the world. 
Rule from the margins is related in many ways to democracy, but the two are not 
identical. Democratic politics creates rule from the center, from figures and ideas grounded in the 
midst of a stable majority. An inoperative sovereign is not disconnected from majority interests, 
but is more concerned with “the least of these” in a given political scenario. Because this 
sovereign’s task is to “let be,” the sovereign focuses more on those who struggle for existence 
than on those whose existence is secure. To those whose interests’ “matter” from the perspective 
of power and prestige, actions done for the sake of such semi-existent persons may appear to be 
“nothing.” The inoperative sovereign may literally appear then to be “doing nothing.” Yet this is 
the result of encounter with Lacoste’s “Absolute”—the first shall be last, and the last shall be 
first. 
Summary 
Through a careful phenomenology of worship practices, Lacoste’s work offers a 
depiction of the human relationship to the Absolute as characterized by inoperativity. The 
worshipper simply exists before the Absolute—neither contributing productive work nor 
receiving tangible benefits. Although Lacoste does not directly seek to formulate a political 
theory of inoperativity, his understanding of liturgy straightforwardly creates a political 
application: the Absolute reveals itself in practices of letting-be. This reframes the way human 
beings see themselves in relation to production, and it also potentially transforms how human 
beings attempt to govern others in hierarchical relationships. 
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As I have shown, by describing liturgy as a site for a reframing of human relationships 
within hierarchies, Lacoste claims that he is describing not just parochial events (night vigils, 
religious holidays, etc.) but reality in its entirety. This suggests that inoperativity might not only 
describe sundry moments in human existence, but human life as a whole. This raises the 
question: May we speak of an inoperativity within human life itself? Could life as a whole enter 
into a Sabbath, whereby liturgy and reality coincide completely? What would be the impact of 
such a vision? In answering these questions, Agamben’s work becomes central. 
Agamben: Inoperativity as a Form of Life 
At the risk of sounding pejorative, one may describe the Italian philosopher Giorgio 
Agamben as a squirrelly thinker.58 His work fits broadly into the category of political 
philosophy, but he pilfers ideas from innumerable other disciplines, including ancient historical 
anthropology, literary theory, poetry, the Bible, and church history, and he moves from one 
discipline to another rapidly. The reason for this massive scope of Agamben’s investigations is 
that his topic is proportionally massive: He seeks to analyze “life” itself. Specifically, he wants 
to explore how human beings come to think about “life” in politically significant ways. In the 
course of doing so, the theme of inoperativity emerges repeatedly. This section first describes 
Agamben’s “method”59 for approaching inoperativity, and then assesses what an inoperative life 
would look like and what type of politics would arise from it. 
 
58 Thomas Carl Wall describes the structure of Agamben’s book The Coming Community as “crazy, slightly 
drunk (even as the thinking in it is precise and delicate).” See Thomas Carl Wall, Radical Passivity: Levinas, 
Blanchot, Agamben (New York: SUNY Press, 1999), 121. 
 
59 I place “method” in quotes because Agamben does not have a clearly recognizable approach in the same 
sense that Lacoste does. This does not mean that Agamben fails to utilize a consistent, rigorous approach to 





It is not possible to give a firm, overarching description of Agamben’s method for 
describing inoperativity—if by “method” we mean a linear process of reflection. That being said, 
as Leland de la Durantaye observes, there is a “unity” to the various works Agamben has 
written.60 Ancient and early modern texts form the basis for many of Agamben’s works, and he 
examines them with the question of political ontology in mind: How to describe “life.”61 
Life, according to Agamben, may be categorized in two different ways (a distinction he 
draws from ancient Greek thought, specifically Aristotle): as zoe and as bios.62 Zoe, the first form 
of life, refers to “bare” life, the life of a subsisting creature. It is characterized by an unadorned 
 
60 According to Durantaye, “Agamben has written some 20 books on topics ranging from aesthetics to 
politics, poetics to ontology. This diversity of topic is coupled with a unity—albeit an evolving one—of method.” 
See Leland de la Durantaye, “On Method, the Messiah, Anarchy and Theocracy,” afterward to Giorgio Agamben, 
The Church and the Kingdom, trans Leland de la Durantaye (London: Seagull Books, 2012), 49. This unity often 
revolves around drawing from ancient sources in order to demonstrate a trajectory in Western thought toward a 
particular political outcome. For example, by citing obscure ancient Roman sources in his Homo Sacer series, 
Agamben hopes to point to seeds of totalitarianism rooted in the Western political mind. As Colby Dickinson and 
Adam Kotsko put it, “in Homo Sacer, we learn that the entire history of Western political thought was always 
heading towards the horrors of totalitarianism.” See Colby Dickinson and Adam Kotsko, Agamben’s Coming 
Philosophy: Finding a New Use for Theology (New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 2015), 4. One could certainly 
argue that this method is speculative and arbitrary, and as scientific historical theory goes, this might be correct. 
However, Agamben’s approach utilizes ancient sources not so much as “proofs” for historical theorems as 
paradigms or case studies of recurring realities in history. In other words, it is not the case that contemporary 
sovereigns directly have in mind the ancient figure of the homo sacer when making political pronouncements, but 
rather that they find themselves reenacting the underlying idea phenomenon of the homo sacer.  
 
61 Matthew Abott argues that Agamben’s work on poetry, language and aesthetics is not merely a critical 
investigation into the quirks of those disciplines, but a study of the political results of the question of human being, 
or what might be called a “political ontology.” See Matthew Abott, The Figure of this World: Agamben and the 
Question of Political Ontology (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2014). 
 
62 This distinction occurs throughout his work, but see especially Giorgio Agamben, Homo Sacer: 
Sovereign Power and Bare Life, trans. Daniel Heller-Roazen (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998); The Open: 
Man and Animal, trans. Kevin Attell (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003); and particularly the first chapter of 
The Use of Bodies, trans. Adam Kotsko (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2016), 3-23.The zoe/bios 
categorization is also important for Michel Foucault, a thinker with whose work Agamben often engages, as well as 
for thinkers such as Roberto Esposito. See Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality: Volume One, An Introduction, 
trans. Robert Hurley (New York: Random House, 1978). See also Roberto Esposito, Bios: Biopolitics and 




functioning on the earth, prior to complex forms of socialization. Human beings are, in many 
ways, discrete biological systems, with certain basic needs and drives, summarized by social 
scientists in terms of the “Four F’s”: feeding, fighting, fleeing, and reproduction. However, 
human beings do not stay as such. We form another kind of life, designated with the Greek term 
bios. This is political life, life under law, corresponding to life within the polis for Aristotle.63 
Bios arises from the making and enforcing of institutions of law, whether they be states, local 
governments, churches, universities, or social clubs. Much of Western political philosophy, from 
Hobbes and Rousseau up to Rawls and Nozick, seeks to describe how zoe should be transformed 
into bios—how human beings in a “state of nature” should form political institutions that 
establish laws, and thereby ensure rights. 
Ultimately, these institutions become marked by the exercise of sovereignty. For 
Agamben, the sovereign is the one who guarantees that a person is more than merely zoe, but 
also bios. This creation and enforcement of a certain type of bios is what Agamben, following 
Foucault, calls “biopolitics.”64 In most Western states, this happens visibly in the process of 
citizenship. The United States, for example, was ostensibly founded on the premise of ensuring 
 
63 Agamben’s use of Aristotle on the differentiation between different forms of life is provocative, 
particularly since Aristotle is not often viewed as a thinker within the “social contract” tradition. On Agamben’s 
understanding of bare life and Aristotle’s categories see James Gordon Finlayson, “‘Bare life and Politics in 
Agamben’s Reading of Aristotle,” The Review of Politics 72 (2010): 97-126. 
 
64 Agamben makes the argument that biopolitics begins with the “sovereign exception.” See Agamben, 
Homo Sacer, 6.  Biopolitics often connotes forms of political power that rely less on overtly hierarchical systems 
and more on organizing life in such a way as to force human beings into certain political frameworks. This does not 
mean it is noncoercive or not truly sovereign. As Colby Dickinson observes, “Biopolitics . . . is little more than the 
force of sovereignty removed from a symbolic figurehead, such as kingship, and directed into a myriad of effects 
produced upon our biological bodies.” See Colby Dickinson, Agamben and Theology (London: T&T Clark 
International, 2011), 57. Although biopolitics is often depicted as a modern phenomenon, Agamben’s work roots it 
in the formation of the self that plays into every political engagement. “In other words, politics has always been 
biopolitics”—is the summary of Claire Colebrook and Jason Maxwell, Agamben (Cambridge: Polity, 2016), 61. In 




“inalienable rights” to human beings, by granting these rights to U.S. citizens. As a citizen, I 
have the capacity to play a role in political action, through voting, petitioning elected officials, 
and taking advantage of those freedoms guarded for me by the government. The sovereignty of 
the U.S. government preserves these rights for me. 
But even the briefest examination of political history reveals that no rights are ever 
always considered inalienable. The sovereign is also the one who declares the state of exception 
over who may be considered purely as bios, and there are many such states of exception.65 In 
most western countries, the sovereign stands under the authority of the law, but may 
paradoxically suspend the law when doing so is necessary to preserve the institution of 
sovereignty. Sovereigns usually describe these events as “states of emergency,” but such 
emergencies may easily morph into permanent conditions. An example of this would be Hitler’s 
suspension of the Weimar Constitution, which ultimately created his capacity as a dictator. 
Another example would be the U.S. government’s decision under George W. Bush to hold 
potential “terrorists” in detention centers such as Guantanamo Bay indefinitely without trial, 
thereby creating a clear violation of the writ of habeas corpus.66 
 
65 Here Agamben follows Schmitt’s understanding of the “state of exception,” with the key difference being 
that for Agamben, the state of exception morphs into a permanent feature of political engagement, because the state 
of exception is involved in the construction of the human person as such. In this respect one can see the influence of 
Arendt’s work on human existence in relation to power on his thinking. See Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958. For an overview of Agamben’s connections to Arendt see Anthony 
Curtis Adler, “Fractured Life and the Ambiguity of Historical Time: Biopolitics in Agamben and Arendt,” Cultural 
Critique 86 (2014): 1-30. 
 
66 In-depth analyses of these examples (as well as other instances of emergency situations as opportunities 
for the exercise of sovereign power) can be found in Giorgio Agamben, State of Exception, trans. Kevin Attell 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005), 3-22. On the significance of Agamben’s understanding of sovereignty 
for understanding these types of deprivations of human rights see John Lechte and Saul Newman, Agamben and the 




In the state of exception, the sovereign may categorize certain human beings as bare life, 
or at least on the border between zoe and bios. Agamben uses the ancient Roman example of the 
homo sacer—a human being who, according to ancient sources, “could be killed but not 
sacrificed” as the model of this atypical form of existence.67 The homo sacer was human, 
undoubtedly, but did not fall into the category of a fully human being who would thus be eligible 
for ritual death. Agamben’s modern example of a site where this reduction of life happens is the 
concentration camp, where persons live as human beings, but with their biopolitical humanity 
negated. Another modern example that could be added to Agamben’s analysis would be the 
condition of many refugees, whose native governments fail to provide them with adequate 
protections for their rights, but who are also denied entry into other countries.68 Such “stateless 
persons” become subhuman, but in a fascinating and disturbing way. We all recognize that they 
are human beings in their physical nature, but they lack the capacity for “life” in the sense that 
citizens possess it.69 Stateless persons are rendered inoperative, an inoperativity made visible in 
the vivid images of refugee camps at borderlands, where impoverished families mill about 
 
67 See Agamben, Homo Sacer, 3-32. 
 
68 On the significance of refugees as examples of this form of life see Giorgio Agamben, Means without 
Ends: Notes on Politics, trans. Vincenzo Binetti and Cesare Casarino (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 
2000), 15-16. 
 
69 Here, as Lechte and Newman observe, we encounter a paradox: Bare life is not “real” life, but we cannot 
escape its call on us as life. Using the example of slavery in Aristotle’s Politics, Lechte and Newman write, “Not to 
be human in any way would make the slave entirely outside any possible status hierarchy. The natural slave, in 
Aristotle’s terms, must still be human, otherwise slavery has no meaning. The slave, in other words, has to be 
included as human, in order to be excluded from every existing form of social life.” See Lechte and Newman, 
Agamben and the Politics of Human Rights, 50. By positing zoe life “on the threshold” of human society in this 
manner, Agamben’s work differs from Arendt’s, who portrays the life of persons such as slaves as still having a 
place in society, without the freedoms and capacities of a full member. See Arendt, The Human Condition, 177-179. 
For Agamben, by contrast, the slave or refugee dwells in an “exclusive inclusion” rather than a full exclusion or 
inclusion. He or she is part of the society by not being a part. A good example of this would be migrant workers, 
whose significance to their host country is often that precisely because they are not members of the society, they can 




waiting to see whether they may be admitted into a new country. Many similar examples of 
biopolitical inoperativity could be adduced to these, including the conditions of minorities under 
racist voter-suppression laws, persons with disabilities, young children, and, in many cases, 
women.70 
The typical neo-liberal response to these states of exception is horror at the flagrant 
violations of constitutional law they embody. It seems dramatically unfair to dehumanize certain 
arbitrary groups of people. According to this vein of thought, the sovereign must be held 
accountable for ensuring inalienable rights for those within the sovereign’s jurisdiction. 
However, under a biopolitical paradigm, it seems impossible to prevent the sovereign from 
ushering a permanent (or at least semi-permanent) state of exception, in which certain human 
beings are rendered inoperative as life on the threshold of zoe and bios. The distinction always 
sneaks in underneath every call for human rights. Agamben points to Aristotle’s analysis of 
slavery in the Politics, where the slave’s existence as threshold life used by the slave master is 
necessary for the latter’s fully bios-life: “The slave in fact represents a not properly human life 
that renders possible for others the bios politikos, that is to say, the truly human life.”71 
According to Agamben, western political thought has taken for granted that the exemplary 
subject is bios-life, forgetting the existence of those human beings who reside at the threshold 
 
70 Matthew Abbott points out that for Agamben, the sovereignty of capitalism itself tends to produce 
subjected individuals whose insignificance reduces them to a form of inoperativity. See Matthew Abbott, “Glory, 
Spectacle, and Inoperativity: Agamben’s Praxis of Theoria,” in Agamben and Radical Politics, ed. Daniel 
McLoughlin (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2016), 27-48. This idea seems to cut against the popular 
mindset we have seen in Moltmann and Heschel, that modern capitalism creates a frenetic pace of activity. 
However, the paradox of capitalism could be that it produces both dizzying production rates as well as toxic 
unemployment and decadent lethargy. A similar thesis seems to be found in Benjamin Noys, Malign Velocities: 
Accelerationism and Capitalism (Winchester: Zero Books, 2014). 
 




between the two forms.72 These human beings are essential to the political order, as invisible as 
they often are. It is easy to forget, in a society without chattel slavery, that there are numerous 
persons whose practical existence is slave-like, in the sense that they cannot make free decisions 
about the type of labor they will do, and are often subjected to dehumanizing conditions while 
doing it. They are barred from fully bios-life, yet they enable that life to attain itself. As Colby 
Dickinson observes, this situation is marked by what could only be called “precariousness.”73 
This precarious quality emerges from the fact that pursuit of ideal “human” goals only proceeds 
by diminishing certain human forms of life. Congress, one might say, could not run long without 
the capitol sewer-plumbers and sanitation workers. 
For this reason, the solution to the problem of sovereignty cannot be an increasing 
emphasis on enhancing rights for bios-individuals. This standard liberal approach seems noble, 
but it inadvertently creates conditions whereby certain persons face a reduction of their 
humanity. To give one example, a policy to increase welfare benefits for citizens in order to 
preserve their rights to shelter and education is an admirable humanitarian idea, but it often leads 
to populist tendencies to keep poor migrants out of the country, lest they cripple extensive 
welfare provisions. Sovereigns preserve power by pitting the poor against the poor, as refugees 
become the nemeses of lower-class native citizens. Within the biopolitical paradigm, laws that 
 
72 Agamben makes a striking observation: “The anthropology that we have inherited from classical 
philosophy is modeled on the free man. Aristotle developed his idea of the human being starting from the paradigm 
of the free man, even if this latter implies the slave as his condition of possibility” (Agamben, The Use of Bodies, 
20). 
 
73 Dickinson comments on Agamben’s incisive recognition of the “contradictions and aporias” that lurk 
underneath political rhetoric of identity and territory: “The precarious position of the political thus comes to define 
its existence, and in some sense at least to legitimate its often (inherently) violent means. The ‘People’ of the polis 
are therefore wedded to the exclusion of certain forms of life (the ‘others’, the ‘enemy,’ those ‘people’ who are no 
part of the ‘us,’ or the always political ‘we’).” See Dickinson, Agamben and Theology, 58. 
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are founded on a zoe/bios distinction inevitably reinforce that distinction, forcing persons who 
live on the threshold or below it into a violent suppression, what I will call (using Agamben’s 
terms, though not his precise formulation) a “sovereign inoperativity.” This type of inoperativity 
maintains a stasis of hierarchy, ensuring that those who have the freedom of full humanity may 
continue in that role, while those who do not will remain in a perpetual state of subjugation. 
What is the solution to the woes of the biopolitical paradigm? If simply attempting to 
extend the realm of bios-life and prevent sovereign inoperativity will not work, what other 
options do we have? Agamben has no thoroughly developed political proposal to offer. 
However, he does point toward a solution, and it is another type of inoperativity. 
Agamben’s Understanding of Inoperativity 
So far, I have referenced one type of inoperativity Agamben analyzes: Sovereign 
inoperativity. However, there is another type of inoperativity at play in Agamben’s thought, one 
that often appears when Agamben dwells on the category of the “messianic.”For this reason, it 
might be called “messianic inoperativity.”74 In what follows I will describe both of these forms 
of inoperativity, in order to show how for Agamben the second form is the remedy for the 
problems of the first. 
 
74 As mentioned in my discussion of the term “messianic” in connection to Moltmann’s work, it is 
important to clarify what this word means in the context in which Agamben and I will use it. Dickinson emphasizes 
that “(t)there are few religious terms that have received such heavy traffic in recent philosophical usage as ‘the 
messianic’” (Dickinson, Agamben and Theology, 86). According to Colebrook and Maxwell, Agamben’s 
understanding of the “messianic” “is drawn from Walter Benjamin’s attempt to think about a messianic event that is 
not some future fulfillment of this fallen world, and is instead the ‘happiness’ of this world lived elsewhere” 
(Colebrook and Maxwell, Agamben, 51). For further analysis of Agamben’s indebtedness to Benjamin see Adam 
Kotsko’s chapter “Reading the ‘Critique of Violence,’” in Dickinson and Kotsko, Agamben’s Coming Philosophy, 
41-50. On Benjamin’s development of this and related themes see Walter Benjamin, Selected Writings, vol. 4, ed. 
Marcus Bollock and Michael W. Jennings (Cambridge: Belknap Press, 2006), 250. I will explain below what a 
“messianic” understanding of inoperativity means in detail for Agamben. At this point, I will only point out that this 
specific understanding of the term entails that a “messianic” politics should not be confused with any particular 





In his most explicitly theo-political work, The Kingdom and the Glory, Agamben points 
out that in theological and monarchical tradition, the sovereign, or God himself, is permanently 
inoperative. Agamben finds this visible in the liturgical phenomenon of “glorifying God.” 
According to Christian tradition, God is infinitely perfect, the instantiation of glory itself. But if 
this is true, why glorify glory? The worshipper who proclaims “glory to God in the highest” 
therefore accomplishes nothing by worshipping (this was substantially Lacoste’s point, as we 
have seen). Glorification is essentially useless. What does this say about the nature of God’s 
being? 
Agamben’s answer to this question is clear: the inoperativity of worship reveals the 
nature of pure sovereignty, which is itself inoperativity hidden behind glory. Agamben explains: 
Inasmuch as it names the ultimate ends of man and the condition that follows the 
Last Judgment, glory coincides with the cessation of all activity and all works. It 
is what remains after the machine of divine oikonomia has reached its completion 
and the hierarchy of angelic ministries has become completely inoperative. While 
in hell something like penal administration is still in operation, paradise not only 
knows no government, but also no writing, reading, no theology, and even no 
liturgical celebration—besides doxology, the hymn of glory. Glory occupies the 
place of postjudicial inoperativity; it is the eternal amen in which all works and all 
divine and human words are resolved.75 
 
Agamben argues that the ritual institution of Sabbath is a “grandiose image” of this divine 
inoperativity. He cites the first creation story in Genesis, in which creation climaxes not with the 
act of creating itself, but with God’s rest on the seventh day. Agamben quotes the Jewish 
philosopher Philo (“only God truly possesses inoperativity”) and the author of Hebrews, both of 
 
75 Giorgio Agamben, The Kingdom and the Glory: For a Theological Genealogy of Economy and 




whom present an image of divine Sabbath-keeping. For Agamben, God’s Sabbath rest is the core 
of God’s sovereignty—which is hidden behind the veil of glory. As Agamben puts it,  
(T)he center of the governmental apparatus, the threshold at which Kingdom and 
Government ceaselessly communicate and ceaselessly distinguish themselves 
from one another is, in reality, empty; it is only the Sabbath and katapausis—and, 
nevertheless, this inoperativity is so essential for the machine that it must at all 
costs be adopted and maintained at its center in the form of glory.76 
 
Simply stated, inoperativity is the stasis of sovereign rule—the essential “pointlessness” of 
sovereign power. If all things exist for God, then God’s rule over all things is a self-reflective 
circle. The humming of the universe has no external end. The great chain of being is immobile, 
and it is as if a permanent caste system is embedded in the cosmos, with God at the top, 
preserving a steady-flow of top down power throughout the system. 
How can a totalitarian power be inoperative, and still be sovereign? Here it is helpful to 
think of the rule of medieval nobles and other ruling classes, who for much of history were set 
apart in the hierarchy by the privilege of avoiding labor—being inoperative. Their job was, in 
essence, to preserve the distinction between themselves and those lesser persons who were stuck 
lower in the hierarchy. The role of the throne in classical monarchy is immensely relevant in this 
regard. The one who rules does not engage in vigorous action, but simply sits adorned in 
majesty. Even today, the “effortlessness” of political leaders constitutes their ultimate panache. 
During a time of crisis, the president may appear before a camera, calmly addressing the people 
from a comfortable chair behind a desk. Just as God is the unmoved mover, the ultimate authority 
does not act but instead exists as the reason why others are forced to act. Through inoperativity, 
the sovereign remains raison de etre of the governmental apparatus. 
 




Rituals of inoperativity, such as Sabbath, could be taken as tokens of sovereign 
inoperativity. To put it bluntly, the divine command to keep Sabbath could function as a 
reminder of God’s dominance. Perhaps some Biblical accounts would fit such a reading, such as 
the obscure story in Numbers 15:32-36, in which an unnamed Israelite is stoned for gathering 
firewood on the Sabbath (the execution is carried out in direct obedience to divine command, as 
if the sovereign deity himself were offended by the man’s act). If this is the case, it would also 
overthrow Lacoste’s affirmative framing of liturgical inoperativity, which he claims reveals the 
“non-necessity of the Absolute.” Rather than upsetting the idea of God as pure act, Lacoste’s 
night vigil would reassert the sovereign activity of God—only this time as the sovereign whose 
actions spring from a core of inoperativity. Rituals of inoperativity such as Sabbath would thus 
be a way in which the zoe/bios distinction could be preserved. 
Of course, this reading of inoperativity as an institution of divine glory is not the only 
interpretation of inoperativity and the creation story available. As we have seen in Moltmann’s 
work, the Sabbath of creation could also be the sign of God’s restful solidarity with creation—
God’s symbol of creative freedom or “letting be.” Such a reading of Genesis might also 
harmonize better with modern science, which depicts the origin of the world less as an act of a 
cosmic magician and more as the outcome of free events. This leads us to the second type of 
inoperativity Agamben discusses. 
Messianic Inoperativity 
The concept of messianic inoperativity in Agamben’s work is tantalizingly vague. 
Agamben stimulates the reader with hints at its qualities, without ever summarily describing it. 
While describing the way Christian theology has understood sovereign inoperativity, Agamben 
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cites an intriguing passage from Augustine’s De Civitas Dei, where Augustine posits an “eternal 
inoperativity”: “After this period (the end of time) God shall be inoperative on the Sabbath, when 
he shall make inoperative itself that very Sabbath that we shall be.”77 Agamben comments: 
“Here, in a stuttering attempt to think the unthinkable, Augustine defines the final condition as a 
sabbatism to the nth degree, a making the Sabbath take rest in the Sabbath, a resolving of 
inoperativity into inoperativity.”78 Although Agamben never fully clarifies what this means, his 
language suggests a new type of inoperativity which is not the substructure of the glory of 
sovereignty. Rather, this inoperativity renders inoperative the very suspension of activity which 
constitutes sovereign authority. 
Such a self-negating dialectic of inoperativity seems to shed additional light on 
Agamben’s exploratory inquiry near the conclusion of The Kingdom and the Glory: “Is it 
possible to think inoperativity outside the apparatus of glory?”79 Agamben leaves this question 
without a solid answer, but he points to the Jewish and Christian concepts of eternal life and a 
messianic age as starting points. As is clear from Augustine’s text, the messianic age is a future 
time when inoperativity will itself become inoperative—the glory will no longer shroud the 
sovereign deity’s dominant inoperativity, but will be borne by all the blessed in the form of the 
stephanos, or crown of righteousness. However, Agamben points out that for Paul, the messianic 
age is not merely future, but extends into the present through Jesus Christ. “This life,” Agamben 
argues, “is marked by a special indicator of inoperativity, which in some ways anticipates the 
 
77 Augustine, cited in Agamben, The Kingdom and the Glory, 242. 
 
78 Agamben, The Kingdom and the Glory, 241. 
 




sabbatism of the Kingdom in the present: the hos me, the ‘as not.’”80 In a sense, just as for the 
author of the book of Hebrews (who claims that “today” is the time to enter God’s Sabbath rest 
in Hebrews 4:7-8), the ultimate, non-sovereign inoperativity of the Sabbath is available now. 
This tension between the already and not-yet is a direct result of the work of the Messiah. 
Agamben further elaborates:  
In the same way that the Messiah has brought about the law and, at the same time, 
rendered it inoperative (the verb that Paul uses to express the relation between the 
Messiah and the law—katargein—literally means ‘to render argos,’ inoperative), 
so the hos me maintains and, at the same time, deactivates in the present all the 
juridical conditions and all the social behaviors of the members of the messianic 
community.81 
 
The Messiah does not suspend law altogether. That would constitute a sovereign form of 
inoperativity, or the Schmittian state of exception. The Sabbath, understood as a divine command 
to suspend action in deference to the authority of the Deity, would constitute such a state of 
exception. But this is not what the Messiah does. The Messiah suspends the law of suspension 
itself, refusing to negate it, but behaving as if it were not a sovereign authority. Agamben tries to 
describe this mysterious existence: “To live in the Messiah means precisely to revoke and render 
inoperative at each instant every aspect of the life that we live, and to make the life for which we 
live, which Paul calls ‘the life of Jesus’ appear within it.”82 This is Agamben’s interpretation of 
what Benjamin called “now-time” (jetzeit), a time of “emergency” that counteracts the 
permanent state of emergency called by the sovereign.83 Such a messianic form of inoperativity 
 
80 Agamben, The Kingdom and the Glory, 248. 
 
81 Agamben, The Kingdom and the Glory, 248. 
 
82 Agamben, The Kingdom and the Glory, 248. 
 
83 Benjamin writes: “The tradition of the oppressed teaches us that the ‘state of emergency’ in which we 
live is not the exception but the rule. We must attain to a conception of history that accords with this insight. Then 
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does not create a new form of dominance or sovereignty, but creates the possibility for a new 
political order.84 In Agamben’s words, “The messianic life is the impossibility that life might 
coincide with a predetermined form, the revoking of every bios in order to open it to the zoe tou 
Iesou.”85 
What does a messianic type of inoperativity look like? How does it differ from the 
hegemonic Sabbath of sovereign inoperativity? Agamben offers no precise answer. In a sense, 
because it is characterized by potentiality—a “still to come” element—a messianic inoperativity 
is impossible to fully articulate. Nevertheless, since the messianic future also extends into the 
present, some notion of a messianic inoperativity should be available for reflection. Agamben 
posits a decisive hint: messianic inoperativity is a form of praxis that reveals and enables basic, 
common human being—what Agamben calls “the Whatever” or “Whatever being,” which also 
correlates with what he calls a “form of life.”86 In his later work, Agamben harnesses the term 
 
we will clearly see that it is our task to bring about a real state of emergency, and this will improve our position in 
the struggle against Fascism.” See Walter Benjamin, “Theses on the Philosophy of History,” in Illuminations, ed. 
Hannah Arendt, trans. Harry Zohn (New York: Schocken, 1969), 253-264 (quote taken from thesis VIII). On 
Benjamin’s attempt to create a “state of emergency” opposed to the sovereign state of emergency see Michael 
Löwy, Fire Alarm: Reading Walter Benjamin’s “On the Concept of History, trans. Chris Turner (New York: Verso, 
2005). 
 
84 In The Use of Bodies Agamben comments (in the context of a discussion of slavery in Paul’s thought): 
“The Pauline ‘as not,’ by putting each factical condition in tension with itself, revokes and deactivates it without 
altering its form (weeping as not weeping, having a wife as not having a wife, slaves as not slaves). That is to say, 
the messianic calling consists in the deactivation and disappropriation of the factical condition, which is therefore 
opened to a new possible use. The ‘new creature’ is only the capacity to render the old inoperative and use it in a 
new way: ‘if one is in the messiah, a new creature: the old things have passed away, behold they have become new’ 
(2 Corinthians 5:17).” See Giorgio Agamben, The Use of Bodies, 56. 
 
85 Agamben, The Kingdom and the Glory, 248-49. 
 
86 See Giorgio Agamben, The Coming Community, trans. Michael Hardt (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 1992), 4-5. According to Wall, “There is nothing mysterious, magical, or ineffable about the 
Whatever. It is as common as can be. It is the most common. It is not representable or thematizable, not because it is 
withdrawn, silent, negative, or removed, but because it is too common.” See Wall, Radical Passivity, 123. Wall’s 
understanding of this “Whatever” or passivity in Agamben points toward a form of life without predicates or 
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“use” to describe this type of praxis. In The Use of Bodies, where Agamben places inoperativity 
in the category of use, he attempts to explain the complicated relationship between inoperativity 
and potential: 
Use is constitutively an inoperative praxis, which can happen only on the basis of 
a deactivation of the Aristotelian apparatus potential/act, which assigns to 
energia, to being-at-work, primacy over potential. Use is, in this sense, a principle 
internal to potential, which prevents it from being simply consumed in the act and 
drives it to turn once more to itself, to make itself a potential of potential, to be 
capable of its own potential (and therefore its own impotential).87 
 
Later in the same context Agamben claims that the inoperative work “will expose in the act the 
potential of acting.”88 But how exactly does it do this? 
In Nudities Agamben includes an essay on “The Glorious Body” that sheds light on this 
question. Drawing from the ongoing medieval-to-modern theological debate over what the post-
resurrection human body will be like, Agamben asks a probing question: What would be the 
significance of the reproductive and nutritive organs in a glorious body which will need neither 
sexual activity nor sustenance? For an answer, Agamben turns to the Angelic Doctor: “Aquinas’s 
strategy is clear: to separate organs from their specific physiological functions. The purpose of 
each organ, like that of any instrument, is its operation; but this does not mean that if the 
operation fails, then the instrument becomes useless (frustra sit instrumentum).”89 Even by doing 
nothing, the bodily organs function as a “display”—they reveal the virtuous or “glorious” 
 
identities. Wall thus links Agamben to the “unavowable” community posited by Blanchot (see the section on 
Lacoste above). 
 
87 Agamben, The Use of Bodies, 93. 
 
88 Agamben, The Use of Bodies, 94. 
 





capacity corresponding to their form. For this reason, according to Agamben, “the glorious body 
is an ostensive body whose functions are not executed but rather displayed. Glory, in this sense is 
in solidarity with inoperativity.”90 Here, completely deactivated sexual organs correspond to the 
glorious inoperativity of the sovereign Sabbath. This is the inoperativity of sovereign power. 
After discussing the obvious aspects of the glorious body, Agamben quickly moves into 
an articulation of the other type of inoperativity—the messianic form. He makes a crystal-clear 
exposition of the distinction between the two types: 
Glory is nothing other than the separation of inoperativity into a special sphere: 
that of worship or liturgy. In this way, what was merely a threshold that granted 
access to a new use is transformed into a permanent condition. A new use for the 
body is thus possible only if it wrests the inoperative function from its separation, 
only if it succeeds in bringing together within a single place and in a single 
gesture both exercise and inoperativity, economic body and glorious body, 
function and its suspension.91 
 
The type of inoperativity that that Agamben seeks is not the type that freezes into glory, but 
rather opens up potential for new use. In the case of the sexual organs, this new type of 
inoperativity corresponds to sexual pleasure without procreative ends; and in the case of the 
human body as a whole, it corresponds to dance, in which regular, goal-oriented movement is 
translated into “pointless” movement which exceeds the natural potential of the body as such.92 
Neither non-procreative sex nor dance are opposed to natural movements in a direct, agonistic 
 
90 Agamben, Nudities, 59. 
 
91 Agamben, Nudities, 101-102. 
 
92 In Agamben’s words: “This is precisely what amorous desire and so-called perversion achieve every time 
they use the organs of the nutritive and reproductive functions and turn them—in the very act of using them—away 
from their physiological meaning, toward a new and more human operation. Or consider the dancer, as he or she 
undoes and disorganizes the economy of corporeal movements to then rediscover them, at once intact and 




way (contra some natural-law theologians), but they suspend “from within” the natural 
trajectories of the body in order to create new, “playful” possibilities.93 This is why in The Time 
That Remains, Agamben argues that in Paul’s writings, the significance of Christ’s work is a 
“messianic inversion of the potential/act relation.”94 Paul’s messiah renders the works of the law 
katargoumen (inoperative) he “gives potential back to them,” and in doing so preserves them (in 
a different way).95 Here Agamben builds upon and extends similar insights made by Jacob 
Taubes about how the “messianic” element of Paul’s thought inserts relativity into the 
Jew/Gentile distinction.96 The Messiah is therefore not anarchic in such a way as to remove 
governmentality and prepare the way for fascism, as Mitchell Dean critically suggests.97 The 
 
93 Agamben explicitly refers to the significance of “play” in this respect in his work Infancy and History, 
trans. Liz Heron (New York: Verso, 1993), 70. Kevin Attell argues that play, for Agamben, points to a type of 
activity which escapes both sacral as well as practical economic significance, pointing to a more basic level of 
being. See Kevin Attell, Giorgio Agamben: Beyond the Threshold of Deconstruction (New York: Fordham 
University Press, 2015), 260-61. 
 
94 Giorgio Agamben, The Time That Remains: A Commentary on the Letter to the Romans, trans. Patricia 
Dailey (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005), 97. 
 
95 See Agamben, The Time That Remains, 99-101. 
 
96 See Jacob Taubes, The Political Theology of St. Paul, trans. Dana Hollander (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 2004). Taubes’s “negative” political theology holds many resemblances to what Agamben 
attempts to accomplish, particularly in his use of Paul. On the concept of a negative political theology see Marin 
Terpstra and Theo de Wit, “ ‘No Spiritual Investment in the World as It Is’: Jacob Taubes’s Negative Political 
Theology,” in Flight of the Gods: Philosophical Perspectives on Negative Theology, ed. Ilse N. Bulhof and Laurens 
ten Kate (New York: Fordham University Press, 2000), 320-53. 
 
97 Sharply critical of Agamben’s discussion of inoperativity in The Kingdom and the Glory, Dean writes, 
“we might ask whether it makes sense for all ‘profane powers,’ including those of public bureaucracy and states, ‘to 
be deactivated and made inoperative’ (p. 166) when they form an important limit to the glorification of the economy  
and the civil havoc this wreaks. Was it not, after all, the collapse of state authority and a ‘transcendent’ sovereignty 
in the face of the anarchic spiralling (sic) of an economy in crisis that prepared the way for fascism, as Agamben 
himself indicates?” (Mitchell Dean, “Governmentality Meets Theology: ‘The King Reigns, but He Does Not 
Govern,’” Theology, Culture, and Society 29, no. 3 (2012): 145-158, 157). I submit that Dean misunderstands 
Agamben’s proposal. Agamben wishes not for complete deactivation in the sense of a sovereign state of exception, 




Messiah’s goal is to create a new potential for life at the threshold of distinctions, not simply to 
annihilate currently existing order.98 
What, then, is the solution to the problem of sovereign inoperativity? It is the type of 
inoperative praxis which upends from within the old model of glorious sovereignty displayed 
through sovereign inoperativity.99 Messianic inoperativity does not negate the law or make it 
obsolete. Rather, it is a force of praxis that opens up new potentialities for inoperativity (here one 
cannot help but think of Jesus’ attitude toward the Sabbath described in the Gospels—a theme I 
will return to in chapter 4). In this sense, this type of inoperativity could be “liturgical”—but in a 
way that circumvents the tendency to loop inoperativity together with glory, in the way seen in 
the liturgy that Agamben analyzes in The Kingdom and the Glory. Messianic inoperativity is 
certainly a religious ritual, but also at the same time a political “founding” act—or perhaps a 
 
98 In The Open, Agamben describes how the “anthropological machine” that governs political life may be 
rendered inoperative in a way that is profoundly nonviolent—he uses the example of lovers in a Titian painting, who 
display a “neutralized” relationship—neither fully human nor animal but without work (senz’opera). See Agamben, 
The Open, 85-87. 
 
99 The qualification “from within” is main feature of Agamben’s understanding of inoperativity vis-à-vis 
political structures, and it is also an element of Agamben’s philosophy that is contested by his critics, particularly 
Ryan Hansen. According to Hansen, Agamben’s messianic inoperativity (particularly as elucidated in his 
Agamben’s study of Paul in The Time that Remains) stays within a plane of pure immanence, meaning that the 
messianic force opposes current powers of sovereignty within this plane. Hansen, by contrast claims that the Pauline 
approach to the messianic force is rather an “apocalyptic” one, entailing a transcendence that constitutes “the 
fullness of Christ” that “fills all things.” For Hansen, this means that Paul’s politics is not competitive in the way 
Hansen understands Agamben’s interpretation of Paul. For Hansen, “The end of one age and the other and of the 
other age exist on the same plane in a non-competitive transcendence, such that the old is opened up and made 
porous to the new, non-antagonistically.” See Ryan Hansen, “Messianic or Apocalyptic? Engaging Agamben on 
Paul and Politics,” in Paul, Philosophy, and the Theopolitical Vision: Critical Engagements with Agamben, Badiou, 
Žižek, and Others, ed. Douglas Harink (Eugene, OR: Cascade Books, 2010), 217-218. Although Hansen’s claim that 
Paul posits a “transcendence within immanence” of the messianic force seems true, his claim that this does not 
involve a competitive relationship between the messianic force and sovereign power does not seem accurate with 
regard to Paul. The “principalities and powers” of the present age are clearly an enemy for Paul, entailing a 
confrontation between the immanent-and-transcendent power of the messianic and the sovereigns of the world. 




deconstructive act.100 It is similar to religious rituals heralding redemption—in that it points 
toward a world made new—but it is a ritual of redemption accomplished through what is truly 
“profanation,” as Dickinson points out.101 Paradoxically, it “functions as a state of exception 
without any form of sovereignty being associated with it.”102 Inoperative rituals such as Sabbath 
could function as forms of political/religious “gesture”—a nonviolent praxis pointing to a 
different way of being human.103 Lacoste’s liturgical inoperativity thus still has value for 
subverting sovereignty—but only as a practice that undermines sovereignty’s attempt to preserve 
itself through glory-veiled stasis. 
 
100 Dickinson points out that for Agamben, “politics would seem to be an almost religious ritual of sorts, a 
continuous reenacting of the exclusive inclusion performed upon the self in order to constitute some sense of 
sovereign being in relation to the others (both persons and animals) surrounding this newly formed humanity.” See 
Dickinson, Agamben and Theology, 72. My argument is that the messianic Sabbath is an analogous religious ritual 
to this founding act, except that it obliterates the distinction created by the “exclusive inclusion.” Perhaps one could 
call it an “anti-religious” ritual, in this sense. 
 
101 Dickinson calls Agamben’s contemplation of the human being as completely inoperative a “profaning 
gesture” (Dickinson, Agamben and Theology, 140). In a sense, a “profaning gesture” is precisely what I am arguing 
inoperative rituals may be. Agamben’s concept of profanation does not point to a derogatory act, as in what English 
speakers might call “profanity.” Rather, profanation involves rejecting the sacred/non-sacred binary that parallels the 
bios/zoe binary, and that takes part in the machine of biopolitics. In this sense, it is similar to what Harvey Cox 
called “profanity”—a type of mundane existence lived without reference to any higher goal or other world. See 
Harvey Cox, The Secular City: Secularization and Urbanization in Theological Perspective (New York: Macmillan, 
1965), 60-61. The difference between Cox’s notion of “profanity” and Agamben’s “profanation” is that the latter is 
not a rejection of a sacred identity or external purpose, but an attempt to move beyond the boundary between the 
two. By extolling profanity and rejecting supra-mundane realities, Cox in effect remains within the binary. 
Nevertheless, there is something in Cox’s attempt to advocate for a mundane life (which he believes secularization 
provides) that is reflective of what Agamben aims at. On the role of gesture more broadly see footnote 103 (below). 
 
102 Dickinson, Agamben and Theology, 91. 
 
103 “Gesture” as such is a repeated theme in Agamben’s work. It refers to a more basic, primal 
communication that does not succumb to the rigid differentiations and stratifications inherent in language. For an 
overview see Anthony Curtis Adler, “The Intermedial Gesture: Agamben and Kommerell,” Angelaki 12, no. 3 
(2007): 57-64. See also Alastair Morgan, “A Figure of Annihilated Human Existence: Agamben and Adorno on 
Gesture,” Law Critique 20 (2009): 299-307. On the significance of gesture as an alternative to forms of violent 
signification in Agamben’s philosophy see Dickinson’s chapter “Gestures of Text and Violence,” in Dickinson and 





In order to understand what Agamben’s messianic inoperativity means for politics, we 
must return to the zoe/bios distinction at the heart of his political philosophy. Keep in mind 
that—as tempting as it is—simply attempting to preserve human beings’ claim to bios is unlikely 
to be a workable method around the problem of sovereignty. Ritual inoperativity, on the other 
hand, could point to a different solution altogether. Understood through a messianic lens, 
inoperativity could be a way to deactivate the distinction between zoe and bios, enabling human 
beings to escape either classification. 
This “crossing out” of the biopolitical divide would lead not to a type of bestial life (pure 
zoe), but to a life without the need for the divide, a life divorced from identity, or rather a 
connection to identity that Agamben calls an “intimacy without relation.”104 Thus, the political 
implications of Agamben’s inoperativity hint at a destabilized state of existence, in which life is 
liberated from the constant attempts to pin it down into categories. Agamben’s work suggests 
that a political breakthrough could be reached if human beings could frame themselves neither as 
elevated into bios, nor as debased into zoe, but as caught precariously in an indefinable state, 
characterized by the “potential” as opposed to the “actual.” The type of political ethics this type 
of framework would entail is best captured by a literary figure Agamben finds himself drawn to: 
Melville’s Bartleby the scrivener, who could write but “would prefer not to.”105 This is a politics 
 
104 According to Agamben, “Form-of-life is this ban that no longer has the form of a bond or an exclusion-
inclusion of bare life but that of an intimacy without relation.” See Agamben, The Use of Bodies, 236. 
 
105 See Giorgio Agamben, Potentialities: Collected Essays in Philosophy, trans. Daniel Heller-Roazen 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999), 246-7. 
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of inaction—one that rejects a vision of how human beings are supposed to be. It involves 
looking at other persons without expectation, simply allowing them to exist in their potentiality. 
All these ideas sound serene and nice. But the main problem with Agamben’s political 
vision is how to think about it practically. This problem itself is, in a certain sense, indicative of 
the type of political program Agamben seeks to avoid. The word “practical” connotes creating or 
producing in action a theoretical vision; and how does one create or produce a political 
framework that aims at the cessation of creation and production? (I will return to this problem in 
relation to the work of Roberto Goizueta in chapter three.) One could easily imagine asking 
Agamben, “Could you describe practical ways of putting into action your political program of 
inoperativity?” and hearing him reply, “I would prefer not to.” 
As delightfully truculent an answer as that would be, it would not do justice to 
Agamben’s own thought. Clearly, he has described a political problem, and has attempted to 
envision a solution. Although his “inoperative” philosophical perspective resists incorporation 
into a political paradigm (he might point out that a “philosopher king” could easily turn 
totalitarian), it is important to reflect on the political outcomes of what a practical inoperative 
“form of life” might look like. To do so, I think it is essential to point to specific practices or 
rituals that create the type of inoperativity Agamben characterizes as messianic, or a bringing in 
of the time that remains. 
Obviously, Sabbath is one such ritual, yet strikingly, the actual practice of Sabbath 
keeping and the ancient literature around it does not appear as often in Agamben’s writing as one 
might expect, with the exception of The Kingdom and the Glory. (I may be speaking too soon; I 
have a strong hunch that Agamben may yet publish a book-length work on the Sabbath in the 
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future.) Matthew Abbott does see a repeated exaltation of the “refusal of work” in Agamben’s 
writing—a tendency Abbott thinks calls for a “practice of inoperativity” which is not simply 
inert but is also creative.106 This could be a consequence of Agamben’s own oversight, possibly 
connected to his tendency to focus on Christian sources rather than Jewish ones. It could also 
spring from the fact that Sabbath as an institution has a fundamental ambivalence about it. There 
are, as we saw in Kingdom and the Glory, two different theological types of “Sabbath” in 
Agamben’s thought. The one, corresponding to sovereign inoperativity, is a Sabbath of stasis or 
actuality. It is the rest of the king for whom all reality exists and to whom all creation gives 
glory. On the other hand, there is the messianic Sabbath, the Sabbath of potential and liberation. 
Perhaps Agamben fears that Sabbath as a ritual drifts too quickly toward the sovereign form of 
inoperativity? 
Such fears, if they exist, would not be without warrant. The political history of Sabbath 
observance in the West (particularly in Protestant Christianity) is littered with examples of 
coercive “rest” imposed on persons not as liberation, but as a fixed form of life to which they 
must correspond as a divine obligation.107 It is legitimate to hold reservations about Sabbath 
entering politics. Seventh-day Adventists have long worried that Sabbath-keeping will become a 
 
106 See Matthew Abbott, Glory, Spectacle, and Inoperativity, 42. On the concept of a “refusal of work” as 
an alternative both to capitalism and “productivist Marxism” see Kathi Weeks, The Problem with Work: Feminism, 
Marxism, Antiwork Politics, and Postwork Imaginaries (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2011), 99. 
 
107 This was the approach to Sabbath made infamous by Puritan practice in North America. According to 
Michael Borg’s assessment, the purpose of Sabbath in the minds of Puritan theologians such as Nicholas Bownde 
was to provide space for glorification of God. Summarizing Bownde, Borg concludes that “unhindered worship is 
the basis for rest in the fourth commandment.” See Michael Borg, “The Morality of the Sabbath,” Puritan Reformed 
Journal 6, no. 1 (2014): 227. See also Nicholas Bownde, Sabbathum Veteris et Novi Testamenti (London: Feli 
Kyngston, 1606). For an overview of Sabbath theology among the Puritans see James T. Dennison, Jr., The Market 





locus of control and persecution by religio-political powers. Nevertheless, it is obvious that 
Sabbath was originally not intended to play such a role, and was instead aimed at being a 
messianic force. Therefore, the political question that confronts us in response to Agamben’s 
work is: How do we encounter a truly messianic Sabbath? In other words, how do we keep 
Sabbath as a source of potentiality, rather than as a means of inducing a hierarchical stasis or 
coercion? 
The answer to this question will form a large part of chapter 4. For now, I will point out 
that such a Sabbath must be able to suspend itself. As Agamben says, it should be a “sabbatism 
to the nth degree,” one in which Sabbath itself takes rest in Sabbath. For this reason, Sabbaths 
that are enforced by legislative authority could never be messianic Sabbaths. If a ritual is 
observed because it is commanded, this will run the risk of making it a mechanism of 
hierarchical stasis. Sabbath must be a time of “weakness”—ritual that by its essential nature 
could never be enforced. It would constitute what Paul Griffiths calls a “quietist” political 
institution.108 To give a concrete illustration of this, it would be absurd for legislatures to 
mandate Sabbath observance with so called blue laws that forbid work on Saturday or Sunday, 
because in order to enforce such commands it would be necessary to make police officers work 
extra to enforce them. For this reason, the legal prescription to keep the Sabbath is a law that, in 
Agamben’s terms, can only fall into the realm of “use” or “play.” It could constitute what 
 
108 Griffiths argues that Agamben’s understanding of “law that suspends itself” points to a form of activism 
that is “quietist” in the sense that it call for no enforcement of “realistic” political ends, but simply a type of 
suggestion. See Paul J. Griffiths, “The Cross as the Fulcrum of Politics: Expropriating Agamben on Paul,” in Paul, 
Philosophy, and the Theopolitical Vision, 179-197. The main challenge I find with Griffiths’ quietism is that it 




Agamben scholar David Kishik might call an “art” that is also “a potent form of insurgency.”109 
Sabbatarians may insist that Sabbath be made into law, while—with no inconsistency—holding 
that such a law must never be made obligatory for the public. 
Another political element of truly messianic political inoperativity, per Agamben, is that 
it would need to gradually negate its own boundaries. This suggests that any religious ritual that 
insists on its own separation from normal or “secular” time could never qualify as a messianic 
Sabbath, because messianic inoperativity could not abide by any hard distinction between sacred 
and secular. Agamben, unlike philosophers such as Gianni Vattimo or theologians such as 
Harvey Cox, is not a proponent of secularizing tendencies—but not because he seeks to uphold 
the category of the “religious” or against the “secular.”110 On the contrary, his thought leads 
toward a negation of the division itself. Sabbath should neither be sacred nor secular. It should, 
on this account, reject the categorization. For Agamben, the keeping of Sabbath would emerge 
conjointly with the rise of a new type of life, one that is neither zoe nor bios, neither “worldly” 
nor “heavenly” but in the space of negation between them. It would be a Sabbath of the 
threshold. Paradoxically, then, Sabbath would cease to exist if a truly Sabbatarian humanity 
emerged, because Sabbatical time would be indistinguishable from normal time. 
The politics of this Sabbath would also need to focus on transcending or “overlooking” 
the binary oppositions that inhere to typical ritual institutions of time. Rituals tend to be sites of 
 
109 Kishik finds in Agamben’s work a pursuit of the type of destabilizing poetry that Plato once deplored. 
Art, in the form of Sabbath, could be a force that does nothing (it is purely aesthetic) but also upends the political 
order. See David Kishik, The Power of Life: Agamben and the Coming Politics (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
2012), 12. 
 
110 On Vattimo’s understanding of “weak thought” (which parallels Agamben’s project in many ways) and 
its connection to secularization see Gianni Vattimo, After Christianity, trans. Luca D’Isanto (New York: Columbia 




contention and dispute in religious communities. They are places which harden and preserve 
their identities. Sabbath, of course, is a classic example of this. But the type of Sabbath 
Agamben’s work points toward would consist in a collapse or re-division of these divisions. It 
would therefore require a type of collaborative or ecumenical quality. This would not be a 
collaboration based on confessional insouciance—the unfortunate connotation of Agamben’s 
concept of “the Whatever” celebrated by Wall.111 It is not a matter of making ritual differences 
easily negotiable. Rather, this dwelling between identities in ritual would celebrate and applaud 
these differences, while inhabiting a space of openness toward the plurality of ways in which 
inoperativity can be explored. I will return to this theme in chapter 4. 
Summary 
Agamben’s distinction between different forms of inoperativity adds a unique vantage 
point for understanding the significance of inoperative rituals. If, as Agamben argues, some 
forms of inoperativity can reinforce forms of domination, it is essential to make a careful 
analysis of any form of inoperative ritual, to ensure that participating in it does not unwittingly 
cause us to fall into such political traps. 
At the same time, Agamben’s rich characterization of messianic inoperativity points to an 
enormous significance behind ritual that perhaps even Agamben has himself has not yet realized. 
This significance will become clearer as we move through this investigation. 
 
111 Wall’s understanding of “the Whatever” may sound dismissive or excessively nonchalant toward 
individuality, but in fact the purpose of this form of life is to highlight the particularity or singularity of persons. See 




Lacoste and Agamben together offer a rich depiction of inoperativity as a political 
concept that destabilizes Western concepts of sovereign power. Lacoste explores inoperativity 
from the local vantage point of liturgy. In the act of worship, according to Lacoste, the human 
being confronts the Absolute not as an active force, but as inoperativity—that which “lets be.” 
Liturgy thus opens up a relationship to sovereign power characterized by a liberating 
inoperativity. Masters and slaves who engage in liturgy together find their relationship 
fundamentally changed because their locations in the hierarchy are relativized. Sovereigns find 
themselves moved to positions in the margins.  
Agamben’s work builds on and problematizes this framework by revealing that there are 
different types of inoperativity at work in liturgy. There are sovereign Sabbaths and messianic 
Sabbaths. The former reinforce the zoe/bios distinction, by hardening the division between Jew 
and Greek, slave and free, male and female. These distinctions require maintenance by force, and 
the sovereign Sabbath may be inflicted on a population by authorities with vested interests in 
“law and order.” In this way, inoperativity can take the form of a quietness and “order” imposed 
by a brutal, unchallenged regime. 
Or, Sabbath can take the form of a messianic inoperativity, a law that suspends itself. 
Inoperativity, framed this way negates the distinctions that turn into mechanisms of control and 
domination. A Sabbath of this sort would “dissolve” into a new type of human life. This Sabbath 
corresponds to the type of inoperativity Lacoste observes in the night vigil. 
Before constructing a political paradigm built on a practice of inoperativity, it is crucial 
to ask how religious practices of inoperativity actually “function”—that is, how experiences of 
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inoperativity practically lead to political frameworks. The thinkers explored thus far make 
helpful theological and philosophical points about the nature of inoperativity in relation to 
politics, but their work falls short of this ultimate end. Hence, we turn to two thinkers on 






INOPERATIVITY AS PRACTICE 
RAV KOOK AND ROBERTO GOIZUETA 
The challenge with abstract reasoning about inoperativity is that it can cause us to forget 
that political theology emerges from the life of communities. Theories about ritual can never 
emerge fully formed ex nihilo from the minds of genius theologians. Just as doctrinal beliefs 
must arise from liturgical actions (lex orandi, lex credendi), any theory of inoperativity must pay 
close attention to the ways in which religious traditions practically engage with inoperativity. 
For this reason, this chapter addresses this practical element by examining two forms of 
inoperativity celebrated by Jewish and Christian traditions, respectively: shmita and fiesta. Why 
do I choose to focus on these two rituals, as opposed to the more commonly recognized 
observance of the weekly Sabbath? Although the weekly Sabbath is obviously a communal 
activity, it is easy to drift into an individualist perspective on how it is celebrated. Shmita and 
fiesta, on the other hand, are strikingly communal activities, impossible to theorize about without 
reference to persons engaging with each other. I focus on these two rituals in order to highlight 
the ways in which inoperativity creates overtly political realities. The insights garnered from this 
exploration will be relevant to understanding the more common and widely-known weekly 
Sabbath, which I address in the next chapter. 
To draw insights about the practical political theology of these two rituals, I will examine 
the works of two thinkers who provide classic treatments on their political significance. Rav 




year. Roberto Goizueta, a contemporary Christian theologian, reflects extensively on the popular 
Latino/a practice of fiesta. My approach in this chapter will be to offer an overview of each 
thinker’s method for addressing these practices, followed by an assessment of the political 
implications of their work. I will conclude with a comparative summary. As I will show, the 
practical results of inoperativity articulated by each thinker provide crucial resources for 
understanding why inoperativity deeply changes contemporary notions of sovereignty.  
Rav Kook 
Because of his breadth of interests and his diverse roles as rabbi and scholar, Kook’s 
work covers enormous conceptual territories.1 For the purposes of this chapter, it is primarily his 
short Introduction to Shabbat Ha’aretz (the Sabbath of the land) that will occupy my attention.2 
Despite its brevity, this work contains dense reflections on the meaning of the shmita for the 
Jewish people’s self-understanding—reflections that also build on the concept of Sabbatical 
sovereignty I have introduced above. In order to understand the political implications of Kook’s 
approach to shmita, it is necessary first to give a brief account of the nature of the institution, and 
explain how Kook became involved in an important historic controversy about it. 
 
1 For a more expansive biographical account of Kook’s life see Yehudah Mirsky, Rav Kook: Mystic in a 
Time of Revolution (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2014).  
 






Background of Shmita 
The first references to shmita, or the Sabbatical year, are found in Exodus and Leviticus. 
These passages articulate how the people of Israel should relate to the arable land they find when 
they enter Canaan: 
For six years you shall sow your land and gather in its yield; but the seventh year 
you shall let it rest and lie fallow, so that the poor of your people may eat; and 
what they leave the wild animals may eat. You shall do the same with your 
vineyard, and with your olive orchard (Exodus 23:10-11). 
 
The purpose for this command is directly humanitarian: The land should not be cultivated “so 
that the poor of your people may eat” along with the wild animals. A similar rationale is 
articulated in Leviticus 25, with an accent on God’s possession of the land.3 Of course, this raises 
numerous interpretive and historical questions. Specifically, how does not cultivating the land 
help the poor to have more food? One would assume that if the land were not cultivated the poor 
would have less to eat rather than more. Such considerations have led scholars such as Leon 
Epsztein to posit that “the land could not have been left fallow. It was cultivated, but once the 
harvest was reaped, it was not taken in; the corn was left spread on the ground to be there for 
those who needed it.”4 Norman Habel disagrees, arguing that the text clearly points to a cessation 
 
3 The Leviticus passage reads: “When you enter the land that I am giving you, the land shall observe a 
Sabbath for the Lord. Six years you shall sow your field, and six years you shall prune your vineyard, and gather in 
their yield; but in the seventh year there shall be a Sabbath of complete rest for the land, a Sabbath for the Lord; you 
shall not sow your field or prune your vineyard. You shall not reap the aftergrowth of your harvest or gather the 
grapes of your unpruned vine; it shall be a year of complete rest for the land. You may eat what the land yields 
during its Sabbath—you, your male and female slaves, your hired and your bound laborers who live with you; for 
your livestock also, and for the wild animals in your land all its yield shall be for food” (Leviticus 25:2-7). 
 






of agriculture in every respect.5 The latter position is also affirmed by John Dominic Crossan 
who points out that Josephus records an absence of sowing in Israel during the seventh year.6 I 
do not have space here to delve into the question of how the shmita was practically conducted in 
ancient Israel. Here we must only observe that shmita emerged as a means of communal justice. 
The purpose of the command is to restore community by leveling inequality, both at the 
human/human level as well as the human/animal. This is an important point for understanding 
Kook’s approach to shmita. 
Obviously, among Jews not residing on land in Israel, shmita was not widely practiced. 
However, toward the end of the nineteenth century when Jews began returning to Palestine and 
commencing agricultural activity, the question of how and whether to implement shmita became 
a central issue. Within the state of Israel, this debate continues to this day.7 This controversy over 
an ancient Jewish practice is the context in which Kook’s contribution emerges. 
 
5 See Norman Habel, The Land is Mine: Six Biblical Land Ideologies (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1995), 
103. 
 
6 John Dominic Crossan, The Birth of Christianity (San Francisco: Harper Collins, 1999), 190. For 
Josephus’ record of first century shmita observance see his Jewish Antiquities, 14: 202. 
 
7 For an account of the various parties arguing for and against sundry details of shmita practice in modern 
Israel, with particular reference to political challenges to shmita, see Amihai Radyzner, “Israeli Legislation as Both 
Halakhic Problem and Its Solution: The Complicated Case of Heter Ha-Mekhira,” Jewish Studies 14 (2018): 1-35. It 
is important to note that the following investigations of shmita in this chapter are not meant to resolve the ongoing 
questions about how shmita should or should not be observed in the land of Israel—questions that are outside my 
scope of scholarly expertise as well as outside my religious confession. My goal through this investigation is simply 
to draw from Rav Kook’s understanding certain principles for understanding the practical role of inoperativity 







In 1904, Kook—an accomplished philosopher and Talmudic scholar—accepted a 
position as a rabbi in the newly formed Jewish community in Jaffa, Palestine. Immediately he 
was caught between two opposing groups of Jews, with different philosophical frameworks.8 The 
first was known as the Old Yishuv who consisted primarily of orthodox Jews who had sojourned 
to the land of Israel for the purposes of piety—to pray, study Torah, and generally lead a 
traditional Jewish life.9 They put little effort into the economic development of the area, relying 
more on charitable contributions from European Jews. The other group was the more secular 
Zionist pioneers also known as the New Yishuv, who were intent on building up local Jewish 
institutions within the land. They focused on establishing a strong agricultural presence in the 
area.10 The New Yishuv disdained their counterparts as hyper-religious loafers, while the Old 
Yishuv branded their opponents as shameless, ritually lax yuppies. It was a volatile situation. 
Kook sat uneasily in the middle. He appreciated the New Yishuv’s enthusiasm for 
economic development and their commitment to the long-term success of the Jewish homeland. 
At the same time, he recognized the importance of maintaining the traditions that would sustain 
Jewish identity, and prevent the type of toxic nationalism that a purely secular mentality could 
produce. Kook believed that a healthy soul for the Jewish nation could only be formed by 
 
8 For an account of Kook’s ongoing arbitration in this situation see Jacob B. Agus, High Priest of Rebirth 
(New York: Bloch, 1972). 
 
9 According to Mirsky, the Old Yishuv was marked by two facets: “enthroning Torah study at the very 
pinnacle of religious life, and hastening the Messiah’s advent by human action.” See Mirsky, Rav Kook, 45. 
 





drawing the two philosophies together. This became his life-long project, to which he applied all 
the powers of his mystical imagination. 
This imagination was informed by the Lurianic Kabbalah, which most scholars believe 
was the “backbone” of Kook’s worldview.11 This framework of Jewish mysticism was named 
after the distinguished Rabbi Isaac Luria (1534-72) who taught that the universe was pervaded 
with “sparks” of divine light which are the remnants of an explosive event at the beginning of 
creation.12 According to Luria, infinite divine energy was poured into vessels which could not 
hold them and shattered.13 Although the sparks can be found everywhere, they are usually 
shrouded by kelipot, shells of darkness that hide the divine energy. The aim of Jewish 
spirituality, in this paradigm, is to liberate the sparks. Because of the ubiquitous character of 
these sparks, anyone who seeks to unveil them must never hide from any source of spiritual 
truth, whether it be religious or secular.14 
 
11 See Julian Sinclair’s introductory chapter, “Rav Kook and the Meaning of Shmita,” in Kook, 
Introduction to Shabbat Ha’aretz 43. 
 
12 Luria’s work builds on earlier forms of kabbalah based on the Zohar and the works of mystics such as 
Azriel of Gerona and Moses Cordovero. Isaac Luria himself wrote nothing, but his ideas were carried on through his 
disciples. For historical background descriptions of the kabbalah and specifically the Lurianic variety, see Daniel C. 
Matt, The Essential Kabbalah: The Heart of Jewish Mysticism (San Francisco: HarperCollins, 1995). For a detailed 
account of Luria’s life and work see Lawrence Fine, Physician of the Soul, Healer of the Cosmos: Isaac Luria and 
His Kabbalistic Fellowship (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003). 
 
13 For early accounts of this model of creation in the Lurianic Kabbalah see Hayyim ben Joseph Vital, 
Kabbalah of Creation: Isaac Luria’s Earlier Mysticism, trans. Eliahu Klein (North Vale, NJ: Jason Aronson 
Publications, 2000). 
 
14 As David Shatz observes, this hermeneutic of synthesis is central to Kook’s approach to every aspect of 
theology. In a Jewish version of the Christian patristic idea of “plundering the Egyptians,” Kook sought to derive the 
best aspects of any philosophy into his work. “Kook,” Shatz notes, “exhorts Jews to open themselves to the realm of 
general culture, confronting and engaging the full range of secular teachings and disciplines.” See David Shatz, 
Jewish Thought in Dialogue: Essays on Thinkers, Theologies, and Moral Theories (Boston: Academic Studies 





Kook applied the logic of this Kabbalistic paradigm to his understanding of Jewish 
existence. The Jewish people, he believed, had the purpose of extending love to all people as part 
of the project of revealing divine light. This purpose entailed the rejection of a certain type of 
exclusive sovereignty: 
As long as each one exalts himself, claiming I am sovereign, I and none other—
there cannot be peace in our midst . . . All our endeavors must be directed toward 
disclosing the light of general harmony, which derives not from suppressing any 
power, any thought, any tendency, but by bringing each of them within the vast 
ocean of light infinite, where all things find their unity, where all is ennobled, all 
is exalted, all is hallowed.15 
 
This preference for universal harmony as a replacement of individual sovereignty is a 
direct outcome of Kook’s Kabbalistic mysticism. A genuine awareness of the divine 
sparks in all human beings must preclude a sense of opposition in human relationships 
(what Carl Schmitt would call “the friend-enemy distinction”). Furthermore, this 
harmonious replacement for standard sovereignty could only result from a type of 
universalism—a “letting be” of all things, and thereby releasing the sparks within them.16 
 This was not universalism in the cosmopolitan sense. Jewish identity was important, 
specifically because the clearest radiance of truth was found in the Torah, held by the Jewish 
 
15 Rav Kook, Orot Hakodesh, vol. II, 588, as cited in Ben Zion Bokser, “Introduction,” in Abraham Isaac 
Kook: The lights of Penitence, the Moral Principles, Lights of Holiness, Essays, Letters, and Poems, trans. Ben Zion 
Bokser (New York: Paulist Press, 1978), 8. 
 
16 It is important to note that in the Kabbalist texts from which Kook draws his inspiration, the concept of 
unity (yichud) is preeminently revealed in the Sabbath. This unification is modeled on divine unity, and it draws 
earth toward heaven. Norman Lamm summarizes this dynamic: “The unification within God on the Sabbath is 
reflected in a corresponding unification within man on the Sabbath. To this day Hasidim, who follow the Sephardic 
version of the liturgy, recite, on Friday nights, the passage from the Zohar beginning ke’gavna . . . . ‘even as they 
unite above in the One, so is there a unification below . . . one corresponding to one . . .” See Norman Lamm, “On 
the Unity Concept,” in Essays on the Thought and Philosophy of Rabbi Kook, ed. Ezra Gellman (New York: Herzl 





people. According to Gershon Winer, for Kook, “Jewish nationalism is elevated to universal 
significance.”17 This Jewish identity could not be closed-minded, and it always had to maintain a 
consciousness that it was for-others, tasked with liberating the divine light in all people.18 This 
Kabbalistic mysticism also forged a deep sense of hope in Kook’s approach to Jewish life. The 
sparks, after all, could not stay hidden forever. And shmita would be one of the ways in which 
they would finally emerge. 
Kook’s Understanding of Shmita 
The situation that provoked Kook’s writing on the Shabbat Ha’aretz was an aggressive 
dispute between the Old and New Yishuv on what to do with agricultural projects in Israel every 
seven years. The argument kicked off in 1888, when the New Yishuv realized that their survival 
within the land of Israel depended on continuing to profit from the land during the Sabbatical 
year. They asked several significant European rabbis (most notably Yitzak Spektor) about how to 
resolve the problem, and were told that it would be acceptable to work the land during the 
shmita, as long as the land was sold to non-Jews.19 At the end of the shmita year, the land would 
 
17 Gershon Winer, “On Religious Nationalism,” in Essays on the Thought and Philosophy of Rabbi Kook, 
(211-218) 215. 
 
18 David Shatz explains Kook’s connection of Jewish nationalism with universalism in the following way: 
“Each nation has its distinctive talents, he explains; but the talent distinctive to the Jews is their capacity to absorb, 
synthesize, and transform the best elements in surrounding cultures. Israel is, thus, ‘the quintessence of all 
humanity.’ The mission of the Jews in history is to exercise their talent for integration and creativity and then to 
bring to the outside world the new product they have fashioned. Only in that way will Israel be able to execute its 
sacred task; to elevate all of humanity and all of existence” (Shatz, Jewish Thought in Dialogue, 93). 
 
19 More specifically, according to Michael Nehorai, the heter mekhira contained two stipulations: “(1) That 
the land be sold to a non-Jew by way of circumvention, as we are accustomed to do with unleavened bread on 
Passover; and (2) that all manner of agricultural work—to begin with—be done by non-Jews, and that even in a 
situation of duress all modes of work that are biblically prohibited should not be done by Jews.” See Michael Z. 
Nehorai, “Halakhah, Metahalakha, and the Redemption of Israel: Reflections on the Rabbinic Rulings of Rav 
Kook,” in Rabbi Abraham Isaac Kook and Jewish Spirituality, eds. Lawrence J. Kaplan and David Shatz (New 




be sold back to the original Jewish owners, at a modest gain to their non-Jewish partners.20This 
compromise, known as the heter mekhira, triggered caustic debates between the traditional 
orthodox Jews, and the New Yishuv. The former alleged that this was nothing more than a 
faithless abandonment of Jewish tradition, while the latter insisted that it was unavoidable if 
Jews wanted to maintain a space in the land. 
The debate over the heter mekhira continued to grow in intensity every seven years, 
becoming especially vehement in 1909-10, when the Jewish agricultural establishments had 
grown in size, and could by no means survive a complete cessation of labor for the entire year. It 
was in this context that Kook wrote his Introduction to Shabbat Ha’aretz, in which he argued in 
favor of the heter mekhira. Kook openly admitted that this provision was innovative, without 
solid backing in halacha. His publication of this work marked a change in perspective—while 
living in Europe, Kook had initially opposed the heter mekhira.21 However, he argued that the 
renovation of the Jewish homeland was itself an unprecedented, revolutionary event, requiring 
unprecedented measures to sustain its existence. If Jews halted their agricultural production 
 
 
20 As Asher Cohen and Bernard Susser observe, this meant that the sale of the land was essentially 
“fictitious,” since the sale involved an agreement that the land would be bought back after the shmita year. On the 
technicalities of this process see Asher Cohen and Bernard Susser, “The ‘Sabbatical’ Year in Israeli Politics: An 
Intra-Religious and Religious-Secular Conflict from the Nineteenth through the Twenty-First Centuries,” Journal of 
Church and State 52, no. 3 (2010): 454-475. The fictitious nature of the heter mekhira is part of what made the 
practice so controversial among more traditional Jewish settlers in the land of Israel.  
 
21 See Daniel Z. Feldman, “A Brief Overview of Some of the Issues Related to the Hetter Mekhira,” 
Tradition 47:3 (2014): 9. Feldman emphasizes that it was Kook’s relocation to the land of Israel that facilitated his 





every seven years, the entire project would fall apart, and thus a degree of ormah, or halachic 
ingenuity, was necessary.22 
Naturally, Kook’s pro-heter mekhira stance earned him harsh criticism from the members 
of the Old Yishuv. One of his most prominent adversaries was Rav Ya’akov David Wilovsky, 
rabbi of Tzfat. Wilovsky claimed that the “compromise” inherent in the sale of the land to non-
Jews was really no compromise at all, and that it was simply an act of disobedience to the clear 
shmita directive.23 In response, Kook continued his insistence that the provision was necessary 
for the survival of the agricultural industries. At bottom, the debate was less about shmita 
specifically and more about the legitimacy of the secular Jews who formed the greater part of the 
New Yishuv. Willowsky and his allies saw these newcomers as heretics, whose attempt to dodge 
an explicit Torah commandment should be recognized as blatant unfaithfulness.24 Kook, on the 
other hand, approached the New Yishuv with a mentality informed by his Kabbalistic 
predispositions. There were sparks of divine holiness in these secular Jews, Kook believed, and 
 
22 The concept of ormah is a complicated issue in the study of Jewish practice. Some Jewish scholars have 
translated it “deviousness,” giving it the connotation of illicit play in the loopholes of Jewish law. It has a long 
history, particularly in the form of small concessions given by halachic interpreters to carry out compromises such 
as permitting the sale of leavened bread to non-Jews during Passover, so as to prevent financial losses by Jewish 
bakers during this time. Other scholars have defined ormah as ingenuity in the face of difficulties, necessary and 
admirable. On the application of ormah to shmita see Cohen and Susser, “The ‘Sabbatical’ Year in Israeli Politics,” 
457-458. On the role of ormah more broadly see Elana Stein, “Rabbinic Legal Loopholes: Formalism, Equity, and 
Subjectivity,” Ph.D. diss., Columbia University, 2014. 
 
23 See Mirsky, Rav Kook, 75. 
 
24 Of course, not all the criticisms of the heter mekhira (a topic which continues to be debated in Israel to 
this day) are rooted in biases on the part of traditional Jews against secular Jews. Many of the arguments against the 
practice were rooted in other concerns, such as a desire to create greater community reliance. Daniel Feldman 
describes a long list of pro and con arguments that continue to recur in discussions about the heter mekhira, 
including the concern that the sale of the land would constitute a violation of the prohibition in Deuteronomy 7:2 of 






this divine essence must be allowed to emerge. Ousting them from the holy land by forbidding 
them an essential compromise with the shmita mandate would only set back the progress of the 
divine light. 
At this point, it might seem that Kook had little use for the shmita, at least as opposed to 
agricultural prosperity. Indeed, this was the reaction of his opponents.25 But nothing could be 
further from the truth. The primary purpose of Kook’s Introduction to Shabbat Ha’aretz was to 
magnify the importance of shmita in the consciousness of both secular and orthodox Jews. In line 
with this aim, the text presents itself as a lyrical celebration of the transformative potential of 
shmita for the life of the Jewish people. Kook attempted to combat a tendency on both sides of 
the heter mekhira debate to view shmita as a purely dogmatic issue, either to be dispensed with 
or defended viciously. By contrast, Kook saw the shmita as a creative institution, which should 
be cherished and nurtured so that it could eventually take root in Jewish society, and from there 
transform the world. Shmita was not simply a religious obligation, but an instrument of change 
(teshuvah) that would renovate human existence.26 It would do so by offering a different vision 
of sovereignty in Jewish life. 
 
25 David Krantz also points out that “Kook’s shmita workaround of heter mechira may have been a 
pragmatic solution that overpowered his idealistic perspective on shmita. Since the public did not absorb Kook’s 
idealistic introduction on shmita, and simply focused on the workaround, heter mechira combined with the Talmudic 
rulings to strip shmita of nearly all its components.” See David Krantz, “Shmita Revolution: The Reclamation and 
Reinvention of the Sabbatical Year,” Religions 7:8 (2016): 10. For this reason, Krantz’s view is that Kook’s 
aspirations to see shmita revived were a failure. However, one this does not discredit the legitimacy of those 
aspirations—it simply points to the communicative inadequacy of Kook’s expression. 
 
26 For Kook, teshuvah (often translated “repentance”) was both change in actions and change at a higher 
level—the mystical soul. Both of these needed to work together to create genuine transformation. See Lawrence A. 





From Kook’s perspective, the opposing camps within the Jewish people had approached 
the shmita debate with an end of using it (or not using it) to establish their own individual 
sovereignty. The Old Yishuv wanted to reinforce the sovereign power of tradition in Jewish life, 
while the New Yishuv wanted to dispense with religious institutions such as shmita so that they 
could pursue economic advancement, resulting in a form of financial sovereignty. Although 
Kook sided with the New Yishuv on the specific question of the heter mekhira, he wanted to 
challenge their paradigm. Kook was not generally lax in his interpretation of halacha.27 He 
grounded his willingness to compromise not in an insouciant attitude toward the institution, but 
in a firm belief in its spiritual power. He believed that in the process of fiercely debating the 
technicalities of the shmita, both sides could lose sight of its medicinal purpose for the soul of 
the people. 
What was this healing purpose? Kook provides a handy formula: “What the Sabbath does 
for the individual, shmita does for the nation as a whole.”28 Just as the Sabbath sustains the 
individual laborer’s life and well-being, the Sabbatical year sustains the core of Jewish identity 
in its collective life. For Kook this identity was not ethnic, nor was it simply a set of dry 
traditions tied to a set of textual interpretations. Rather, this identity was found in divine 
imitation, a “godly” life.29 Kook emphasizes that “the light and salvation of each person depends 
 
27 For an account of Kook’s generally rigorous application of halacha see Arye Edrei, “From Orthodoxy to 
Religious Zionism: Rabbi Kook and the Sabbatical Year Polemic,” Dine Israel: Studies in Halakhah and Jewish 
Law 26 (2009): 45-145. In light of Kook’s generally strict readings, Gerald Blidstein hears an “anguish” in Kook’s 
writing on the heter mekhira, because of a longing for a fulfilled practice of the institution. See Gerald J. Blidstein, 
“Man and Nature in the Sabbatical Year,” Tradition: A Journal of Orthodox Jewish Thought 9, no. 4 (1966): 51. 
 
28 Kook, Introduction to Shabbat Ha’aretz, 95. 
 
29 As Avinoam Rosenak points out, Kook’s holistic approach to halacha focused on not merely applying the 




on the depth of this imprinting awareness that the value of life is in its godliness.”30This 
godliness, springing from divine light, is the core of Jewish existence: “The essential quality of 
the Jewish people’s collective soul is its divine nature.”31 This is what shmita would exemplify, 
restore, and preserve.32 
How would the Sabbatical year bring out the divine nature in the Jewish people? Kook 
explains: 
This national treasure that is imprinted deep within us, the image of a world that is 
good, upright, and godly—aligned with peace, justice, grace, and courage, all 
filled with a pervasive divine perspective that rests in the spirit of the people—
cannot be actualized within a way of life that is purely secular. Such a life, full of 
frenetic action, veils the glory of our divine soul, and the soul’s clear light is 
blocked from shining through the overpowering, mundane reality. The impulse 
toward growth and self-realization needs space to come to fruition.33 
 
Here Kook gently chides the secularists of the New Yishuv for envisioning a collective existence 
marked by ceaseless production. Such a “purely secular” development would make the pioneers 
 
outlook. In this sense, although Kook was strict in his observance, he was the opposite of a legalist. See Avinoam 
Rosenak, “Hidden Diaries and New Discoveries: The Life and Thought of Rabbi A.I. Kook,” Shofar 25:3 (2007): 
11-147. 
 
30 Kook, Introduction to Shabbat Ha’aretz, 89. 
 
31 Kook, Introduction to Shabbat Ha’aretz, 91. 
 
32 In a sense, one could call Kook’s framework a type of “mysticism of the state,” since he believed that the 
“collective soul” of the Jewish people was incarnated through their presence in the land of Israel. At the same time, 
he did not dissolve the personal element from this collective soul—the individual mystic played a crucial role in the 
building up of this soul. The result is a tension in Kook’s thought between the world of the nation as a whole and the 
individual thinker. On the complexity of this tension see Ben Zion Bokser, “Rav Kook: The Road to Renewal,” 
Tradition: A Journal of Orthodox Thought 13, no. 3 (1973): 137-153. The idea of the collective soul and its 
relationship to the individual was also carried on by Rav Kook’s son, Zvi Yehudah Kook. For an overview of the 
idea of the “collective soul” in Zvi Kook’s work, and its relationship to that of his father, see Uriel Barak, “The 
Collective Soul: Some Remarks on R. Zvi Yehudah Kook’s Readings of the Maharal of Prague and R. Avraham 
Azulai,” Journal of Jewish Thought and Philosophy 24 (2016): 300-317. 
 





unchallenged sovereigns over the land, and perhaps even over certain sectors of the middle-
eastern economy, but the result would be a loss of the Jewish soul—the element of “peace, 
justice, grace, and courage.” The practitioners of this form of sovereignty would find themselves 
increasingly alienated from each other and from their land. The type of harmony that 
characterizes the gentleness and kindness of the divine life would be impossible. Only through 
shmita could the Jewish people cultivate a national identity marked by these qualities. 
Ultimately, for Kook, this identity would transform the Jewish conception and enactment 
of sovereignty. Although Kook does not explicitly discuss the question of sovereignty in 
philosophical terms, his assessment of the purpose of shmita is deeply interlaced with this 
question. In a context in which traditional orthodox Jews were attempting to force their will on 
their neighbors, and pioneering secular Jews were attempting to force economic prosperity, Kook 
observes that the shmita challenges human notions of forcefulness altogether:  
On the shmita, our pure, inner spirit may be revealed as it truly is. The 
forcefulness that is inevitably part of our regular, public lives lessens our moral 
refinement. There is always a tension between the ideal of listening to the voice 
inside us that calls us to be kind, truthful and merciful, and the conflict, 
compulsion, and pressure to be unyielding that surround buying, selling, and 
acquiring things. These aspects of the world of action distance us from the divine 
light and prevent its being discerned in the public life of the nation.34 
 
Keep in mind that the “pure, inner spirit” is the essence of the divine sparks. Its qualities are 
those of God. The style of existence displayed in shmita, therefore, reveals God; and the 
celebrants of shmita model the divine existence through the ritual. Shmita would transform their 
souls after the divine pattern. 
 





This, obviously, raises a question that would have almost certainly run through the minds 
of Kook’s more traditional Old Yishuv critics: If shmita is effective in changing the soul of the 
people, why not start observing it right away? Why permit the heter mekhira to hamper the 
people’s embrace of godliness, preventing the transformative effects of this Sabbatical ritual? 
Kook’s answer is that doing so would destroy the original purpose of the shmita, which was to 
restore the people’s connection to the land and create community. Because of economic 
circumstances, the rabbis who instituted the heter mekhira “realized their historical obligation to 
smooth the path of the new settlements and, as much as possible, not to let the mitzvot that are 
connected to the land be obstacles.”35 If the shmita was a suspension of activity to make way for 
life, in this case the people needed a “suspension of the suspension” in order to fulfill the intent 
of shmita. This dynamic is precisely what Agamben calls the “Sabbath of Sabbath.” For Kook, 
the only way to preserve the Sabbatical sovereignty of the shmita is to cancel the sovereignty of 
shmita. 
Paradoxically, Kook even argues that the lack of observance of shmita can be a way to 
preserve its memory and significance. “Since the evasion is carried out according to the 
prescriptions of the law, it constitutes a remembrance of the precept so that the law will not be 
forgotten, and when the time comes again for them to observe the biblical law, all the laws will 
be known.”36 The point was to study and celebrate the principles of shmita, as well as enact any 
parts of the relevant halakha that were within the grasp of possibility. Doing so would gradually 
 
35 Kook, Introduction to Shabbat Ha’aretz, 137. 
 





renovate the vitality of the collective Jewish soul, making possible a progressively greater 
celebration of shmita. The Jewish people should not treat shmita as a dogmatic dictate that must 
be served as if it were a slave-master. The shmita was made for liberation; thus the people 
should—in this case—liberate themselves from it, temporarily.37 
As the people gradually adopted this Sabbatical spirit into their collective soul, even 
without practicing every shmita precept, Kook believed the rigor of shmita observance would 
increase. Over time, the divine light accruing every seven years in the spirit of the people would 
grow, reaching the Kabbalistic equivalent of a “critical mass.” The result would be the yobel, or 
year of jubilee, which, according to the Talmud, could only occur when all the inhabitants of the 
land of Israel were living there.38 In Kook’s paradigm, the yobel would fundamentally alter the 
entire category of sovereignty for the Jewish people. This is visible in the biblical discussions 
about the yobel’s impact on property and labor. As land and slaves returned to their owners, 
domination of one person over others would entirely cease. A new world would be created. Kook 
is eager to emphasize, however, that the yobel would not be a sudden, cataclysmic operation: 
This freedom does not erupt like some volcano; it emerges gradually from the 
inner holiness. It is not a radical exception to the regular social order but flows 
from within it, nurtured by the life of the shorter, preceding periods until, 




37 This did not mean that settlers in the land of Israel must utilize the heter mekhira. As Simcha Raz notes, 
Kook “made sure that those farmers who wanted to adhere to the laws of Shemittah would be able to do so, not 
letting anyone force them to rely on the heter. He even urged farmers to refrain from working the land, if they could 
afford to do so, and he set up a special fund to assist them.” See Simcha Raz, Angel among Men: Impressions from 
the Life of Avraham Yitzchak Hakohen Kook (Jerusalem: Kol Mevaser Publications, 2003), 31. 
 
38 Talmud Bavli, Arakhin 32b. As cited in Kook, Introduction to Shabbat Ha’aretz, 111. 
 





For Kook, yobel cannot become a pretext for procrastination about dealing with injustice. Rather, 
a yobel would not even be possible unless Israel embraced the shmita/yobel spirit into its regular 
existence, allowing the form of sovereignty entailed by these mitzvot to display itself. The people 
could not attain this outcome by forgetting shmita, but neither could they attain it by a haphazard 
enforcement of the command, such as the opponents of the heter mekhira were trying to do. 
Kook’s endorsement of the heter mekhira is thus not an example of a type of “antinomianism” 
that Dov Schwartz ascribes to Kook.40 As Rosenak argues against Schwartz, Kook’s willingness 
to suspend shmita was not because of a disdain for laws and principles, but because of a view 
that those institutions did not exist for their own sake, but for the benefit of humanity.41 In 
Kook’s mind, inoperative ritual was still commanded and necessary. But it had to render itself 
inoperative in order to become more fully operative. 
Political Implications 
In Kook’s mind, those who favored an immediate enforcement of shmita were 
themselves falling victim to the type of perverse theo-political sovereignty that shmita was 
intended to counteract. Kook corrects their error when he justifies the heter mekhira with the 
 
40 See Dov Schwartz, The Religious Genius in Rabbi Kook’s Thought: National “Saint”? trans. Edward 
Levin (Boston: Academic Studies Press, 2014), 129-135. Schwartz finds numerous examples of antinomianism in 
Kook’s aphoristic, spiritual writings. In the reading posited by Schwartz, Kook sees the saint as someone with a 
certain “double life,” with a bifurcation between holiness and everyday existence (yet one that is dialectically 
overcome). Schwartz argues that this “provides an opening for antinomianism” in which the saint can set aside the 
Torah commandments (132). This may be true with regard to the personal psychology of the saint, but it seems to 
have little connection to the significance of the heter mekhira for Kook. His argument, as I have noted above, was 
not that the shmita ought to be left behind in favor of a higher holiness, but that the heter mekhira was the only way 
to fully realize the end purpose of the shmita. 
 
41 According to Rosenak, “It is the fate of zaddikim, in Rabbi Kook’s view, to observe the commandments 
in great distress, not for the sake of their inherent vitality but for the sake of the world and of society and for 





observation that “God does not make tyrannical and unreasonable demands of His creatures.”42 
At the root of the traditionalists’ insistence on rigid adherence to the shmita mandate was a 
failure to understand the sovereignty of the God who gave the mandate. The people’s 
relationship of sovereignty toward the land would parallel God’s relationship of sovereignty 
toward them. Forcing Jews to keep shmita, endangering their capacity to live in harmony with 
each other and to survive in the nascent Jewish homeland, would reflect an image of a sovereign 
deity who exercised unilateral power over others without concern for their freedom. 
Kook’s understanding of the political logic behind the heter mekhira is inseparable from 
his mysticism, as Abraham Shemesh has pointed out in an important article.43 Kook believed that 
shmita was part of a restoration of the people’s “inner character” and that its political function 
was tied to this mystical goal. Because the mystical reality of a transformed soul within the 
Jewish people could not be imposed from outside, neither could shmita. Hence, according to 
Shemesh, Kook promoted the heter mekhira as a way to draw non-Jews and secular Zionists into 
a collaboration—one that would eventually result in a full observance of shmita.44 This 
mysticism originated in “a combination of the sacred and the mundane” ultimately aimed at a 
 
42 Kook, Introduction to Shabbat Ha’aretz, 137. 
 
43 Shemesh emphasizes that Kook’s insistence on the heter mekhira, as well as his nuanced views on other 
administrative questions in the land of Israel, “derives from his grasp of Zionism as a sign of the coming of the 
Messiah. He perceived the development of the country by the pioneers, despite their being non-observant, as a deep 
human partnership in the universal cosmic process of bringing the redemption.” See Abraham Ofir Shemesh, “‘For 
the Public’s Improvement and for the Benefit of the Town:’ Correspondence Between the Rabbi Kook and 
Residents of the Moshavot in Eretz Israel on Ecological and Environmental Matters,” Modern Judaism 38, no. 1 
(2018): 58. 
 
44 Shemesh points out that Kook’s concern for Muslims and a desire to draw them into mutual community 
in the land of Israel could also have been a factor in his promotion of the heter mekhira. See Shemesh, “‘For the 





type of inoperativity with practical value.45 If one believes, as Kook did, that the right form of 
inoperativity arises from a fundamental focus on human well-being as part of larger whole in 
which ritual and ecological concerns play a part, it makes sense that inoperativity must 
sometimes suspend itself in order to fulfill its broader function. The sovereignty of shmita must 
be the authority of a deity who mystically transforms the soul, rather than coercively commands 
it. As Tamar Ross notes, this same mystical idea of “the intrinsic value of noncoercion” was 
evident in other policies Kook commended, such as his methods of addressing heterodox 
members of the community.46 The kabbalistic idea of sparks within each person that need only to 
be flamed into action sets the stage for a mode of interpersonal ethics in which “letting be” 
becomes the paradigm for politics as a whole.47 
 
45 See Shemesh, “‘For the Public’s Improvement and for the Benefit of the Town,’” 59. 
 
46 Ross analyzes Kook’s various statements encouraging toleration for non-believers and “heretics” in the 
land of Israel, finding that Kook’s toleration was grounded in his mystical approach to halacha. According to Ross, 
Kook believed that “although the natural instinct of the national spirit is to assert its authority whenever signs of 
spiritual disintegration become apparent, such authority can be effectively imposed only when the nation’s powers 
are at the height of their perfection.” See Tamara Ross, “Between Metaphysical and Liberal Pluralism: A 
Reappraisal of Rabbi A.I. Kook’s Espousal of Toleration,” Association for Jewish Studies Review 21, no. 1 (1996): 
81. In other words, until the people of Israel had arrived at a place of full spiritual elevation, exercising censure and 
discipline toward heretics had no place, because they would not accept such correction. Instead, wayward Jews 
should be loved and drawn into a position whereby the “sparks” within them could alight, drawing them toward that 
perfection of soul that the halacha aimed at. Only at that point could public discipline have any value (of course, by 
that point it would also not be necessary). In this sense, Kook’s politics was always “mystical”—directed toward a 
“letting be” of the Jewish soul within the nation. 
 
47 The influence of kabbalistic mysticism on political theory is not something that appears only in Rav 
Kook’s work. Shaul Magid finds it also in the American Jewish Renewal movement, which used kabbalistic 
concepts to help articulate a politics of pluralism, in a way that parallels Kook’s approach. See Shaul Magid, 
“Pragmatism and Piety: The American Spiritual and Philosophical Roots of Jewish Renewal,” in Kabbalah and 
Modernity: Interpretations, Transformations, Adaptations, ed. Marco Pasi, Boaz Huss, and Kocku von Stuckrad 
(Leiden: Brill, 2010), 357-387. Interestingly, according to an argument by James McBride, the influence of kabbalah 
(particularly the idea of the sparks or orot) is also a prominent influence on Walter Benjamin’s political theory (who 
is also an enormous subsequent influence on Giorgio Agamben—as argued in chapter two of this work). See James 
McBride, “Marooned in the Realm of the Profane: Walter Benjamin’s Synthesis of Kabbalah and Communism,” 
Journal of the American Academy of Religion 57, no. 2 (1989): 241-266.This lineage should not be surprising, given 
the conceptual link between the inoperativity of kabbalah that emerges in Rav Kook’s political theory and the 




The type of sovereignty Kook envisioned through the suspension of shmita is also one in 
which the rights of poorer persons are central. This connects to the central meaning of shmita in 
the original Biblical texts, as noted above. In Kook’s time, it would have been possible for 
wealthy pioneers in the land of Israel to practice shmita.48 In such situations, it is easy for the 
privileged to project their own capabilities onto others. This logic often plays out whenever the 
rich look on persons under economic duress and condescendingly exclaim, “If I were in their 
place, I would . . .” while being grossly under-informed about all the factors that create financial 
insecurity. At the core of Kook’s vision of sovereignty is an awareness of the struggles of the 
less-fortunate. For Kook, sovereignty requires the ability to place oneself in the position of those 
whose lack of privilege hinders their ability to carry out tasks that seem easy to members of 
higher classes. By making the observance of shmita contingent on the financial ability of all the 
Jews in the land of Israel, and simultaneously working for the eventual restoration of shmita 
observance, Kook essentially argued for a campaign for economic equality. In a way that 
parallels the Christian “preferential option for the poor,” Kook’s shmita formulated a key 
principle of sovereignty—no action that fails to account for the interests of the poorest in the 
land holds validity. 
In a sense, then, Kook’s shmita was the political kernel from which a much larger socio-
political plant was supposed to emerge. Metaphorically, through the heter mekhira, Kook wanted 
 
 
48 Feldman sees in Kook’s defense of the heter mekhira a concern to prevent something like a spiritual 
inequality emerging in the land of Israel. Wealthy farmers would have spiritual access to the soul-reviving powers of 
shmita because they could afford to take a year off. On the other hand, “on a spiritual level, there is the concern that 
non-observant farmers will cease to have any connection to shemitta, were the hetter to be unavailable.” See 





to bury this seed in the ground, enabling the transformative power dynamics of a Sabbatical logic 
to germinate. This would happen as the people who worked the land during the shmita year 
anticipated fervently the arrival of the ultimate year of rest, and finally the jubilee year. They 
would study shmita’s meaning, and “learning itself leads to action . . . “from one year to the next, 
more and more people will be caught up in enthusiasm.”49 The result would be a “butterfly 
effect” on Jewish institutions of sovereignty. Kook believed this political dynamic proceeded 
from the essential uniqueness of the Jewish people, and that this was the gift Jewish existence 
could give to the world.  
What does Kook’s theological analysis of the Jewish Sabbath of the land in Palestine in 
the early twentieth century offer for Christians attempting to develop a political theology of 
inoperativity in America and elsewhere in the West in the twenty-first century? Here I can offer a 
few observations that could be helpful. 
First, Kook’s work suggests that a practice of ritualized inoperativity—deliberately doing 
nothing as an imitation of divine existence—can directly alter a people’s conception of 
sovereignty, and thus their politics. Christians in the West may not find shmita a useful ritual for 
this purpose, but the idea itself could be pivotal (as I will argue in chapter five). According to 
Kook, ritualized inoperativity can dampen the spirit of material acquisition and ceaseless 
production that marks Western (and especially American) attitudes toward land. In the United 
States, land is the site of competition and relentless grasping for power. The values of shmita 
could upend this paradigm. 
 




Second, Kook’s understanding of shmita depicts a type of sovereignty which can suspend 
itself for the sake of human well-being. Through the heter mekhira, Kook wanted to suspend 
various aspects of shmita observance, not to abolish shmita but to bring its intended purpose to 
fruition. This may also be connected to what Lawrence Kaplan describes as a process of 
“affirmation and negation” that is a key feature of Kook’s understanding of holiness.50 Faith, 
according to Kaplan’s reading of Kook, is a phenomenon that opens itself by being suspended—
as Kook claims happened during the Aqedah.51 As I noted above, this is exactly what Agamben 
calls the “suspension of suspension” or a “negative dialectic.” In this political framework, 
sovereign power freely destabilizes itself.  
Third, Kook’s understanding of the heter mekhira is also a site for fruitful interreligious 
cooperation. In order for this exception to shmita to work, Jews needed to work together with 
non-Jews, by selling the land to non-Jews during the Sabbatical year. Since, according to Kook, 
the heter mekhira was ultimately a way for shmita to gradually realize itself, non-Jews were 
helping Jews to carry out their religious practices by participating in the heter mekhira.52 Kook’s 
theology of shmita thus offers an example of how religious rituals can open themselves to a 
broader community of different religious faiths. For Christians living in the religiously diverse 
 
50 See Lawrence Kaplan, “The Love of God in Maimonides and Rav Kook,” Judaism 43, no. 3 (1994): 227-
239. 
 
51 Kaplan claims that for Kook, the Aqedah was God’s suspension of the faith-command for Abraham to 
become the father of many nations, and yet it was through this suspension that the fulfillment of the command took 
place. The same is true for other forms of faith, per Kook. See Kaplan, “The Love of God in Maimonides and Rav 
Kook,” 233-236. 
 
52 This point was made eloquently in a discussion I had with Prof. Devorah Schoenfeld of Loyola 





West, this is instructive. Such communities should consider how their own practices of 
inoperativity can suspend themselves (if necessary) to affirm the well-being of others. For 
example, this is why a mandatory Sunday law (such as the much disputed “blue laws” of 
nineteenth century America) would not be an appropriate way to display the sovereign 
inoperativity of a Christian Sabbath. 
Finally, Christians in the Western world can learn something from Kook’s ideal of 
gradual spiritual development in communal life. Although Christian theologians such as Martin 
Luther King have vilified the “fallacy of gradualism” that postpones and ultimately derails 
urgent social changes, there is something to be said for Kook’s long-term view of how shmita 
would take hold of the Jewish collective soul and bring about a new form of ethical existence. 
Although history often seems to change in sudden spurts, these developments could also be the 
product of slow moving shifts. Kook’s believed that “the mitzvot of today are a means to the 
higher ethics of the future, which will reach beyond Judaism toward all humanity and even to the 
animal and natural worlds.”53 One does not have to embrace all the metaphysics of the kabbalah 
to see that this vision is deeply resonant with a many Christian visions of ethical change. This 
does not mean that Christians should stall on important social justice issues. It does mean, 
however, that they should invest in simple actions that could transform the “soul” of their 
communities. For example, by embracing forms of ritual inoperativity, Christians could induce 
 





these types of long-term shifts in spiritual mentality, grounded in a vision of the inoperative 
sovereignty of God.54 
The idea of a long term, inner change in a collective consciousness does raise the 
question of whether Sabbath (like shmita in this case) should be understood as an interruption of 
a social system, or simply as one beneficial component within it. Although Kook does not 
directly address this question, it seems that his answer might be “an interruption, but one that can 
interrupt itself.” As I have argued above, Kook did not understand the heter mekhira as a 
diminishment or abandonment of the shmita, but as a suspension of shmita on the basis of its 
own principles. The original goal of shmita was harmony between the people and the land, 
achieved through the elevation of the poor. As such, shmita must interrupt any economic 
structure that would hinder this outcome. The heter mekhira would be simply a way for this 
interruption to gain a foothold within society. 
Kook’s vision of shmita thus gives us an applied example of what Lacoste’s inoperative 
resolution to the master/slave dialectic might look like. By gradually building rest into their 
societal development, Kook believed the Jewish people would be able to reorient themselves 
toward sovereign power and the drive toward coercive political subjugation that undergirds it. 
Kook’s understanding of the politics of inoperativity differs from Lacoste’s in that the former 
focused on explicitly on communities engaging together in inoperative rituals, while the latter 
 
54 The question, of course, is how to prevent this approach from drifting into dangerous gradualism. 
Although Kook does not answer this question, I could venture a guess as to what he might say. Because the heter 
mekhira was the only option available for low-income Jews wishing to survive in the land, Kook advocated it as the 
one possibility for moving closer to a full shmita observance. The principle he advocated therefore seems to be that 
one should always take any positive steps available. This would not lead to apathetic gradualism, because that 




focuses on individual relations to the Absolute, but the dynamic is the same. Kook’s shmita 
would halt the competitive master/slave dialectic by providing a means for the community to 
exist together in a state of inoperative harmony. 
This harmony would not be achieved by a sudden, totalitarian imposition of the 
inoperative ritual. Such a form of inoperativity would have constituted a revival of sovereign 
power, as Agamben’s work emphasizes, and would have driven poor farmers into a greater state 
of destitution, forcing them into a position of zoe life. The heter mekhira thus functions as a 
concrete example of how Agamben’s “suspension” of the machinery of modern politics might 
work. The shmita—operating through the suspension of itself via the heter mekhira—would 
interrupt the political system, but not in a way that mimics the mechanism of sovereign power.  
This interruption would finally take the form of an ultimate collective Sabbath, the fifty-
year jubilee, or yobel. Because Kook is primarily concerned with social relationships among 
Jews in the land of Israel, his work tends to focus on this collective Sabbath. However, this work 
presupposes an understanding of the Sabbath’s impact on individual personal existence, for “the 
personal is political.” How we live together as political communities is inseparable from how we 
live as individuals within families. For these reasons, Kook’s vision of the collective Sabbath is 
intimately related to the more “individual” weekly Sabbath. The insights Kook offers for 
understanding the significance of the shmita and yobel, and their partial suspension in the form 
of the heter mekhira, are applicable also to understanding smaller-scale forms of inoperativity. 
Summary 
The Sabbath of the land is for Rav Kook an experience that transforms the community’s 




Israel continued to strive for a greater celebration of this form of ritual inoperativity, they would 
find themselves increasingly blossoming into the spirit of the yobel, or jubilee. To make this 
happen, however the ritual needed to suspend itself as a way to create the practical outcome for 
which the ritual was originally intended. In exactly the way that Agamben envisions a “Sabbath 
of Sabbath,” Kook’s promotion of the heter mekhira thus describes a process through which the 
shmita would accomplish its goal through a type of self-reduction, or what Agamben might call 
“poverty.”55 
This notion that inoperativity has a “goal” raises questions. Kook’s work, as well as that 
of several of the thinkers we have examined thus far, advocates that inoperative ritual must have 
a purpose, or function. Naturally, this is important for my overall argument, which is that 
inoperativity may play a key role in political transformations. Nevertheless, as I have already 
hinted in this work, the idea that inoperativity “functions” or has a practical purpose, appears 
paradoxical, if not contradictory. We now turn to a thinker who analyzes a different form of 
inoperativity, and argues that it in fact has no purpose whatsoever. 
Roberto Goizueta: The “Useless” Fiesta 
The Catholic theologian Roberto Goizueta writes from a distinct practical vantage point: 
the experiences of Latina/o56 communities in the United States. Such communities—finding 
 
55 This type of self reduction is a main theme in Giorgio Agamben’s The Highest Poverty: Monastic Rules 
and Form of Life, trans. Adam Kotsko (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2013). 
 
56 I use the term “Latina/o” to describe a group that is also sometimes titled “Hispanic” or, more recently 
“Latin@” or “Latinx.” The use of these terms seeks to avoid the gender specificity of “Latino.” My use of 
“Latina/o” rather than “Latinx” merely arises from the fact that, as Orlando Espín observes, “it reflects the more 
common pronunciation and usage” (though unlike Espín, I place the a suffix before the o, to avoid privileging the 
male gender). See Orlando Espín, “Introduction” in in The Wiley Blackwell Companion to Latino/a Theology, ed. 




themselves often displaced—seek survival through the affirmation of human relationships. 
Goizueta’s work reflects on the various ritual and philosophical approaches Latino/a Catholics 
have devised to address this need. One of these approaches is a distinct understanding of 
inoperativity. 
To explain how Goizueta develops his view of inoperativity (though he does not use this 
term), I will first provide an overview of his methodology, then give an account of his 
understanding of inoperativity, and finally reflect on its political consequences. 
Method 
Goizueta’s theological method emerges from several sources. The first is his locus 
theologicus within U.S. Latina/o communities. Goizueta recognizes that all theology results from 
dialogue with the theologian’s personal background and life experiences, and that no theologian 
can interpret a doctrine or text apart from these personal factors.57 Hence, his work is a reflection 
of his own experience within the odd setting of U.S. Latina/o culture. This culture is not 
homogeneous or easily categorized, since cultures designated “Latina/o” or “Hispanic” may arise 
from diverse locations. Furthermore, the social categories bearing these titles display immense 
internal variation in culture, religion and race. This means that persons lumped into the 
“Latina/o” box by the larger Anglo-American society may actually display a much more 
complex, hybrid identity—what Goizueta and other theologians sometimes refer to as mestizaje 
 
well, although he often uses “Hispanic.” I admit, however, that the term “Latinx” could more adequately include 
non-binary individuals, and that perhaps a linguistic move in this direction should be taken. 
 
57 See Roberto Goizueta, Caminemos con Jesús: Toward a Hispanic/Latino Theology of Accompaniment 





or “hybridity.”58 Goizueta himself is an immigrant from Cuba, who has spent much of his time 
among Mexican communities in the U.S. This unique and complex identity is the site from 
which Goizueta speaks. 
Despite the immense variation within Latina/o communities, Goizueta focuses on a 
common element that seems pervasive in these communities, and that influences his thinking 
prominently. This is the importance of popular religion, especially within Catholicism. As a 
precise term, “popular religion” is difficult to define—a challenge Goizueta understands.59 At 
first, the term can seem to indicate religion that is “popular” in the sense of common, well-liked, 
or trendy, in a way analogous to “popular music.” This is not the sense in which Goizueta uses 
the term. The popular religious elements in Latina/o Catholicism can be either widespread or 
parochial, and may be well-known or somewhat hidden. In Goizueta’s theology, therefore, “the 
 
58 A number of theologians have evaluated the significance of mestizaje in contemporary theological 
perspectives on Latina/o theology. This concept is not without controversy. In the 1970’s Virgilio Elizondo 
celebrated the term as a description of the Latina/o reality on which theology should build. See Virgilio Elizondo, 
Mestizaje: The Dialectic of Cultural Birth and the Gospel (San Antonio: Mexican American Cultural Center, 1978). 
See also Justo González, “Hispanics in the United States,” Listening: Journal of Religion and Culture 27, no. 1 
(1992): 7-16. More recently, theologians such as Néstor Medina have cautioned that mestizaje can be a term that 
unhelpfully masks experience of indigenous peoples who found their identities erased through colonization, and may 
also be a term that washes over the realities of racism and religious conflict within Latina/o communities. See Néstor 
Medina, Mestizaje: (Re)Mapping Race, Culture, and Faith in Latina/o Catholicism (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis, 2009). 
See also Carmen Nanko-Fernández, Theologizing en Espanglish: Context, Community, and Ministry (Maryknoll: 
Orbis, 2010). A similar critique has been offered by Jean-Pierre Ruiz, who focuses on the parochial focus of 
mestizaje in Elizondo’s work (who developed the idea with specific reference to Guadalupe), and questions how it 
can incorporate the hybridity of the broader Caribbean-American framework. See Jean-Pierre Ruiz, Readings from 
the Edges: The Bible and People on the Move (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis, 2011), 18-22. Carmen Nanko-Fernández 
surveys a number of the problems with the term mestizaje as an all-encompassing term to describe Latina/o 
hybridity, and points toward a few new scholars such as Robyn Henderson-Espinoza who are attempting to re-
describe mestizaje as a place of “in-betweenness.” See Carmen Nanko-Fernández, “Lo Cotidiano as Locus 
Theologicus,” in The Wiley Blackwell Companion to Latino/a Theology, ed. Orlando O. Espín (Oxford: Wiley 
Blackwell, 2015), 15-33. 
 
59 Goizueta discusses the difficulty of defining popular religion in Caminemos con Jesús, 20-27. On this 
challenge see also Orlando Espín, “Popular Catholicism among Latinos,” in Hispanic Catholicism in the United 
States: Issues and Concerns, ed. Jay P. Dolan and Allan Figueroa Deck (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame 





adjective (popular) refers to the socio-historical fact that these religious symbols, practices, and 
narratives are of the people.”60 In other words, the popular religion of Latina/o Catholicism 
emerges directly out of the everyday experiences of marginalized and diverse communities.  
A major aspect of popular religion is the importance of sacramentality within its 
theological framework. Goizueta points to the research of scholars such as Orlando Espín and 
Mark Francis, who have shown that the Catholicism of Latina/o Catholics stems from Iberian 
traditions that predated modern Catholicism. This type of Catholicism was more “medieval” in 
character, which means that it did not display the focus on conceptual and doctrinal specificity 
that characterized the Catholicism of the counter-reformation.61 Hence, Latina/o Catholics are 
more apt to see God within their symbols, rather than ascribing merely descriptive significance to 
these symbols.62 This will become important for understanding the significance of inoperativity 
 
60 Goizueta, Caminemos con Jesús, 21. 
 
61 On this see Orlando Espín, Faith of the People: Theological Reflections on Popular Catholicism 
(Maryknoll: Orbis, 1997), 117; “Pentecostalism and Popular Catholicism: The Poor and Traditio,” Journal of 
Hispanic/Latino Theology 3, no. 2 (November 1995): 19; and Mark Francis, “Popular Piety and Liturgical Reform in 
a Hispanic Context,” in Dialogue Rejoined: Theology and Ministry in the United States Hispanic Reality, ed. Ana 
María Pineda and Robert Schreiter (Collegeville, MN: Liturgical Press, 1995), 165-166. 
 
62 Goizueta argues that within the devotional framework of Latino/a popular religion, practices are 
embedded within a community’s social and religious life. These practices are seen as “giving” life to the 
community. This helps to prevent the type of “shopping around” for religious practices that makes them expendable 
carriers of meaning. The rituals of Latino/a Catholicism thus have a deep connection to the enchanted world of 
medieval Catholicism which much of Northern-European and American Catholicism has lost, largely as a result of 
nominalism. See Goizueta, Christ Our Companion, 72-84. See also Vincent J. Miller, Consuming Religion: 
Christian Faith and Practice in a Consumer Culture (New York: Continuum, 2004). On the influence of 
nominalism on changing attitudes toward symbol and religious life see Louis Dupré, Passage to Modernity: An 
Essay in the Hermeneutics of Nature and Culture (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1995).The sacramental vision 
present in Goizueta’s work holds much in common with the theological trajectory advanced by Karl Rahner—a 
point true also of several other Latino/a theologians, including Miguel Díaz. Rahner’s theology exemplifies the 
Jesuit approach which “seeks to find God in all things,” including the realm of human culture. See Miguel H. Díaz, 





within Goizueta’s thought, because the sacramentality of inoperative practices is important for 
understanding their political implications. 
Much of Goizueta’s work can also be understood as a constructive critique of certain 
strands of liberation theology. Goizueta agrees with the fundamental trajectory of liberation 
theology—identifying Christ with the poor and the marginalized. “For Christians,” Goizueta 
says, “the significance of the crucified and risen Christ is precisely that God is found, in some 
special way, among those people who continue to be crucified today—the poor, the hungry, the 
naked, and the outcast.”63 Gustavo Gutierrez famously formulated this method in liberation 
theology by claiming that theology is a “critical reflection on praxis” and that theology could 
only be verified by “orthopraxis.”64 This procedural prioritizing of praxis characterizes liberation 
theology pervasively, although defining the relationship between theology and praxis is not 
without difficulty, as shown in a key study by Clodovis Boff.65 Goizueta, for his part, provides a 
 
63 Roberto Goizueta, “Love the Poor You’re With: The Editors Interview Roberto S. Goizueta,” U.S. 
Catholic (August 1, 2013):26-30, 29. 
 
64 See Gustavo Gutierrez, A Theology of Liberation (Maryknoll: Orbis, 1973), 6-15, 45. For an expanded 
theological work also based this principle see Juan Luis Segundo, The Liberation of Theology (Maryknoll: Orbis, 
1976). For an overview of the primacy of praxis in liberation theology see Alfred T. Hennelly, Liberation 
Theologies: The Global Pursuit of Justice (Mystic, CT: Twenty-Third Publications, 1995). As Eddy Muskus 
summarizes, “Liberation theologians advocate that only when involved in the praxis of liberation, as understood 
through the social sciences, should a theologian come to the Scripture as a source of revelation. Liberation 
theologians have adopted the praxis of liberation as the criterion for determining the truth of a particular theology.” 
See Eddy José Muskus, The Origins and Early Development of Liberation Theology in Latin America: With 
Particular Reference to Gustavo Gutierrez (Waynesboro, GA: Paternoster Press, 2002),14-15. 
 
65 Boff agrees that praxis holds priority in theology, but he insists that this praxis must itself be subject to 
ethical evaluation on the part of theology. Without this dialectical relationship between the two, praxis becomes 
arbitrary and open to corruption. Boff is scathing in his assessment of theologians who are content to posit liberative 
praxis as a self-evident axiom: “It may be that there are political situations that are so urgent that they dispense us 
from all rigor of thought and make a very direct appeal for indignation and action. Still, when an individual or group 
is satisfied with crying, ‘Praxis, praxis!’ or ‘Political action, political action!,’ thinking that thereby something has 
been done, we must recognize that this individual or group has scarcely gone very far, in terms of either theory or 
praxis. If truth be told, this is the road leading directly to that impatient, truncated form of pragmatism called ‘doing 




detailed assessment of the role of praxis in theology, and this is where his views on the nature of 
inoperativity become important.  
Goizueta’s Understanding of Latina/o Inoperative Praxis 
Commenting on liberation theology’s reinstatement of praxis at the heart of Christian 
faith, Goizueta asks a simple question that has easily been overlooked: What is praxis?66 Both 
liberation theologians and their critics often assume that praxis is simply “doing something,” and 
that the point is to figure out how to do it. But this level of analysis is insufficient, because there 
are a variety of ways of understanding what “doing” means.  
Goizueta observes that Karl Marx, whose work has had some influence on liberation 
theology (though not as much as some critics have maintained), defined praxis as making or 
production—useful activity. This type of activity is the central hallmark of human nature. “In 
creating an objective world by his practical activity, in working-up inorganic nature, man proves 
 
evaluation.” See Clodovis Boff, Theology and Praxis: Epistemological Foundations, trans. Robert R. Barr 
(Maryknoll: Orbis, 1987), 202. Boff’s irritation stems less from any disagreement with the express political 
programs of liberation theologians, and more from the fact that without careful correlation of praxis with theoretical 
reflection on faith, such theologians render themselves vulnerable to criticisms of methodological inconsistency, 
jeopardizing the legitimacy of liberation theology as a whole. Boff draws his critique of groundless praxis from 
similar arguments made by Raymond Polin, La creation des valeurs: Recherches sur le fondement de l’objectivité 
axiologique (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1944), and Alfred Grosser, Au nom de quoi ? Fondements 
d’une morale politique (Paris : Seuil, 1969). See also Max Weber, Politics as a Vocation (Philadelphia: Fortress 
Press, 1965). Boff’s call for a calculated assessment of praxis has been echoed and (in part) answered by Zoe 
Bennett, “Action Is the Life of All: The Praxis-Based Epistemology of Liberation Theology,” in The Cambridge 
Companion to Liberation Theology, ed. Christopher Rowland (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007): 39-
54. For an example of careful ethical reflection on praxis see Thomas L. Schubeck, Liberation Ethics: Sources, 
Models and Norms (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1993). See also the response to liberation theology in Ada Maria 
Isasi-Diaz, who advocates a careful “epistemological vigilance” with regard to praxis in her Mujerista Theology: A 
Theology for the Twenty-First Century (Maryknoll: Orbis, 1996), 66-79. See Ada Maria Isasi-Diaz, “Reading A 
Theology of Liberation from a Mujerista Perspective,” in Caught Reading Again: Scholars and their Books, ed. R.S. 
Sugirtharajah (London: SCM Press, 2009), 143-157. 
 





himself a conscious species being,” Marx says.67 By production, a human being gives form to 
substances, and concomitantly gives form to him or herself.68 The result is that, when human 
beings produce goods to be sold on the market, the very selves of the producers are being sold. 
This is the core of what Marx calls alienation.69 Implicit, then, within Marx’s critique of 
capitalist structures is an anthropology in which “the human person is homo faber.”70 
However, according to Goizueta, this definition of praxis as production is not the only 
definition available. Goizueta points to Aristotle, who makes a key distinction between praxis 
and poiesis. The latter term refers to production or making—“human action whose end is 
external to itself.”71 Praxis, for Aristotle, refers to behavior aimed at internal ends—that is, 
action done for its own sake.72 Goizueta uses several analogies to illustrate the difference 
between praxis and poiesis. Someone who makes a guitar engages in poiesis, because the object 
 
67 Karl Marx, “Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844,” in The Marx-Engels Reader, ed. Robert C. 
Tucker (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 1978), 76 (cited in Goizueta, Caminemos con Jesús, 81). 
 
68 Marx puts it very straightforwardly: “He (the human being) begins to distinguish himself from the animal 
the moment he begins to produce his means of subsistence, a step required by his physical organization. By 
producing food, man indirectly produces his material life itself.” See Karl Marx, Writings of the Young Marx on 
Philosophy and Society, ed. Loyd Easton and Kurt Guddat (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1967), 409 (as cited in 
Goizueta, Caminemos con Jesús, 81). 
 
69 On the concept of alienation see Marx, “Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844,” XXIII (in 
the chapter “Estranged Labor”). See also Nicholas Churchich, Marxism and Alienation (Rutherford, NJ: Fairleigh 
Dickinson University Press, 1990); V.V. Ivanchuk, “Alienation and the Project of Man’s Universal Emancipation in 
Early Marx,” Grani 20:3 (2017): 98-103; Chris Byron, “Essence and Alienation: Marx’s Theory of Human Nature,” 
Science and Society 80:3 (2016): 375-394. 
 
70 Goizueta, Caminemos con Jesús, 82. To make this observation, Goizueta draws on Kostas Axelos, 
Alienation, Praxis, and Techne in the Thought of Karl Marx (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 1976). 
Goizueta also employs a critique of Marx’s utilitarian anthropology found in Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958). 
 
71 Goizueta, Caminemos con Jesús, 83. 
 
72 Goizueta draws this distinction from an analysis of Aristotle’s Politics, 1.4.1254 and his Nichomachean 





created is intended for another purpose (playing music). Someone who plays the guitar on the 
other hand, engages in praxis, because the act of musical production is an end in itself (unless, of 
course, the player attempts to use the guitar music only to accomplish some other end, such as 
earning money). Another, subtler analogy Goizueta uses is the distinction between “making a 
house” and “making a home.” Someone who fixes boards together with concrete creates a space 
that will be used for another purpose: living. This externally-oriented act is poiesis. However, the 
persons who eat, sleep, and enjoy themselves within the house engage in praxis. Their living is 
an end in itself.73 
Modern Western society, in Goizueta’s evaluation, has largely neglected Aristotle’s 
definition of life-as-praxis in favor of the Enlightenment perspective of life-as-production—the 
view that Marx also adopted. The result has been a tendency to instrumentalize human persons, 
to depict their value in terms of their ability to transform their world. Of course, Marx deeply 
opposed the reduction of human beings to work-objects. Yet he could not avoid the influence of 
production oriented thinking, even in his opposition to the inevitable exploitation that resulted 
from such thinking. The same thing is true of liberation theologians influenced by Marx, 
according to Goizueta. Although he agrees with the work of pivotal figures such as Gustavo 
Gutierrez and the Boff brothers in restoring the primacy of praxis into Christian theology, 
Goizueta argues that this concept has been built from an Enlightenment utility mold. Liberation 
 
73 Goizueta, Caminemos con Jesús, 83. Goizueta draws the latter analogy from Nicholas Lobkowicz, 
Theory and Practice: History of a Concept from Aristotle to Marx (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame 





theology, by focusing on transforming the world, runs the danger of assuming that human beings 
are defined by their capacity to effect changes in sociopolitical systems. 
Goizueta affirms the importance of transforming the world. He applauds efforts to 
remove oppressive powers as one of the central features of the Gospel. But his recognition of the 
subtle instrumental anthropology lurking within liberation theology leads him to the following 
critique: 
My own experience in Latino communities, such as San Fernando, has also led 
me to question . . . any emphasis on the social transformative dimension of human 
action which would make this dimension itself foundational. In these 
communities, I have witnessed a type of empowerment and liberation taking place 
which, at least initially and explicitly, seems to have relatively little connection to 
any social or political struggles. Indeed, in many cases, empowerment and 
liberation are not explicit goals at all. Seemingly, the only explicit goals are day-
to-day survival and, especially, the affirmation of relationships as essential to that 
survival. This affirmation is manifested in all those seemingly insignificant ways 
in which we love, care for, and embrace other persons. Central to the struggle for 
survival and relationships, moreover, is the community’s life of faith, which also, 
at least on the surface, seems little related to social transformation.74 
 
Goizueta’s focus on the everyday aspects of life is built on this fundamental point. This insight is 
also the foundation for his work on the rituals and celebrations of popular Catholicism, which 
could otherwise be derided as useless folk mythology. Participants in a via dolorosa 
reenactment, for example, do not follow the footsteps of Christ in order to accomplish 
something, such as illustrating the liberative significance of the cross. Their action is an end in 
itself.75 Of course, a via dolorosa procession in a Latina/o community may have the byproduct of 
 
74 Goizueta, Caminemos con Jesús, 88. 
 
75 Speaking of a participant in one of these reenactments, Goizueta sums up his point: “God is revealed in 
the doing, in the active participation, in the hammering of the nails. It is in the act of walking alongside Jesus and all 
the others on the Via Dolorosa, and in the act of hammering the nails into Jesus’ feet, that this man encounters 
God—in the most concrete, physical way possible. The only end, or goal, of the man’s action is simply the action 




signaling a theopolitical point—such as Christ’s presence with the “crucified peoples of history” 
(Ellacuria)—and thus contribute directly to transforming the world. But this is not the point. The 
ritual aims at nothing other than itself. Such activities are intended to draw the participant into a 
physical, tangible relationship to God and community, and thus construct an intrinsically-good 
concrete way of being in the world. Goizueta therefore categorizes these rituals as having an 
“aesthetic” value, using this term to refer to the non-instrumental goodness of unity-with-
difference, connected to the U.S. Latina/o experience of mestizaje, or “empathic fusion.”76 
This inoperative quality to Latina/o Catholic ritual becomes even clearer in an essay 
Goizueta writes on Latina/o celebrative practices, or “fiesta.”77 Goizueta begins his analysis of 
fiesta by repeating his earlier criticisms of liberation theology’s focus on externally-oriented 
praxis.78 However, when he begins discussing the new paradigm of popular religion in Latina/o 
 
 
76 For his concept of the aesthetic Goizueta draws on the Mexican philosopher Jose Vasconcelos, who 
opposed positivistic, regulatory organization of society favored by Mexican dictator Porfirio Diaz. According to 
Vasconcelos, rejection of aesthetic values tended to create a culture in which human beings were treated as numeric 
entities, valuable only for their material output. This framework created unity, but it was unity of number rather than 
unity of harmonious mixture, or mestizaje. See Jose Vasconcelos, Obras Completas (Mexico: Libereros Mexicanos 
Unidos, 1958), 4:16. Goizueta employs Vasconcelos as an example of a distinctive value of the aesthetic in Latino/a 
thought. He then applies this to rituals: “The symbols and rituals of popular religion are prime examples of the 
intrinsic value of beauty, and, hence, the intrinsic value of human life as beautiful, i.e. as an end in itself, for the goal 
of the community’s participation in the stories, symbols, and rituals of popular religion is nothing other than that 
participation itself. The goal of the interaction among the participants, and the interaction between them and Jesus, 
Mary, and the saints, like that between Juan Diego and la Morenita, is nothing other than the interaction itself—
which is to be enjoyed and celebrated” (Goizueta, Caminemos con Jesús, 102). 
 
77 Roberto Goizueta, “Fiesta: Life in the Subjunctive,” in From the Heart of Our People: Latino/a 
Explorations in Catholic Systematic Theology, ed. Orlando Espín and Miguel Diaz (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis, 1999), 
84-99. 
 
78 However, Goizueta is more temperate here, arguing that liberation theology was “initially inattentive” to 
the “importance of celebration, ritual, popular religion and family life in the ongoing struggles of the poor” 
(Goizueta, “Fiesta,” 87). He notes the work of such liberation theologians as Gustavo Gutierrez on the importance of 





theology, he quickly adds that “by retrieving the central theological significance of popular 
religion, U.S. Latino/a theologians are also responding to this new reality, not by rejecting 
liberation theology, but by adopting, adapting, and helping to deepen the groundbreaking and 
radical insights of liberation theologians.”79 In other words, Goizueta does not want to choose 
between “useless” popular religion and “useful” liberation. His goal, as he states clearly, is to 
show how the “useless” popular activity of fiesta “is a principle form of cultural resistance,” 
because of the new form of anthropology it introduces.80 
How does a fiesta establish a socially-transformative and yet useless praxis, one that 
defines a new anthropology? Goizueta answers this question by giving a detailed explanation of 
the philosophy of fiesta. He begins apophatically. “The fiesta,” Goizueta says, “is not a party.”81 
Although the fiesta does involve pure enjoyment, displayed in merriment of various kinds 
(music, food, and dancing), it is also a serious act of commemoration. It is a way of being 
together as a community—not simply a way to fulfill oneself as an individual partier. As 
Goizueta puts it, “The fiesta is, at the same time, play and work.”82 
The “work” that is part of a fiesta is not merely the physical labor involved in setting up 
the amenities for revelry. It is the aspect of intentional community construction involved in the 
recreation. Goizueta points to research done by Ronald Grimes on the fiestas of Santa Fe, in 
which participants were asked if they could use music other than mariachi for the events. The 
 
79 Goizueta, “Fiesta,” 89. 
 
80 Goizueta, “Fiesta,” 90. 
 
81 Goizueta, “Fiesta,” 90. 
 





response was emphatic: “The fiesta would no longer be a fiesta.”83 The quintessence of the fiesta 
is creating and drawing together a community, and this requires culturally authentic elements—
in this case, mariachi rhythms. This authenticity is part of the “job description” of a fiesta. 
At the same time, Goizueta says, a fiesta is not work, defined as production. Using 
Aristotelian terminology, it is praxis, not poiesis. According to Goizueta, the inherent 
“uselessness” of this praxis enables those who participate in the fiesta to experience life as a gift, 
not a human-made construct. 
What we are receiving and responding to is the gift of life, not in a sentimental 
sense, but in an ontological sense: we know that whatever ‘we’ do, make or 
achieve is ultimately gift; we know that whatever relationships we construct are 
grounded in the prior constitutive relationship with the One who has loved us 
first; we know that who we are is not dependent on what we do, make, or achieve; 
we know that life—all of life—is gift before it is an ‘object’ that we work upon, 
mold, transform, or liberate.84 
 
This mentality, fostered through the ritual inoperativity of fiesta, is itself both the condition of 
true liberation and the reality of that liberation. In other words, fiesta is an act of resistance 
because it creates a different world within the present world. Goizueta calls this aspect of fiesta 
“life in the subjunctive,” meaning that it provokes the participant to act “as if” the world had 
been restored to a condition of perfect community, without hierarchy. Quoting Victor Turner, 
Goizueta suggests that during the fiesta, “it is as though everything is switched into the 
subjunctive mood for a privileged period of time.”85 The action of fiesta pulls future expectation 
 
83 Ronald Grimes, Symbol and Conquest: Public Ritual and Drama in Santa Fe, New Mexico (Ithaca, NY: 
Cornell University Press, 1976), 194, cited in Goizueta, “Fiesta,” 92. 
 
84 Goizueta, “Fiesta,” 95-6. 
 
85 See Victor Turner, The Anthropology of Performance (New York: PAJ Publications, 1986), 128. Cited in 





out of its distant, hazy mirage and places it squarely within the community’s life. In this sense, 
the subjunctive mood of the fiesta is a practical enactment of Moltmann’s future “anticipation.” 
The eschatology Moltmann speaks of in abstract terms is carried out regularly in the jubilant 
celebrations of Latino/a communities. In other words, Goizueta’s fiesta ties together the 
eschatological vision of Moltmann’s understanding of divine inoperativity with the liturgical 
encounter of Lacoste’s liturgical inoperativity, creating Agamben’s inoperative “form of life” 
through the community-transformation Kook longed for. Of course, this carries enormous 
consequences for political theology. 
Political Implications 
It is not hard to see that politics is deeply melded within the rituals of the Latina/o 
communities Goizueta describes. However, in order to understand this political framework it is 
important to emphasize that fiesta/inoperativity does not simply “carry” political meaning for 
Goizueta, as if it were a symbol to which a community describes particular meanings. Goizueta 
observes that is popular among scholars trained in a Northern European “nominalist” tradition to 
analyze the practices of other cultures by searching of conceptual significance lurking behind the 
practices, and then to connect such significance to various political causes. For example, one 
could interpret the appearance of the Virgin of Guadalupe to Juan Diego as a story symbolizing 
the affirmation of lower-class Latina/o identity. On such a reading, according to Goizueta, “what 
matters is not Juan Diego but ourselves, our own need for identity, our own sense of dignity, our 
own need for hope and liberation.”86 
 





Goizueta opposes this abstract form of interpretation. He points out that for the Latino/a 
Catholic communities that celebrate the story of Juan Diego and Our Lady of Guadalupe, these 
characters do matter. Similarly, the political meaning ascribed to fiesta is not the point. Of 
course, Juan Diego and fiesta do carry political meaning—Goizueta does not deny this. But this 
meaning cannot be separated from the form of the symbols. Goizueta explains that “the poor do 
not find meaning and hope in the religious practices themselves, but in the particular person of 
Jesus Christ, Guadalupe, and so forth.”87 The rituals of fiesta and other devotional practices must 
be interpreted sacramentally, in such a way that the truth of the symbol and its form are not 
separated.88 
This makes an analysis of the political implications of Goizueta’s fiesta-inoperativity 
tricky, because the one thing we must not do is suppose that we can draw out a functional telos 
from behind the form of the ritual. We must not look for any implicit political goals hidden 
within the matrix of Latino/a popular Catholicism. Doing so would be like asking a person, 
“What are the political goals behind your existence as a human being?” The question is absurd 
because it fails to acknowledge that people do not live for political transformations; they engage 
in political transformations in order to live.  
 
87 Goizueta, Christ Our Companion, 91. 
 
88 Goizueta’s understanding of the sacramental symbol in which both form and content are not separated is 
closely tied to Karl Rahner’s similar articulation of the meaning of the symbol. Rahner offers an analysis of 
symbolism that retrieves something like the medieval holistic approach, though with a modern form of 
argumentation. See Karl Rahner, “The Theology of the Symbol,” in Karl Rahner, Theological Investigations IV 
(New York: Crossroad, 1966), 244. On the medieval understanding of symbolism see Gary Macy, 
“Demythologizing ‘the Church in the Middle Ages,” Journal of Hispanic/Latino Theology 3, no. 1 (August 1995): 




How, then, may we speak of “political implications” to Goizueta’s understanding of 
inoperativity in Latina/o rituals? The answer to this question emerges from understanding the 
inherent relatedness and communal vision that are central to rituals in Latina/o popular religion. 
Goizueta and other scholars such as Ada María Isasi-Díaz note that inherent within the linguistic 
and cultural epistemic outlook of Latina/o persons in the United States is a different way of 
understanding the self and the self’s social role. Goizueta emphasizes that “for U.S. Hispanics, 
there is no such thing as an isolated individual who is not intrinsically defined by his or her 
relationship to others.”89 This sets the Latina/o perspective at variance with the typical Anglo-
American perspective on the self, which tends to isolate the individual as the basic unit of 
meaning within social relationships.90 In an individualistic framework, “politics” signifies 
something individuals do, or choose not to do, depending on their own life choices. Activities 
may be “political” if they are explicitly focused on political aspects of the self, which can be 
donned or discarded at will. However, because of its understanding of the person as intrinsically 
relational, the Latina/o perspective seems much more in line with the aphorism, “the personal is 
 
89 Goizueta, Caminemos con Jesús, 50. Isasi-Díaz highlights the fact that in the Latino/a perspective, 
“community is not something added on, but a web of relationships constitutive of who we are.” This is revealed in 
simple elements of the Spanish linguistic world, such as the fact that the Spanish word for raising children—criar—
derives from the same root word as crear, denoting “to create.” Isasi-Díaz similarly points out that the Spanish word 
individuo carries a negative connotation of one who is selfish or puts oneself outside the bounds of community.” See 
Ada María Isasi-Díaz, En la Lucha/In the Struggle: Elaborating a Mujerista Theology (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 
1993), 171. 
 
90 It is important to observe that Goizueta does not deny the significance of the individual (and individual 
rights) in Latino/a thought. One must not move from an extreme individualism on one hand to a mindless 
collectivism on the other. Goizueta proposes a Latino/a model in which the individual exists as a locus of self-
interpretation, but is always embedded in a social/communal world. This differs considerably with the Anglo-
American framework, in which the individual opts in an out of social matrices at will. On the meaning of 
individualism in Anglo-American culture see Robert N. Bellah, et al., Habits of the Heart: Individualism and 
Commitment in American Life (New York: Harper and Row, 1985), 142-147; and the various essays in David 





political.”91 By engaging in communal acts such as fiesta, the person may not add an explicitly 
political dimension to her/his activity, but that is because the political is not a “meaning” that the 
activity carries, but is already a constitutive element of the act itself. The inoperativity of ritual, 
in the Latina/o framework, is political insofar as it is a form of life that is a politics of its own. 
The intrinsic nature of politics in ritual helps to explain why Goizueta does not address 
specifically the challenge fiesta presents to manifestations of sovereign power. Doing so would 
imply that fiesta is simply a tool for accomplishing a political purpose, rather than being a form 
of politics itself. In this sense, his reluctance to make political applications to inoperative rituals 
is similar to Stanley Hauerwas’s insistence that “the church does not have a social ethic; the 
church is a social ethic.”92 Hauerwas does not imply that social transformation is undesirable—
only that it must arise from a living witness—a concrete exemplification of the reign of God in a 
particular community. For Hauerwas, thinking about the community’s life as an instrument for 
political change risks neglecting the cultivation of those unique qualities of the community that 
make political change possible. Likewise, for Goizueta, thinking of Latina/o popular Catholicism 
as a political tool devalues the particular lives whose very being creates political change. 
 
91 On the significance of the “personal” aspect of community relationships for politics, especially within the 
Latino/a context, see Michelle Gonzalez, “When We Don’t Choose Our Friends: Friendship as a Theological 
Category,” Theology Today 69, no. 2 (2012): 189-196. 
 
92 Stanley Hauerwas, The Peaceable Kingdom: A Primer in Christian Ethics (Notre Dame: University of 
Notre Dame Press, 1983), 99. By making this bold claim, Hauerwas is attempting to articulate a vision in which the 
church offers an eschatological “foretaste” of the world to come, by incarnating “kingdom values.” In this sense, his 
view is similar to Moltmann’s (and also Goizueta’s). However, Hauerwas differs from Moltmann and Goizueta in 
that he attempts to present the church’s ethical practices as self-contained, rather than spilling over into the wider 
world (Moltmann’s “beating swords into ploughshares”). Goizueta, for his part, does not seem to see any need to 
isolate Latino/a Catholic rituals and culture from “worldly” rituals and culture, and in fact sees blending or mestizaje 






Rather than making fiesta-inoperativity a political tool, Goizueta’s perspective entails 
that there is a politics within the ritual.  What does this politics look like? Goizueta makes a 
number of observations that help us characterize it. One such statement is his declaration that the 
fiesta is a time of “sweet disorder,” and a “liminal event.”93 It is a time when hierarchies of 
power are overturned. For example, in the quinceanera a young girl—typically an otherwise 
unprivileged member of society—receives royal treatment and is the subject of celebration.94 At 
a broader level, this type of ritual displays what Mikhail Bakhtin calls the “carnivalesque”—a 
celebratory upheaval in which societal classes are flipped.95 Such a time of dramatic social 
change could signal a new way of social and political existence. 
How does sovereignty function in this type of inoperative politics? Goizueta’s work 
seems to suggest that it functions through the quality of the aesthetic. In Christ Our Companion, 
Goizueta attempts what might appear to be a disjointed theological move: Bringing the practices 
of Latino/a popular religion into dialogue with the theology of Hans Urs von Balthasar. The 
 
93 See Goizueta, “Fiesta,” 93. As a caution against Goizueta’s optimistic view, it is important to keep in 
mind Laura Hernández-Ehrisman’s observation that fiesta-type practices “often stigmatize groups of low social 
status rather than offer a critique of social power.” See Laura Hernández-Ehrisman, Inventing the Fiesta City: 
Heritage and Carnival in San Antonio (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 2008). She makes this 
observation with regard to practices in the San Antonio carnival in the early 1900’s in which native groups were 
induced to act out stereotypical indigenous practices as a way to mockingly contrast them with more “elevated” 
Anglo-American life. Her cautionary note thus suggests that fiesta is easily co-opted by powers of oppression—a 
point that complements Goizueta’s analysis. 
 
94 For a description of this ritual see Almudena Ortiz, Fiesta de Quinceanera: Queen for a Day (M.A. 
Thesis, University of California, Berkeley, 1992). 
 
95 See Mikhail Bakhtin, Problems of Dostoevsky’s Poetics, trans. Caryl Emerson (Minneapolis: University 
of Minnesota Press, 1984). Bakhtin considers the carnival to be a “form of time” which is a “time out,” enabling 
society to reclassify itself. See also Mikhail Bakhtin, The Dialogic Imagination: Four Essays (Epic and the Novel, 
From the Prehistory of Novelistic Discourse, Forms of Time and of the Chronotype in the Novel, Discourse in the 





latter claims that the beauty of divine revelation is located within the form of this revelation 
itself: “The content does not lie behind the form, but within it.”96 Goizueta claims that this is 
exactly the viewpoint on which Latino/a popular religion bases itself. Because the form of Christ 
is that of a crucified person, it is within the form of the lives of poor, marginalized communities 
that the beauty of the revelation of Jesus Christ appears. The rituals that sustain these lives do not 
give rise to some sort of alternative construction of meaning (poiesis), but are the meaning of 
Christ’s beauty. In Goizueta’s summary, “if the great Swiss theologian thus bemoaned 
contemporary Catholic theology’s inability to see the form, U.S. Latino/a theologians are today 
articulating a theology that, grounded in Latino/a popular Catholicism, suggests that the poor are 
indeed able—and have always been able—to see the form.”97 
Here Goizueta makes a key point: If the beauty of the form of Christ is revealed in the 
lives and communities of crucified (and resurrected) persons, the type of power that this beauty 
possesses must never be coercive or controlling.  
To assert that Christ is the Way, the Truth, and the Life through any type of 
coercion is impossible without thereby denying in practice what one claims to be 
asserting in theory. If the truth of Christ is indeed beautiful, it can only attract and 
compel from inside, through the inherent power of the crucified and risen Christ 
as he is present today in the world, in Scripture, in the church, and especially in 
the concrete lives of Christians.98 
 
 
96 Hans Urs von Balthasar, The Glory of the Lord, Vol. 1, Seeing the Form (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 
1982), 151.  For an analysis of Balthasar’s concept of “seeing the form” that is also influential on Goizueta’s 
thinking see also Michelle Gonzalez, Sor Juana: Beauty and Justice in the Americas (Maryknoll: Orbis, 2003), 177. 
 
97 Goizueta, Christ Our Companion, 112. 
 





The inoperativity of Latina/o Catholic rituals thus suggests an aesthetic politics—or a politics of 
beauty—in which the model of sovereignty is a divine figure whose radiance reveals itself in the 
simple splendor of communities coming together in celebration. Thus, returning to the question 
of sovereignty, we could say that an inoperative sovereign creates a governmental model 
whereby justice emerges through the inherent goodness of human lives. That is to say, justice is 
the “letting be” of human beauty. 
Summary 
Goizueta’s work suggests that without rituals of pure inoperativity, social justice activism 
can forget the basic goodness and eschatological significance of communal life itself. 
Furthermore, excessively focusing on ends-oriented activism can easily sideline those persons 
whose existence seems to have little to do with changing the world. For example, the abuelitas 
Goizueta describes as being at the center of the home community may not have the time or 
physical ability to engage in political campaigning. Nevertheless, their day-to-day life—focused 




How does Goizueta’s emphasis on the self-fulfilling nature of inoperative ritual relate to 
Kook’s argument that ritual serves an end outside of itself? At first, these seem to be opposing 
paradigms. Kook claims that inoperative ritual must at times suspend itself in order to make way 
for a new form of life, which is the intended product of the ritual. Goizueta claims that 




of inoperativity are two sides of the same coin. Kook did not argue that shmita was only a tool 
for producing a new form of life. Rather, shmita was the key element in that life—one which 
needed to be suspended in order to fulfill itself. This point harmonizes perfectly with Goizueta’s 
argument that inoperative ritual needs to be identified with life itself. In both perspectives, the 
end result is a framework in which particular practices embody a distinct type of political 
existence. 
Perhaps we could say that Goizueta and Kook guard against different—though related—
challenges inoperative practices encounter. Kook was responding to the danger that inoperative 
practices could destroy life by making it subservient to the sovereign control of a unitary force. 
This force was the top-down authority of the deity. Goizueta, on the other hand, responds to the 
danger that inoperative practices may unwittingly destroy life by being co-opted by a different 
type of sovereign power—that of the market. For Goizueta, inoperative rituals must challenge 
the tendency of market-based political paradigms to define the human being as homo faber, and 
therefore as a tool to be managed at will by powers operating in permanent states of exception. 
Kook wanted to protect inoperativity lest it be used to serve religio-political ends. Goizueta 
sought to guard inoperativity against being employed by economic-political ends (which are 
also, of course, religio-political). 
Both Kook and Goizueta provide practical analyses of inoperative rituals that display the 
main features of inoperativity we have charted in the previous two chapters. Kook and Goizueta 
illustrate how rituals of inoperativity point toward the type of anthropology Moltmann and 
Heschel find in Jewish and Christian texts. In shmita and fiesta, we find a conception of human 




rituals offer a glimpse at a practical application of the philosophical perspective on power 
articulated by Lacoste and Agamben. Kook’s shmita and Goizueta’s fiesta demonstrate how 
inoperativity creates an alternative approach to human community, characterized by a state of 
harmony, replacing the competitive and coercive trajectories of politics. 
At the same time, Kook’s and Goizueta’s analyses show us that inoperative rituals are not 
easily practiced. As the complex debates around the heter mekhira illustrate, applying rituals of 
inoperativity to actual political problems requires nuance and an in-depth awareness of the 
theology behind the ritual. Goizueta would also admit that extending the type of inoperative 
existence of fiesta into all aspects of everyday life in Latina/o communities is likewise 
challenging. For Jewish communities in early twentieth-century Palestine as well as for Latino/a 
communities in twenty-first century America, there was and is an ever present possibility that 
inoperativity might slip into its opposite, either as a tool for serving a controlling deity, or a tool 
for pleasing market gods. Nevertheless, Kook’s shmita and Goizueta’s fiesta convincingly 
demonstrate that a particular concept of ritual inoperativity is a viable tool for theo-political 













THE CLIMATE-HEALING SABBATH 
A POLITICAL ETHIC OF INOPERATIVITY 
Throughout the preceding chapters, we have examined different building blocks for 
constructing a political theology of inoperativity, drawn from three central sources for thinking 
theologically. At this point, the stage has been set for developing a political ethic of 
inoperativity. In other words, we may now articulate how religious practices of inoperativity can 
play a role in shaping the way we live as political actors. The goal of the following chapter is not 
to establish a precise political program for using ritual inoperativity in activism or legislation—
that would fall well outside the boundaries of this work. Instead, my purpose will be to establish 
a framework for thinking about engaging in ritual inoperativity in an explicitly political way. 
I will use the weekly Sabbath as a key example of ritual inoperativity in this chapter. I 
will do so because the weekly Sabbath is one of the most widespread and recognizable forms of 
inoperativity, and also one that—if practiced—takes up a considerable amount of time (one-
seventh of existence). As noted in Heschel’s and Moltmann’s work, there are numerous ways in 
which Sabbath may impact political life—far too many to address here. In order to keep the 
following exposition brief, I will develop the following theological paradigm of Sabbath against 
the background of one specific political problem: climate ecology. Unfortunately, Sabbath is no 
panacea for the troubling dilemmas associated with climate change. But it does offer a helpful 





among others.1 Recently, several Jewish thinkers have issued calls to consider Sabbath as a 
response to climate change, as is visible in the “Green Sabbath Project,” which has also drawn 
participation by members of clergy from a variety of traditions.2 As far back as the early 90’s 
Jewish thinkers such as Vicky Joseph recognized the value of traditional Sabbath practices for 
ecology.3 I will speak more about these proposals at the end of this chapter and in the next.  
Before showing the significance of Sabbath for addressing this issue, it is important to 
identify the core of the problem. As with any political crisis, there are background paradigms 
that form the structure for climate change. Understanding the elements of this background will 
pave the way for demonstrating how inoperativity in the form of Sabbath provides a solution. 
Thus, before drawing on the descriptions of inoperativity as developed in the previous chapters 
to suggest a Sabbatical ecological ethic, I will first offer a brief description of the conceptual 
substrata from which the climate challenge arises. 
 
 
1 At the end of his work on Sabbath in creation, Moltmann famously noted—in connection to the problem 
of pollution in general—that Sabbath could be “a day when we leave our cars at home, so that nature too can 
celebrate its Sabbath.” See Moltmann, God in Creation, 296. Perhaps due to the fact that—in the late 1980’s when 
Moltmann was writing—climate change was only beginning to emerge in the popular consciousness as the massive 
problem that it is, Moltmann left this provocative idea undeveloped. Laura Hartmann has seized upon this idea and 
developed an “ecological spirituality” based on Sabbath practices connected to using fewer resources. See also 
Laura M. Hartmann, “Christian Sabbath-keeping as Spiritual and Environmental Practice,” Worldviews 15 (2011): 
47-64. Other important thinkers who have connected Sabbath to the task of environmental action include Richard 
Lowery, Sabbath and Jubilee (St. Louis: Chalice Press, 2000); and Ched Myers, The Biblical Vision of Sabbath 
Economics (Washington, DC: Tell the World, 2002). 
 
2 The Green Sabbath Project seeks to unite members of different religions in a collective effort of “doing 
nothing” as a response to climate change. See www.greensabbathproject.net.  Much of what I will argue is 
complimentary to this movement, as will be seen in the concluding chapter. 
 
3 See Vicky Joseph, “Action on the Environment: A Practical Guide,” in Judaism and the Environment, ed. 
Aubrey Rose (London: Cassell Publishers, 1992), 119-128. Joseph specifically mentions walking to synagogue and 





Background: The Nature of the Problem 
Strong scientific consensus suggests that present levels of carbon emissions will result in 
temperature increases with disastrous and possibly irreversible long term effects.4 Climate 
change is, of course, a global phenomenon, but it does not impact everyone equally. People 
living in places such as North America are unlikely to see significant problems, aside from 
occasional coastal relocations due to rising sea levels and somewhat unpredictable weather.5 
However, in equatorial regions—particularly coastal arid ones—climate change will lead to 
famines, increasing storms, and other natural disasters.6 These could trigger political upheavals 
such as mass migration, increased class stratification, and violent conflict.7 
Halting the devastation of our earth is not easy, for hosts of immediate political reasons, 
deftly explained by James Gustave Speth and Naomi Klein.8 All these reasons arise from cultural 
 
4 For scientific assessments of the risks associated with continuing high-levels of greenhouse gas emissions 
see Mario Malina et al., “What We Know: The Reality, Risks and Response to Climate Change,” AAAS Climate 
Science Panel, American Association for the Advancement of Science (2014): 15-16. On the potential irreversibility 
of these developments see Kevin Anderson, “Climate Change Going Beyond Dangerous—Brutal Numbers and 
Tenuous Hope,” Development Dialogue 61 (September 2012): 29. See also Michael Le Page, “Climate Change: It’s 
Even Worse Than We Thought,” New Scientist, https://www.newscientist.com/round-up/worse-climate/.  
 
5 On the different impacts of climate change on different regions of the earth see the reports collected in 
Mark G. New, et al., Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society, A 369 (2011): 1-241. See also Anders 
Levermann et al., “The Multimillenial Sea-Level Commitment of Global Warming,” Proceedings of the National 
Academy of Sciences 110 (2013): 13748.  
 
6 For vivid accounts of the disastrous outcomes of these impacts see Elizabeth Austin, Treading on Thin 
Air: Atmospheric Physics, Forensic Meteorology, and Climate Change: How Weather Shapes Our Everyday Lives 
(New York: Pegasus Books, 2016). 
 
7 These inevitably tragic political outcomes of climate change have been documented by many scientists, 
but see especially Gar Lipow, Solving the Climate Crisis through Social Change: Public Investment in Social 
Prosperity to Cool a Fevered Planet (Santa Barbara: Praeger, 2012). On the particular problem of migration as a 
result of population displacement see Melissa Fleming, “Climate change could become the biggest driver of 
displacement: UNHCR chief,” United Nations High Commissioner on Refugees, 
http://www.unhcr.org/4b2910239.html.  
 
8 See James Gustave Speth, The Bridge at the End of the World: Capitalism, the Environment, and 




factors. The surface-level political problems are rooted in deeper philosophical conceptions. 
Although the complexity of the cultural factors that have unleashed climate change could take 
volumes to describe, I propose—for the purpose of the present argument—that there are two 
primary categories, human identity and authority. These two categories are closely related, and 
they correspond precisely to what Pope Francis, in his recent encyclical on “care for our common 
home” refers to as the: “the place of human beings and of human action in the world.”9 
Identity 
Human beings have always struggled to describe their identity in relation to the earth. For 
much of Western history, human beings have widely considered the earth an object to be 
mastered and controlled. A strict stratification of human/nature has held sway at least implicitly 
in political thought. Those of us living in Europe and North America (with the exception of 
indigenous persons) have inherited a paradigm of human identity, whereby the human is defined 
 
Everything: Capitalism versus the Climate (Toronto: Alfred A. Knopf Canada, 2014). The problems they describe 
are intricate and insidious. First, in many cases those most responsible for climate change—those living in the global 
“North”—are precisely those who need worry least about its results. It is difficult to motivate voters to enact 
sweeping policy changes to avert an outcome that will barely affect them, aside from killing the moose they see on 
vacation or bringing an extra couple blizzards and rainstorms each year. Second, the effects of climate change are 
slow enough in arrival that they do not fall within the tenure of many politicians. Unlike an event like an economic 
recession or international conflict, no politician has to “own” climate change—the responsibility is spread out over a 
vast multitude of political actors over a grand sweep of time. Together, these factors make it seem impossible to do 
anything about the problem. 
 
9 See Pope Francis, Laudato Si: On Care for Our Common Home (Vatican: Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 
2015), 101. Commenting on Pope Francis’s approach, Mark Shiffman observes that this obsession with using the 
natural world is rooted in a conception of human identity as a power holder: “The problem is not simply that the 
extent and scope of our power have outstripped our wisdom and virtue. The problem rather is our fundamental 
understanding of what the power that we are developing is, over what we develop it, and how and why we develop 
it. Since such power is a human attainment, and its development is a human activity, the root problem turns out to be 
at the same time a faulty sense of who and what we are as human beings—a faulty sense that both grounds and is 
reinforced by our technocratic relationship to nature.” See Mark Shiffman, “The Other Seamless Garment: Laudato 
Si’ on the Human Relationship to Created Nature,” in Care for the World: Laudato Si’ and Catholic Social Thought 





by use of the earth for human ends. This paradigm requires a careful maintenance of the binary 
between zoe and bios, and a sense that zoe must increasingly be corralled and altered. Not 
surprisingly, as human beings have attained unparalleled mastery over natural phenomena, we 
have used this power to engineer the potential for our own demise. 
Under this same heading is a conception of productivity as the end goal of human life. If 
human beings must find their ultimate fulfillment in making or production, it seems inevitable 
the natural world must constantly feed this fundamental human need. Ceasing or cutting back on 
production would, in this paradigm, be an anti-humanitarian measure. Because we tend to think 
that the endless employment of nature is essential to who we are, we struggle to justify any effort 
to do nothing in the face of nature. Efforts to stop climate change thus run against our basic sense 
of human dignity.10 
An illuminating example of this can be found in the “Cornwall Declaration on 
Environmental Stewardship,” produced by the Cornwall Alliance, a group of conservative 
evangelical, Catholic and Jewish leaders that denies human-produced climate change.11 In this 
chapter, I will refer frequently to the Cornwall Declaration for several reasons. First, it is an 
ecumenical and interreligious document, drawing together signatories from Catholic, evangelical 
Protestant, and Jewish traditions. Second, although it is not officially binding on the members of 
any of these traditions, it represents the views of key thought leaders. Third, it is one of the few 
 
10 This plays a key part in the fascinating psychological phenomena associated with climate-change denial 
analyzed in George Marshall, Don’t Even Think About It: Why Our Brains Are Wired to Ignore Climate Change 
(New York: Bloomsbury, 2014). 
 





ethical statements offered by religious leaders that directly opposes a movement to address 
climate change through concerted action (in most cases, it is safe to say, Christians of this stripe 
often ignore the problem or offer only a brief nod to climate-skepticism).12 
The primary thrust of the document is that human beings are valuable because of their 
capacity to “develop” resources and “enrich” creation. The document asserts that human beings 
display the image of God by being “producers.”13 Although part of the document is nobly 
concerned with preventing harmful outcomes for the poor that might result from economy-
slowing ecological policies, it is clear that a key rationale behind the opposition to such policies 
is a motive to protect the identity of human beings as a producers and modifiers of nature. 
A marked contrast to this approach can be seen in Pope Francis’s Laudato Si, which does 
not deny the role of human beings as producers, but seeks to curb a “misguided 
anthropocentrism” that defines human beings by technological accomplishment.14 The contrast 
between the two documents demonstrates that a pivot point in the contemporary ecology debate 
lies within our anthropology. This strongly suggests that if we want to reduce greenhouse gas 
emissions, we will have to directly face our own conception of ourselves in relation to the world. 
We may, for brief intervals, slow down the problem of climate change by discovering more 
efficient ways of expanding our domination of nature, or protecting ourselves from the most 
 
12 The influence of the thinkers behind the Cornwall Declaration cannot be understated. Laurel Kearns 
points out that the Cornwall Alliance is a group that supports many (or possibly most) anti-green movements within 
conservative Christianity in the United States, including the “Resisting the Green Dragon” series. See Laurel 
Kearns, “Religious Climate Activism in the United States,” in Religion in Environmental and Climate Change: 
Suffering, Values, Lifestyles, ed. Dieter Gerten and Sigurd Bergmann (London: Continuum, 2012), 132-151. 
 
13 See “Concerns” 1 and 2 of “The Cornwall Declaration.” 
 




imminent problems we have created. But these efforts will ultimately fail if we do not 
fundamentally change who we think we are. Sabbath, I argue, can play a significant role in this 
change. 
Authority 
Climate change taps into an ongoing difficulty Westerners face regarding authority. This 
challenge is linked to the problem of identity because in a capitalist society, private property 
creates sovereignty. We think of ourselves as “owning” portions of the earth, and thereby 
possessing the authority to act as we wish in our respective domains. “Sovereign is the one who 
decides in the state of exception,” and the one who decides is the one who owns the property in 
which the exception occurs. Any pact or international agreement to reduce emissions levels may 
be perceived as a threat to local sovereignty over natural resources. 
This problem also emerges in connection to how to prevent people from using resources 
that seem to be freely available to them. If human beings are in sovereign control of the materials 
earth gives to them, how can anyone intervene in the ways private individuals choose to utilize 
these materials? How do we ethically call a halt to the exploitation of earth, especially when it 
appears that some people rely on this exploitation in order to survive? 
This authority challenge appears in the Cornwall Declaration as well. The authors 
repeatedly appeal to human “dominion” over earth, and emphasize that humans should recognize 
“their proper place in the created order.”15 Although the authors assert that this dominion should 
be “caring” and should take the form of stewardship, there is a clear indication that the authors 
 





perceive human manipulation of creation to be an essential aspect of the human role in the world. 
Since human beings are rightful bearers of authority over the earth, any attempt to curtail this 
authority interferes with a divine commission. Hence, the authors “aspire to a world in which 
liberty as a condition of moral action is preferred over government-initiated management of the 
environment as a means to common goals.”16 In this perspective, government regulation is 
problematic not merely for practical reasons (concerns about mismanagement, etc.), but because 
it prevents the free exercise of divinely-granted authority. 
In this approach, authority functions through a hierarchical system of control, 
characterized by a need for humans to extract resources from that which is beneath them. This 
contrasts sharply with the vision articulated by Pope Francis, who argues that in past Christian 
tradition, “what was handed on was a Promethean vision of mastery over the world, which gave 
the impression that the protection of nature was something that only the faint-hearted cared 
about.”17 Against this framework, the Pope longs for an anthropology in which human beings are 
in authority over nature, but this authority takes the form of self sacrifice and “openness to 
others.”18 Once again, the cavernous contrast between the Cornwall Declaration’s approach and 
that of Pope Francis serves to emphasize the importance of conceptions of authority in 
addressing climate change. 
 
16 See “Aspiration” 4 in “The Cornwall Declaration.” 
 
17 Pope Francis, Laudato Si’, 116. 
 





Responding to the concerns of the authors of the Cornwall Declaration is tricky, because 
in many situations there seems to be an inverse relationship between the amount of authority 
each individual human being holds over the natural world and the amount of authority human 
beings have over each other. In other words, the “liberty” of human beings may be in tension 
with the “liberty” of nature. Freed from the tethers of government regulation, human beings may 
place nature in enormous, oppressive bondage. However, excesses of government regulation may 
place human beings in oppressive bondage as well.19 Therefore it is not enough merely to insist 
on the freedom of nature or the freedom of human beings. A political ethic for climate change 
must consider how the types of authority corresponding to these freedoms relate to each other. 
As with the problem of identity, the issue of authority in relation to climate change could 
take volumes of its own. I cannot attempt to solve it here. I will argue, however that Sabbath 
could play a key role in a solution. 
A Sabbatical Ethic of Identity and Authority 
Our perspectives on identity and authority are integral parts of our “social imaginary”—
the set of ideas that form the unquestioned background for how we think and act.20 Trying to 
address climate change without changing this social imaginary will only result in short-term 
solutions.21 In the following sections, I will explore how a particular practice of Sabbath—
 
19 Thus far in history, we have not yet seen an “ecological totalitarian government” that forces its citizens 
into conditions of grim hardship in order to protect the environment, and thus it seems that climate skeptics who fear 
this type of outcome may be propagating baseless fears. Nevertheless, such a totalitarian government is certainly 
possible, and at least at a theoretical level, an ethicist must take it into consideration.  
 
20 See Charles Taylor, Modern Social Imaginaries (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2004). 
 
21 For this reason, Sallie McFague has called for a change in spirituality in order to address the problem of 
climate change. McFague’s proposal is to focus on emulating the self-emptying lifestyles of certain saints—those 




grounded in the biblical, philosophical, and practical perspectives developed in previous 
chapters—can dramatically alter our social imaginary. In what follows, I will draw on the 
biblical, philosophical, and practical insights of the thinkers examined in chapters 1-3 in order to 
articulate how this Sabbath might address human identity and authority.22 
Sabbath and Identity 
In general, human beings separate themselves from the earth by actions. One could argue 
that the primary relationship in all of human life is that between activity and passivity. The latter 
we associate with nature, whose patterns and rhythms seem not to lead to any particular goal, but 
only to a continual repetition of the same. We do not know if mosquitoes or elk think about their 
“life span” and what they want to accomplish in it, but certainly the clouds around New York 
and the redwoods of California seem oblivious to such questions. By contrast, human beings 
indicate that they are “above” nature through their construction projects, scientific developments, 
and manufacturing of surplus goods. This is a key part of the “technocratic” paradigm Pope 
Francis analyzes in Laudato Si.23 
 
Climate Change and the Practice of Restraint (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2013). The saints she analyzes are John 
Woolman, Simone Weil, and Dorothy Day. Although I applaud McFague’s careful research and recommendation of 
a “saintly” way of life as an approach to climate ecology, I worry that the focus on heroism associated with her 
method could cause religious practitioners to focus on individual genius rather than on simple, community-based 
practices. This may not be the case, however, and my approach and McFague’s could be harmonized. Strangely, at 
no point in her work on the practice of “restraint” does McFague address Sabbath—a peculiar omission. 
 
22 I must continually emphasize that using Sabbath to address these issues will not result in a perfect 
solution to the problem. A situation as complex as climate change cannot be handled with simplistic, one-
dimensional approaches. My recommendation of Sabbath observance is predicated on the notion that Sabbath can be 
one helpful tool to use in this case, not the only tool. 
 
23 As Pope Francis puts it, “this paradigm exalts the concept of a subject who, using logical and rational 






As Lynn White famously observed, the idea that human beings are above nature and are 
obligated to dominate it has deep, tenacious roots in the Christian tradition.24 Popular 
understandings of Genesis 1’s injunction to the primordial couple to “fill the earth and subdue it” 
often confirm this anthropocentric/dominant anthropology. By placing human beings in a 
separate category from nature, the stage is set for an oppressive relationship. This imperative 
within the creation story has often been used as a pretext for human oppression of nature, 
although this is hardly the only or most straightforward reading of what “fill and subdue” might 
mean, as several scholars have pointed out.25 
Nevertheless, it is fascinating that the first creation narrative ends with God keeping a 
Sabbath. This suggests that Sabbath could fulfill a key role in changing conceptions of human 
identity, and thus impacting the paradigm that has lead to earth’s oppression. We can see this 
impact first from the Biblical angles discussed in chapter 1. 
 
24 Lynn White, “The Historical Roots of Our Ecologic Crisis,” Science 155, no. 3767 (March 10, 1967): 
1203. Of course, not everyone concurs with White’s allegations. For a different perspective on the historic 
contribution of Christianity to ecology see Wendell Berry, “Christianity and the Survival of Creation,” Classical 
Carousel (April 8, 2015). 
 
25 Most persuasive among these scholars could be Richard Bauckham, who points out that the command to 
fill the earth and subdue it is not an imperative that sets human beings apart from nature, but is part of humanity in 
which humans are similar to animals: “When humans obey the command to be fruitful and multiply, to fill the Earth 
and to subdue it, they are not imitating God in a unique way but behaving like other species. All species use their 
environment and, though agriculture is unique to humans, it can be seen as a peculiarly human extension of the right 
of all animals to use their environment to live and to flourish.” See Richard Bauckham, The Bible and Ecology: 
Rediscovering the Community of Creation (Waco, TX: Baylor University Press, 2010), 19. On the idea that “filling 
and subduing” do not justify coercive control see also Douglas John Hall, Imaging God: Dominion as Stewardship 
(Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1986); Norman C. Habel, “Is the Wild Ox Willing to Serve You? Challenging the 
Mandate to Dominate,” in The Earth Story in Wisdom Traditions, ed. Norman C. Habel and Shirley Wurst 
(Sheffield: Sheffield Academic, 2000), 179-189; and Peter Harrison, “Having Dominion: Genesis and the Mastery 
of Nature,” in Environmental Stewardship: Critical Perspectives, Past and Present, ed. R.J. Berry (London: T&T 




Biblical Approaches to Inoperative Identity 
As we observed in our analysis of Moltmann’s and Heschel’s readings of Sabbath 
traditions, there is an anthropology latent in Jewish and Christian Sabbath texts. This is evident 
in the fact that the Jewish and Christian Scriptures do not simply mandate Sabbath without 
explanation. The Sabbath command in Exodus 20:8-11 points backward to the creation story as 
its rationale. This creation story leaves us with an image of God and human beings resting 
together in a state of mutual respect.  
What does this mean for human identity vis-à-vis nature? Here Moltmann’s emphasis on 
humanity as imago Dei becomes paramount. Often the idea of the imago Dei can be portrayed as 
an identity marker of separation. The animals and plants, for example are not made in the image 
of God, but humans are. This grounds humanity’s right to rule over the earth. But if human 
beings exist as images of a Sabbath-keeping God, this relationship is much more complicated 
than it initially appears. Through the Sabbath, God’s relationship to earth does not feature 
constant production and development, but a state of letting be. Therefore, the Sabbath keeping of 
humans must take a parallel form. By resting on the Sabbath, human beings adopt the identity of 
God in relation to the world. Their being in the world mirrors God’s being. As Moltmann puts it, 
“His (God’s) works express God’s will, but the Sabbath manifests his Being.”26 
As we saw in chapter 1, Moltmann uses this view of God to provide hints at an 
anthropology in which human beings do not form their identities through activity in nature, but 
through a type of inoperativity that blends with human action in the world, providing it with a 
 





telos or self-fulfilling goal. In this anthropological framework, human beings display their 
purpose in the world by resting with God. As described in chapter 1, this does not mean that 
humans ought to do nothing, but that their activity ought to be pervaded with rest as its goal and 
criterion for meaning. For Moltmann, this leads to a direct political ethics of labor in which work 
does not create human identity but emerges from it. 
Heschel reinforces this same idea with his interpretation of the Jewish perspective of 
Sabbath as a counter to spatial covetousness. He argues that “Judaism tries to foster the vision of 
life as a pilgrimage to the seventh day; the longing for the Sabbath all days of the week which is 
a form of longing for the eternal Sabbath all the days of our lives. It seeks to displace the 
coveting of things in space for coveting the things in time, teaching man to covet the seventh day 
all days of the week.”27 This perspective moves the locus of human identity from the conquest of 
things to a form of existence for its own sake—a restful being with God. Heschel draws on 
Jewish textual traditions that personify this rest as a “queen”—a sovereign figure who arrives in 
a distinctly non-imperial way. For Heschel, this translates into a politics of spatial “letting be,” 
changing the anthropology that underlies racism and economic mismanagement. 
What would be the potential outcome of this type of Sabbatical thinking for the current 
ecological crisis? Moltmann and Heschel’s work suggests that Sabbath keeping could counteract 
the tendency to identify human beings with the effects they produce in nature. Industrial culture 
and the economy it produces mirror the identity that human beings create for themselves. If we 
are what we do, it becomes imperative for human beings to do more and more to alter our world 
 





to suit our desires. Rest, as the biblical traditions depict it, is the fundamental antithesis of this 
trajectory. By purposefully resting (and not resting merely to prepare the way for more work), 
Sabbath-keepers articulate a view of human identity that slows the perpetual motion-machine of 
the modern western world. For this reason, if westerners adopted a biblical-Sabbath 
anthropology, the identity framework that founds the climate change problem would be undercut. 
This transformation of identity on a biblical Sabbath model would also alter the way the 
image of God is understood in documents such as the Cornwall Declaration. As noted above, the 
authors of this document often use the biblical language of human “dominion” to justify a 
fundamental human need to produce value in the world. In this approach, to “fill the earth” 
through production is the practical application of being in the divine image. What this approach 
easily forgets is that the God of the Genesis story is portrayed as culminating the creative project 
with Sabbath rest, indicating—as Moltmann and Heschel argue—that God’s way of being in the 
world is characterized by Sabbath. God does not dwell with creation as a productive force, but as 
the power of letting be. Because human beings should strive to display the divine image, they 
should imitate God’s restful coexistence with nature. 
This biblical understanding of human identity would also change the way we view the 
standard of human progress. If we define ourselves as actors and producers, we logically come 
closer to our ideal the more we act and produce. “Progress” toward the human ideal then means 
endlessly increasing activity. But if, as Moltmann and Heschel argue, God’s being with the earth 
must be understood sabbatically, the ideal of human progress would be realized not by doing 
more, but by doing things differently. In other words, ethics based on this anthropology would 




would dramatically change the common western assumption that every opportunity for economic 
development is necessarily a boon.  
Understood this way, Sabbath would also point western culture toward a re-evaluation of 
material “needs.” It has been pointed out that if everyone on earth attempted to use as many 
resources as residents of the United States do, earth’s resources would be forthrightly depleted.28 
The problem is that developed economies such as that of the United States view constantly 
increasing production as a “need.” (If there is any doubt about this, consider what would happen 
if a U.S. politician running for office were to say that “our economy is growing fast enough.”) 
This political problem is built on a perspective of human identity that Sabbath, understood 
through the biblical lens of Moltmann and Heschel, could help to change. 
Philosophical Approaches to Inoperative Identity 
The philosophy of inoperativity articulated by Lacoste and Agamben also addresses the 
ecological problem of human identity. Although Lacoste examines the ritual of the night vigil 
rather than Sabbath, his phenomenology suggests that being inoperative before God expresses a 
different vision of the human person’s role in the world. As we have seen, the individual who 
keeps the night vigil “does nothing” and yet in doing so exists in a reciprocal relationship to the 
Absolute. The absolute is inoperative, and those who enter into liturgy emerge inoperative as 
well, for liturgy is not a circumscribed zone of human life, but integral to being human. Lacoste 
thus helps us envision a “Sabbatical end of history” in which the identity recognition of master 
 
28 According to the official statistics of the University of Michigan’s Center for Sustainable Systems, the 
United States in 2018 contained about 5% of the world’s population, and used 17% of the world’s energy. Contrast 
this with China, which in the same time period comprised 19% of the world’s population and used 22% of the 





and slave—self-oriented thymos—is achieved not through relentless competition, but conjoined 
inoperative worship. 
Agamben’s philosophy leads to a similar identity framework, approached from the binary 
perspective of zoe and bios. Against standard political theories that seek to define how societies 
should structure bios life and exclude zoe, Agamben grasps for a way to suspend these 
categories, or to express a human identity on the threshold between them. The resulting 
anthropology would characterize human beings with a type of passivity before nature. The world 
of humans and the world of nature would dwell in a space of non-differentiation. Perhaps the 
best image for capturing this type of existence is Sabbath. 
From the perspective of Lacoste’s and Agamben’s depictions of inoperativity, a ritual 
such as Sabbath would suggest that human beings need not aspire to an absolute identity built 
around action. Their key insight is that humanity can fully “be itself” without relying on 
functional operations as a means of preserving the category of the human. This is crucial, 
because in the western world, reversing climate change may require doing what—under a 
production oriented paradigm of human identity—are fundamentally “anti-human” or even 
“inhumane” measures. This is why voters are unlikely to approve of policies that could slow the 
economy in order to reduce carbon emissions. Cynics might point to greed and short-sightedness 
as explanations for this democratic phenomenon—and they would be partially right—but there is 
also an identity issue lurking here. Human beings strive to achieve Absolute being through 
constant activity in the world. They desire to separate themselves from nature in order to exist as 





This is where a ritual such as Sabbath becomes important. Sabbath could enable human 
beings to exist together with an inoperative identity. In other words, by keeping Sabbath 
together, human beings could create an identity that suspends the categories of master and slave, 
or zoe and bios. Sabbath would direct human beings back to materiality in fresh ways. As Sigve 
Tonstad observes from the perspective of Christian church history, “disparagement of the 
Sabbath, as in the writings of Origen, went hand in hand with repudiation of the body and 
neglect of the Earth.”29 Earth-connectedness and Sabbath are closely tied together, because the 
latter provides the identity formation which enables the former. 
The phenomenon of vehicle-driving provides a vivid example of how identity and action 
could be altered by Sabbath. In many parts of the Western world—especially the United States—
driving a car is one of the central ways in which human beings establish their identity. This goes 
beyond the simple status question of what kind of car one drives. By driving to work, human 
beings increase their sense of a separate identity from nature and from lower life forms (those 
unfortunate human beings who do not work or must take public transportation to work). In some 
cases, longer and more expensive commutes indicate a more important identity, such as in cases 
where one owns a home far out in the suburbs and works in the metropolitan center. In these 
contexts, to drive is human. 
Against this backdrop, consider the sabbatarian practice of not driving cars (most 
commonly followed by orthodox Jewish communities). Of course, if widely practiced, such a 
ritual would reduce carbon emissions significantly. At a deeper level, the action would suggest 
that Sabbath is a day on which we refrain from exercising difference over the earth. By walking 
 




wherever we need to go, we would signal a type of passivity, akin to Bartleby’s “I would prefer 
not to.” Not only would this directly slow climate change, it would also help develop a 
Sabbatical mindset that questions the necessity of a separate identity vis-à-vis nature, the 
framework that created the problem in the first place. 
Practical Approaches to Inoperative Identity 
Although Kook and Goizueta do not seem to directly analyze a paradigm of human 
identity, we do find in their approach a practical perspective on how inoperativity could inform 
such a paradigm. In the case of shmita, Kook emphasized that the purpose of the ritual was to 
allow the “soul” of the nation to display its divine qualities: “On the shmita, our inner spirit may 
be revealed as it truly is,” Kook said.30 The purpose of the practice was thus to display a shmita-
people, whose identity was marked by rest-giving and fellowship. This was why the partial 
suspension of shmita through the heter mekhira was so important. The ritual needed to be used to 
create a society of rest-giving and a sovereignty of “letting be,” and in order to fulfill those goals, 
the ritual needed to be capable of inoperativity in itself. 
Goizueta formulates his approach to identity from a much different angle. Rather than 
examining inoperative ritual as a means to construct a particular political result, Goizueta’s 
method finds a human identity within the ritual. Recall that for Goizueta, “The fiesta is, at the 
same time, play and work.”31 In other words, fiesta is a human identity, lived in a subjunctive 
attitude toward a just world. The rituals of fiesta accomplish nothing, but in doing so they fulfill 
 
30 Kook, Introduction to Shabbat Ha’aretz, 96. 
 





their purpose of allowing human beings to flourish. Inoperative ritual, in Goizueta’s paradigm, is 
a way to view human joy in existence as an intrinsic end, one that requires no external 
accomplishment for its own validation. 
This type of inoperative praxis—manifested in fiesta or Sabbath—is creates a different 
approach to human identity than found in either capitalism or socialism. Goizueta agrees with 
Marx that the rituals of modern capitalism alienate human beings by instrumentalizing them, but 
he also points out that Marx’s solution falls into the same trap: “What Marx—like all 
modernity—failed to appreciate is the ambiguity inherent in any notion of human praxis that 
defines it in terms of production, even if what is being produced is ‘the just person’ or ‘the just 
society.’”32 The type of praxis Goizueta calls for—and finds in Latina/o communities—is a 
genuinely “aesthetic” praxis, characterized by communal indwelling or accompaniment, with no 
end outside itself. To recall Goizueta’s analogy we explored in chapter 3, this is the difference 
between building a house (poiesis) and making a home (praxis).The latter celebrates life and the 
home environment not as a means to further development or conquest, but simply as inherent 
goodness. Rituals focused on this type of life are the only kind that can avoid reducing human 
identity to productivity—the very conceptual framework that has created the climate problem.33 
 
32 Roberto Goizueta, “Rediscovering Praxis,” in We Are a People! Initiatives in Hispanic American 
Theology, ed. Roberto Goizueta (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1992), 59. 
 
33 Goizueta’s recommendation of totally inoperative ritual (“aesthetic praxis”) may therefore point to a third 
political route between the horns of the capitalism vs. socialism debate in ecology. If Goizueta is right, and both 
capitalism and socialism structure human identity as productivity, simply replacing a vicious capitalist economy 
with a socialist one will not provide a long term solution to our ecological crisis. What is needed instead, according 
to Goizueta, is a type of popular religious praxis oriented toward “the practical, performative, and participatory 
affirmation of community as the foundation of all human activity.” See Goizueta, “Rediscovering Praxis,” 64. Like 





Taken together, Kook’s and Goizueta’s perspectives on inoperativity suggest that a 
cohesive approach to human identity in response to climate change must utilize practices that 
improve the world (Kook’s concern), but do so by being intrinsic ends (Goizueta’s concern). In 
other words, we must use particular rituals to address climate change, but we must not make this 
ecological goal something external to the ritual. The ritual must be a way of being on earth, not 
simply a tool or gimmick for fixing a problem. The climate problem requires solutions that arise 
from the depths of everyday human life. We must actively change destructive political structures 
by living a different kind of politics. 
The practical benefit of a weekly Sabbath as a ritual for addressing climate change is 
precisely that it is a ritual that blends with human life. Because it occurs every seven days, 
Sabbath has a unique capacity to influence the way we live our lives on the other days. Sabbath 
is also a ritual that points toward the domestic sphere, re-centering human attention on those 
elements of life that are seemingly unrelated to industry and therefore forgotten by the modern 
production-identity paradigm. This domestic focus is something Sabbath holds in common with 
Latina/o popular religious rituals, which are also centered on the home, as Miguel Díaz 
observes.34 By celebrating the common, domestic Sabbath as the highest ideal of human life, one 
 
34 Commenting on Goizueta’s attempt to formulate a theory of praxis that is truly inoperative, Díaz points 
out that “the modern reductionistic understanding of the human person as an agent of history (homo faber) and the 
identification of such agency with public places, leaves little room for the home. Home is the place of feeling, 
aesthetics, and empathic love, the public is the place of production and accomplishment.” See Díaz, On Being 
Human, 37. Díaz shows how Latina/o popular religion changes the locus of human identity from the purely 
productive sphere to the domestic sphere, creating empowering implications for marginalized persons such as 
women, the elderly, and others. I would add that inoperative practices such as Sabbath have a similar effect, and that 
a framework of home-oriented identity could be essential for addressing our ecological crisis. The type of 
exploitative economic behavior that continues to ravage our planet emerges precisely because we fail to see human 
beings as residents of a home (earth), instead viewing them as players on a vicious, competitive battlefield. We will 
need an identity change in order to see earth as “our common home” as the English subtitle of Pope Francis’ 




acquires a new identity—that of a Sabbath-keeper or sabbatarian, which is a way of saying “one 
who lets be.” This identity change signals an enormous difference between keeping a Sabbath 
and simply taking time off from work in a casual way. The latter might be an eco-friendly thing 
to do, but it signals no direct intention to allow freedom to the earth. Vacations and days at home 
are largely amoral practices, in that they make no direct statement about the goodness or badness 
of any given lifestyle or identity. Sabbath-keeping, on the other hand, is a straightforward claim 
that doing nothing can be good, that ceaseless production is not an absolute human ideal. 
The weekly Sabbath may thus be “life in the subjunctive,” as Goizueta might put it. It is a 
practice aimed at a particular goal (changing the “soul” of a people, to use Kook’s language), but 
that is because it makes a claim about the intrinsic value of the kind of life it embodies. In the 
context of climate change, this type of identity-transforming ritual is essential, because moral 
exhortations alone are unlikely to be effective in changing entrenched patterns of behavior. 
Climate activism often resorts to fervent appeals for action—or work—to address the impending 
catastrophe. Such appeals are noble and understandable. However, they remain trapped in an 
anthropological framework in which the human being is defined by labor or production. Under 
this paradigm, it will be impossible to effectively urge human beings to stop the constant 
exploitation of Earth’s resources. What we need now is a celebration of truly “aesthetic” 
praxis—a genuine “accompaniment” of our planet. For centuries Western culture has viewed the 
planet as a house that needs building through productive mechanisms of control. Now we need to 
transition toward viewing it as a home for dwelling. Given the severity of the problem—many 




ever to find the t’shuvah Kook longed for, accomplished through inoperative rituals that alter our 
innermost being.  
Sabbath and Authority 
The climate change problem is connected to the issue of authority in several ways. At one 
level, there is the question of human authority over nature. Like all creatures, human beings 
exercise some level of control over natural processes. Aside from a few highly romantic 
naturalists, most people agree that human beings must “govern” nature to some extent. 
Furthermore, most agree that humans should manage nature in a non-exploitative way. Even the 
authors of the Cornwall Declaration use words such as “care” and “stewardship” to describe their 
ideal human-nature relationship. Clearly, though, such noble language does not go very far in 
describing the extent of human authority over the earth. At what point should we curb our 
impulse to grab more power over nature? 
Another aspect of the authority problem is human-to-human authority. It seems hard to 
address climate change without talking about coercion in some form or another. Part of the 
reason certain emissions-reduction agreements have failed to gain the acquiescence of important 
countries such as the United States is that there is no one to leverage force strong enough to 
make these nations join and keep the agreements.35 Within individual nations, coercive power 
seems necessary to keep corporations and individuals compliant with restrictions. The problem 
of curbing climate change has led some to argue that only a revival of some form of socialism 
 
35 This is especially visible in the case of the Kyoto Protocol. On this see Henry Shue’s chapter “A Legacy 
of Danger: The Kyoto Protocol and Future Generations” in his book Climate Justice: Vulnerability and Protection 





can lead to success.36 Such speculations cause others to fear the potential of a planned economy 
with no place for market freedom. 
The problem of authority—its limits, ideal qualities, and methods of enforcement—is too 
broad to adequately address here. My goal is to show instead how Sabbatical inoperativity, 
understood in the frameworks developed in the previous three chapters, can point toward a type 
of human authority that could be helpful. 
Biblical Approaches to Inoperative Authority 
From the perspective of traditional Christian and Jewish texts, Sabbath is deeply 
connected to sovereignty. The first Genesis creation story shows God resting after the 
completion of creation, indicating that rest is an integral part of God’s being. If, in Christian and 
Jewish theologies, God is sovereign, God is such as one who rests. As noted above, this idea has 
enormous implications for understanding human identity in the world, because human beings are 
intended to bear the image of God, being in the world as God is. Correspondingly, it carries great 
weight for a concept of human authority. If human beings have authority over creation, this 
authority must be enacted in a “Sabbatical” manner. 
But what does that mean? Here it is helpful to recall Moltmann’s understanding of work, 
analyzed in chapter 1. For Moltmann, work and Sabbath must be understood in the light of each 
other. Moreover, the relationship between them is teleological. Work exists for the purpose of 
 
36 Naomi Klein observes that “there is a clear and compelling relationship between public ownership and 
the ability of communities to get off dirty energy. Many of the countries with the highest commitments to renewable 
energy are ones that have managed to keep large parts of their electricity sectors in public (and often local) hands, 
including the Netherlands, Austria, and Norway” (Klein, This Changes Everything, 99). Antipathy toward socialism 
is a major impetus behind the climate change denier movement, as observed by Naomi Oreskes and Erik M. 
Conway, Merchants of Doubt (New York: Bloomsbury, 2010), 5, 25-26. See also Riley E. Dunlap and Aaron M. 
McCright, “Organized Climate Change Denial,” in The Oxford Handbook of Climate Change and Society, ed. John 




Sabbath. Moltmann asserts that “work is thus meaningful not because it alone provides the 
meaning of life, but precisely because it is limited by the goal of rest and joy in existence. The 
Sabbath does not simply interrupt work. Rather, work is understood and defined through the 
Sabbath.”37 As we saw in chapter 1, Moltmann deduces from this axiom that work must always 
be exercised for the purpose of liberation. It follows from this that the work of governing the 
earth must also be carried in the same way. 
Heschel’s observations on the sovereignty of Sabbath follow a similar trajectory, 
though—as we saw—Heschel also draws on additional Jewish Sabbath traditions. Like 
Moltmann, Heschel depicts the days of the week as existing for the purpose of Sabbath, thus 
making all human activity conducted on those days point toward Sabbath as its ultimate 
fulfillment. Heschel adds imagery from Jewish tradition depicting Sabbath in starkly personal 
and political terms: “The distinction of the Sabbath is reflected in the twin meanings of the 
phrase kabbalat Shabbat which means to accept the sovereignty as well as to welcome the 
presence of the day. The Sabbath is a queen as well as a bride.”38 As argued in chapter 1, this 
metaphor of Sabbath as queen and bride indicates accepting Sabbath as a model for private and 
public existence. As Heschel argues, to live in the Sabbath is to live for the sake of time, rather 
than merely for space. To exert sovereignty in a Sabbatical way is therefore to reject the spatial 
covetousness that Sabbath, in Heschel’s understanding, is so firmly against. Sabbatical authority 
would be a liberating authority that “lets” space be. 
 
37 Moltmann, On Human Dignity, 41 
 





How would such an authority work in the context of climate change? One way to 
understand such authority was briefly introduced in the discussion of Jesus’ healings in chapter 
1. According to Moltmann, Jesus celebrated the meaning of Sabbath in his controversial Sabbath 
healings. Moltmann does not elaborate in great detail on the significance of these healings, but 
they are important for understanding what Sabbatical authority might look like. 
To understand why, one must understand the meaning of “healing” in the Gospels. Of 
course, this is a topic which is much too large to address in full here. Certainly there are 
numerous facets to the healings of Jesus.39 However, some key scholarship on the subject of 
healing is particularly useful.40 To illuminate what Jesus was doing through his miracles, 
scholars sometimes make a key distinction between disease and illness, a conceptual binary first 
formulated by Arthur Kleinmann.41 Diseases are bodily malfunctions that impair physical health, 
resulting from pathogens, chemical imbalances, or toxins. Modern medicine, as a rule, attempts 
to cure diseases. Illnesses are sharply different, even though they are closely related. An illness is 
 
39 For an overview of the miracles that addresses the numerous facets of the healings see Jeffrey John, The 
Meaning in the Miracle (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2004). 
 
40 See John J. Pilch, Healing in the New Testament: Insights from Medical and Mediterranean 
Anthropology (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2000) and John Dominic Crossan, The Historical Jesus: The Life of a 
Mediterranean Jewish Peasant (San Francisco: Harper San Francisco, 1991). Crossan’s work draws extensively on 
Pilch’s—thus some scholars refer to their approach as the “Pilch-Crossan Model.” See Jan-Olav Henriksen and Karl 
Olav Sandnes, Jesus as Healer: A Gospel for the Body (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2016), 25-40. For an overview of 
the different approaches to Jesus’ healings in New Testament scholarship over the last century see Bernd Kollmann, 
Neutestamentliche Wundergeschichten: Biblisch-theologische Zugange und Impulse für die Praxis (Stuttgart: 
Kohlhammer, 2002), 137-166. 
 
41 According to Kleinmann, “Disease refers to a malfunctioning of biological and/or psychological 
processes, while the term illness refers to the psychological experience and meaning of perceived disease. Illness 
includes secondary personal and social responses to a primary malfunctioning (disease) in the individual’s 
physiological or psychological status.” See Arthur Kleinmann, Patients and Healers in the Context of Culture: An 
Exploration of the Borderland between Anthropology, Medicine and Psychiatry (Berkeley: University of California 





a broader form of social or political toxicity that often gives rise to disease. You cannot cure an 
illness with a drug or surgical procedure. Illnesses can only be cured by changing a person’s 
social standing or personal circumstances—through an act of social authority. 
According to scholars such as Pilch and Crossan, Jesus’ healing miracles addressed 
illness, not disease. Of course, this could be a misleading distinction, because the two categories 
feed into each other. But thinking with these two categories is helpful because it is necessary to 
see the broader social implications of Jesus’ healings. It appears that Jesus performed some type 
of symbolic actions which effectively changed the social status of the persons suffering from 
illnesses. In other words, healing was an authoritative act that changed the social status of the 
persons Jesus encountered. For example, by touching people with skin diseases or women with 
menstrual disorders, Jesus was exercising a power to transform their socially-imposed lack of 
dignity.42 
By performing these healings on the Sabbath, as Moltmann observes, Jesus was 
indicating that Sabbath is a day of healing, and that the authority of Sabbath exists for the 
purpose of healing. Since healing was not merely the removal of disease but more properly a 
social-structural transformation, this would indicate that the authority of Sabbath works to 
restore health by placing human beings and nature in dignified relationships to each other. 
In the context of ecology, the authority of Sabbath would consequently work to “heal” 
the earth by restoring its dignity, as well as that of those who live on it (especially those 
 
42 This aspect of the healing stories is noted by Wendy Cotter, especially with regard to the story of the 
blind beggar Bar-Timaeus and the various stories of leper-healing. See Wendy Cotter, The Christ of the Miracle 





marginalized persons who are often the first victims of ecological crises). In answer to the 
question, “how much authority do human beings have over the earth?” the answer would be, 
“that authority which is necessary to restore and preserve the dignity of the earth.” In other 
words, just as Jesus did not use his Sabbatical authority to subjugate those beneath him, human 
beings who live sabbatically will not seek to subjugate the earth, but will respect its dignity and 
independence. 
The idea of authority-as-healing directly challenges the interpretation of human dominion 
offered in the Cornwall Declaration. Although the authors use the language of “stewardship” to 
describe human sovereignty over nature, this concept implies the management of private 
property, used for the benefit of the owners. “We aspire to a world in which the relationships 
between stewardship and private property are fully appreciated, allowing people’s natural 
incentive to care for their own property to reduce the need for collective ownership and control 
of resources and enterprises,” the authors assert.43 Here, authority functions in a relationship 
between a user (humanity) and the thing used (the earth). Much like the benevolent paternalism 
of some slave-masters over their slaves, there is an element of “caring” here, but it is caring for 
the purpose of extraction of benefits.  
A Sabbatical approach to authority is much different. As understood by the Jewish and 
Christian traditions Heschel and Moltmann draw from, and as articulated through image of 
healing, such authority must work to restore the inherent dignity, well-being, and independence 
 





of earth. On this basis, we should approach climate change with a healing mindset, treating the 
planet with the same sovereignty Jesus used in healing lepers and demon-possessed persons. 
On the same note, this approach mandates that human-to-human authority should be 
carried out with a similar approach to dignity and freedom. This means that efforts to address 
climate change should consider how those most threatened by the crisis can be aided. Climate 
change policies should be aimed at increasing the freedom of these marginalized persons. This 
will mean reducing the freedom of those who exploit the environment, but only insofar as is 
necessary to create a situation of “letting be” between humans and nature.44 In the final, 
concluding chapter, I will suggest ways in which a Sabbath that illustrates this healing authority 
could function. 
Philosophical Approaches to Inoperative Authority 
The concept of inoperativity developed in chapter 2 adds important dimensions to a 
theory of human authority. As we saw, Lacoste’s phenomenology of worship depicts human 
beings in an inoperative relationship to the Absolute. If liturgy is the model for how the Absolute 
is sovereign over the worshipper, Lacoste envisions a type of sovereignty characterized by 
openness between them. Worship accomplishes nothing, indicating that the deity worshipped 
transcends the boundaries of human action. For this reason in liturgy, a person “refuses to 
participate in the dialectics that make up history.”45 Master and slave, in Lacoste’s framework, 
may rest together, pointing to a Sabbatical kind of existence in which hierarchy subverts itself. 
 
44 This type of Sabbatical “force” would be analogous to Civil Rights legislation in the US, which created 
freedom for racial minorities, but only by reducing the freedom of those who would seek to operate on racist 
principles.  
 




Agamben develops this approach in a similar yet different way, focusing on the 
“biopolitical machine” which functions through a hierarchical separation between zoe and bios. 
Sovereign authority, for Agamben, declares a distinction between these forms of life and 
preserves the domination of one over the other. The type of inoperativity Agamben characterizes 
as “messianic” would suspend these categories, creating a “division of the division.” It would 
create a space for “whatever” being—ontology of the human and the natural that would not 
collapse them together, but would not insist on the strict classifications that classical western 
theological approaches have long cherished. Human authority would no longer base itself on the 
enforcement of divisions. Using Agamben’s work, I have argued that Sabbath could create a 
space for this imagery of the human to be realized. 
Building on the approaches of Lacoste and Agamben, it seems that a Sabbath could 
create dramatic alterations in the entire debate over human authority in relation to climate 
change. The reason for this is that Lacoste and Agamben challenge the conceptual field in which 
this debate is carried out. To see why this is the case, consider once again the Cornwall 
Declaration. The authors of the document repeatedly use the preposition “over” to describe the 
relationships between God, humans, and the earth. The document’s summary statement of beliefs 
begins by asserting the following: “1. God, the Creator of all things, rules over all and deserves 
our worship and adoration.”46 At first glance, this theological and liturgical assertion seems to fit 
oddly in the flow of the document. What does “worship and adoration” of God who is “over all” 
have to do with ecological policies?  
 
 





The answer quickly becomes apparent when we read the next few lines, one of which 
begins, “Men and women were created in the image of God, given a privileged place among 
creatures, and commanded to exercise stewardship over the earth.” Once again, notice the key 
preposition “over.” The document’s argumentation appeals to a hierarchy of being, in which God 
rules over humans who exist for God’s glory, and humans rule over nature. Nature is to humans 
as humans are to God. Authority, in this scheme, is a function of these strict categories, which 
are preserved through the mechanism of glory. 
What happens if these categories are rendered inoperative through a “messianic” 
Sabbath? Such a time would challenge the hierarchical designations of “divine,” “human,” and 
“natural.” As tools of language, these designations would still exist. Humans would not become 
indistinguishable from frogs. What would change is the significance of these designations for 
authoritative governance. Frogs would not exist for the glory or utility of humans. The 
connection between them would be a space of “letting be.” In Agamben’s terms, there would be 
“intimacy without relation.”47 
This philosophical Sabbath might sound like it would result in an apathetic approach to 
nature, but the result could be a greater appreciation for the natural world.48 This type of 
appreciation would be different from the typical approach of romantic “nature appreciation,” 
which tends to posit nature as a separate, discrete object, living out an identity beneath human 
 
47 Agamben, The Use of Bodies, 236. 
 
48 A small scale study of individuals asked to take a “technology Sabbath” by disconnecting themselves 
from phones and internet during a twenty-four hour period revealed that this Sabbath had the potential to increase a 
feeling of “connectedness” to earth. See Lisa Naas Cook, “Restoring a Rhythm of Sacred Rest in a 24/7 World: An 
Exploration of Technology Sabbath and Connection to the Earth Community,” The International Journal of Religion 





beings.49 We confine nature to parks and forest preserves, separating our “natural” worlds from 
our properly “human” worlds. The inoperative Sabbatical mindset, by contrast, would suspend 
the categorization. This would create a perspective about nature that creates a different kind of 
“closeness” or authoritative nexus between the human and the natural. 
To give a personal illustration of this, when I moved from rural Michigan to Chicago, I 
took it for granted that I was leaving “nature” behind to move to the city. But, as I currently sit 
looking out the window at my surrounding urban landscape, I realize that nature is not separable 
from the human. The greenhouse gasses emitted in Chicago will not stay in Chicago. The city’s 
atmosphere is the world’s atmosphere. Human beings cannot claim separate spaces that do not 
impact nature, and then engage in biopolitics from a distant vantage point. Sharon Delgado calls 
this orientation shift “awakening to who we are,” and claims it is a crucial precursor to any 
ecological change.50 
Notice, it is significant that I did not come to this realization until I looked out my 
window. That is to say, I did not come to terms with my overarching position of unity with 
nature until I was inoperative. Only in a time of passivity before the world could the carefully-
constructed classification system monitored by biopolitical management dissolve.51 Without a 
 
49 McFague calls this an “inner/outer” split: “We do not think, deep down, that we are really and truly 
interrelated and interdependent with all other life-forms and that their health determines our own” (McFague, 
Blessed Are the Consumers, 23).  
 
50 Sharon Delgado, Love in a Time of Climate Change: Honoring Creation, Establishing Justice 
(Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2017), 87-89. 
 
51 This suggests that Sabbath is a type of contemplation leading directly to action (political critique of 
power structures). The nexus of contemplation with critiques of hierarchical power has been explored by mystical 
theologians, especially Richard Rohr, who argues that “being centered in God” through contemplation provides the 
only accurate awareness of power dynamics. See Richard Rohr, “Mending the Breach: Inner and Outer Worlds,” in 
Grace in Action, ed. Terry Carney and Christina Spahn (New York: Crossroad, 1994), 182-187. Another thinker 




Sabbath, the pace of frenetic human activity encourages a latently top-down hierarchical 
perspective of authority over nature. 
This is true even for those whose occupations or lifestyles put them in direct contact with 
the natural world. For example, many people, frustrated by life in artificial urban landscapes, 
relocate out of the city into rural areas, seeking greater “closeness” with nature. Such efforts, 
admirable as they sound, often entail modifications to the natural world that may be more 
damaging to the earth than actions carried out by typical urban dwellers. An American in a rural 
home might use larger amounts of fuel to heat a larger living space, or drive longer distances in a 
larger vehicle for commuting. The constant work necessary to maintain a rural life may 
paradoxically cause a person to authoritatively dominate nature, rather than appreciate it.  
This suggests that the solution to the cold-hearted attitude displayed by human beings 
toward nature—a sinister mindset easily blamed for climate change—might not be countered 
simply by increasing romantic appreciation of nature, but rather through the openness of 
Sabbath.52 
 
Thomas Merton, who castigated the outlandish pace of modern capitalist life for its emphasis on use of persons, 
even in recreational contexts: “Why then aren’t we happy? Because of our servility. The whole celebration is empty 
because it is ‘useful’. We have not yet rediscovered the primary usefulness of the useless . . . Yes, we still try with 
all our might to believe in joy, since Madison Avenue tells us to. But we know that Madison Avenue itself is not 
convinced. The fruit of our servility is the despair that no one can admit—unless of course he is a monk or a 
beatnik.” See Thomas Merton, Confessions of a Guilty Bystander (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1966), 282-3. 
 
52 Fritjof Capra and David Steindl-Rast point out the importance of this observation, emphasizing that 
nature cannot be appreciated only from the intellectualized, distant vantage point, which has a tendency to reinforce 
the human/nature distinction. Rather, what we need is what Agamben’s language might call a “threshold” 
experience: “You realize that your clean concept, your clean observation, is impoverished in that it artificially 
abstracts you from the complicated truth of your being caught in a web of interconnections.” See Fritjof Capra and 
David Steindl-Rast, Belonging to the Universe: Explorations on the Frontiers of Science and Spirituality (San 




Practical Approaches to Inoperative Authority 
As the most cursory observation of political life will show, authority functions through 
rituals. Particularly in religious contexts, rituals serve to magnify the authority of the deity and 
remind worshippers of their subservient place before the deity. (This is in part why Lacoste’s 
analysis of the inoperativity at the heart of liturgy is so groundbreaking.) As shown above with 
reference to Agamben’s work, a ritual that commands inoperativity may be a further instance of 
sovereign authority, or it may be “messianic” event—a ritual that brings about a suspension of 
sovereign authority. 
As shown in chapter 3, Rav Kook and Roberto Goizueta represent two different but 
complimentary approaches to the second type of inoperativity. Kook’s understanding of the 
authority of shmita gives a practical example of an authority structure that can suspend itself. 
The heter mekhira was not a means of stifling shmita, but of bringing it to its ultimate fulfillment 
by making space for the flourishing of the people and the land. Through its suspension, shmita 
would reveal that its authority did not exist for itself, but for the sake of “use.” According to 
Kook, using the authority structure in this way would culminate in a mystical transformation of 
the soul of the nation. By advocating for the heter mekhira, Kook gave an illustration of the early 
Jewish and Christian idea that “the Sabbath was made for human beings, not human beings for 
the Sabbath.” Ritual authority always has an extrinsic purpose. 
Goizueta offers a much different perspective, which at first seems to contradict Kook’s. 
For Goizueta, ritual is an end in itself. One does not “use” a fiesta to make the world a better 
place. Of course, as argued in chapter 3, there is no contradiction here. Goizueta cautions against 




ritual. A ritual functions by allowing the participant to simply experience the new world of 
justice and peace that is being created. For this reason, the authoritative power of the ritual does 
not operate to accomplish an external purpose (even though, at a larger level, it does, because it 
restructures human being in the world).  
Combining the insights of Kook and Goizueta, one could argue that the authority of 
inoperative rituals such as Sabbath for addressing climate change works through an affirmation 
of the intrinsic value of a certain kind of life. This type of ritual would draw together the main 
ideas we have seen in the biblical traditions and philosophical analyses examined above. A 
sabbatical authority would create ways of being in the world that are healing and restorative 
precisely by appreciating the intrinsic value of people and the earth—not seeing it as a means to 
something else that is valuable for human beings. Such an authority structure would use neither 
human beings nor nature, and precisely by doing so it could practically be “used” to create a 
more just, sabbatical world. 
The weekly Sabbath is the ideal ritual for addressing the authority problem in ecology 
because it practically suspends the means-end structure of most forms of authority. Sabbath, as a 
space for letting things be, imposes only that type of authority that is necessary for preserving the 
inoperativity of everyone (and everything) involved. One does not keep a Sabbath “for” the 
Earth, as if Sabbath were simply a means to ecological prosperity. At the same time, however, it 
would not be Sabbatical to deny the earth the capacity to have a Sabbath. In this way, Sabbath 
challenges us to find a type of life in which all can rest, without coercion or force. 
A key factor in creating this Sabbatical approach to climate change is the importance of 




one without which no true Sabbath is possible. The reason Kook supported the heter mekhira 
was that it protected the viability of the community. The reason Goizueta argues that fiesta is an 
end in itself is that it arises in and through community. Without a communal context for 
inoperative rituals, the authority behind them can easily become distorted into a sovereign power 
over others. If I tell someone that he or she may not drive a car on a particular day, I impose my 
sovereign authority on that person. If the person cannot survive without driving on that day for 
economic reasons, my sovereign power puts that person in danger. If, however, we are part of a 
care-giving community with a common inoperative ritual, the authority of this ritual may take 
the form of a permission: You do not need to drive on a particular day, because it is not 
necessary. In other words, the community creates a form of life that enables earth-benefiting 
behavior, rather than prohibiting earth-harming behavior. 
The creation of communities of this type is an important and highly overlooked 
contribution to efforts for combating climate change. In a largely individualistic society—such as 
the United States—habits of moral restraint are difficult to develop outside of communities in 
which those practices are workable.53 This is why moral exhortations about using less in order to 
halt climate change do not go far unless they are given in contexts where a community is present 
to help carry them out.  
At the same time, communities themselves cannot be formed without shared rituals that 
enable them to live life together. This is a major part of Goizueta’s argument. Here a ritual such 
 
53 This is a key point of communitarian ethicists, who argue that without social structures for moral values, 
such values are largely irrelevant to human functioning. See, for example, Alisdair MacIntyre, After Virtue: A Study 
in Moral Theory (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1984), and more recently Jonathan R. Wilson, 





as Sabbath becomes pivotal, because it contains a form of life that may inherently oppose climate 
change, and it also helps to structure a community that (un)works together to accomplish the 
same goal. This is the same dynamic that motivated Kook to defend the heter mekhira. 
Ultimately, Kook wanted to see the land governed in a fully Sabbatical way, in which it would 
gain complete rest every seven years. But in order to make that happen, a community needed to 
flourish within it, and this required a “suspension of the suspension.” The authority of shmita 
could only work through community. 
Along the same lines, an ecological Sabbath ritual needs community in order to realize 
itself. However, there is a benevolent, gracious circularity in this type of ritual. Sabbath can only 
be kept through communities, but Sabbath-keeping also draws communities together and holds 
them in place (through shared space, food, accountability, and so on). It thus contains an 
authority structure within itself. In this way, Sabbath mirrors the reality of divine grace in 
Christian tradition, which requires an active response by the human subject, but is itself also the 
source of that response. This is perhaps why the author of the book of Hebrews uses Sabbath as a 
model of “entering” God’s grace.54 Like Jesus’ healing acts, which “commanded” individuals to 
be made whole, Sabbath manifests an enabling authority. To borrow a phrase from Augustine, it 
“grants what it commands.”55 
 
54 Hebrews 4:9-11 reads: “Therefore, a Sabbath rest still remains for the people of God. And whoever 
enters into God’s rest, rests from his own works as God did from his. Therefore, let us strive to enter into that rest, 
so that no one may fall after the same example of disobedience.” Usually, “Sabbath rest” is understood as a 
metaphor for salvation in this passage. However, Erhard Gallos argues that an actual reference to Sabbath-keeping 
as a practice may be referred to as well. See Erhard Gallos, “Katapausis and Sabbatismos in Hebrews 4,” Ph.D. diss. 
Andrews University (2011). 
 
55 Commenting on this famous theme, Stephen Duffy observes that “grace in Augustine’s theology does not 
merely teach us what must be done; it enables us to do it.” See Stephen J. Duffy, The Dynamics of Grace: 




At this point, a question still remains: Even if Sabbath is an authority of letting be that 
works to create healing through a new evaluation of humans and earth, does it nevertheless 
involve some type of coercion? Before concluding with a brief description of a climate-healing 
Sabbath based on these ideas, it is crucial to answer this question. 
Sabbath Politics and Coercion 
As mentioned above, it seems impossible to address the problem of climate change 
without some type of coercive politics. Human beings do not naturally stop using earth’s 
resources, and our near-sightedness about the climate problem only adds to our inherent cupidity. 
If, as argued above, Sabbath may be crucial in changing our views of human identity and 
authority, we might ask whether it must be used to force people to stop. 
Clearly, as seen in chapter two, such a Sabbath would not fulfill the requirements of 
Agamben’s “messianic” Sabbath. It would constitute an act of sovereign power, leading not to 
genuine rest but to the tense peace of hegemonic control. The Sabbath rest that brings in a 
transformed soul may only be offered and freely chosen. That being said, there is a way in which 
I will argue it is possible for Sabbath to be understood as a politically-applicable command, 
coming from a sovereign power. 
This sovereign enforcement of Sabbath is necessary in the following sense: we must view 
Sabbath as an absolute divine requirement. At first, this stipulation appears to contradict what 
was argued earlier—that Sabbath should not justify itself as an operative worship practice 
 
argue that in Augustine’s thought, grace functions as a power that enables freedom. And this freedom, 
paradoxically, functions through a type of inoperativity: “Movement from velleity to true freedom (posse) is not 
attained by an assertive clenching of fists and a stiff upper lip, but by letting go. Vulnerability, powerlessness is at 




directed to God. But there is a fruitful paradox here. It is true that Sabbath does nothing for God. 
At the same time, God needs and commands our Sabbath. The paradox emerges from the fact 
that a Sabbatical God needs and desires our freedom and the freedom of the earth. And without 
divine command, this freedom will not exist, because others will attempt to take it from us or 
from the earth. 
We see this paradox in the story of the Exodus from Egypt, specifically in the ongoing 
debate of Moses with Pharaoh. As Walter Brueggemann points out, this narrative is the essential 
background for understanding Sabbath, which is why Brueggemann claims Sabbath must 
incorporate, or be viewed as, a form of resistance.56 According to the narrative, the Israelites 
“groaned under their bondage” working for Pharaoh, and God “heard . . . and God knew” 
(Exodus 2:23-25). The story establishes that God’s concern for Israel motivates God to seek their 
freedom.57 Yet, when Moses and Aaron speak to Pharaoh on God’s behalf, Moses’ argument is 
perplexing: 
Afterwards Moses and Aaron went to Pharaoh and said, ‘Thus says the LORD, 
the God of Israel: Let my people go, that they may hold a feast for me in the 
wilderness.’ Pharaoh answered, ‘Who is the LORD, that I should obey him and let 
Israel go? I do not know the LORD, and I will not let Israel go.’ They replied, 
‘The God of the Hebrews has come to meet us. Let us go a three days’ journey in 
the wilderness, that we may offer sacrifice to the LORD, our God, so that he does 
not strike us with the plague or the sword.’ The king of Egypt answered them, 
‘Why, Moses and Aaron, do you make the people neglect their work? Off to your 
labors!’ Pharaoh continued, ‘Look how they are already more numerous than the 
people of the land, and yet you would give them rest from their labors!’ 
 
 
56 Obviously, the connection is also made in Deuteronomy 5. Brueggemann emphasizes that the authority 
of the God of Sabbath is expressly contrasted with the Egypt experience. See Walter Brueggemann, Sabbath as 
Resistance: Saying No to the Culture of Now (Louisville: Westminster John Knox Press, 2014), 2-10. 
 
57 This is a major feature of the Exodus narratives outlined by Sigve Tonstad, who calls them a “program of 





Even though God’s purpose in sending Moses and Aaron is to free Israel from sovereign 
oppression, they do not make a humanitarian case for this cause. Instead, they confront Pharaoh 
by telling him that Israel has a strictly theonomous, or divinely-ordained obligation to cease 
working.58 Israel must hold a “feast” in the wilderness. The word for feast here (hagag) is the 
same word used to describe the mandatory religious festivals such as the feast of unleavened 
bread, Pentecost or “the feast of harvest” (Shavuot), and the feast of booths (Sukkoth).59 These 
feasts were times of inoperativity, of rest.60 As the prophets noted, they had a humanitarian 
purpose, without which they would be worthless. However, Moses and Aaron do not specify this, 
even implying that God will punish them for failing to rest. Why? 
One explanation is that Moses and Aaron are bluffing. Perhaps, as Nahum Sarna argues, 
this so-called “feast” is simply a cunning way to sneak out of Egypt, and claiming divine 
authorization for this “feast” gives weight to the argument.61 (Perhaps a good analogy for this 
would be the strategy of avoiding a troublesome social engagement such as an office party by 
erroneously claiming that one’s spouse would be unhappy if one attended.) There is some truth 
 
58 As Cornelis Houtman observes, “Moses and Aaron mean to say that they make the request only for 
religious reasons, that they are under enormous pressure and have no option but to ask Pharaoh for permission.” See 
Cornelis Houtman, Exodus, vol. 1, Historical Commentary on the Old Testament (Kampen: Kok Publishing House, 
1993), 466. 
 
59 On these see Exodus 12:14, 23:16, 34:16, Deuteronomy 16:13, 31:10, and Leviticus 23:34. It is unclear 
what kind of festival Moses and Aaron are referring to in their command to Pharaoh. 
 
60 As Leviticus 23 makes clear, there were different gradations of rest involved in the feasts. Sabbath and 
the day of atonement (yom kippur) were days of “complete rest” in which no work whatsoever could be done. On 
other holy days, such as the first day of the feast of unleavened bread, no “heavy work” was to be done (Leviticus 
23:8). The same was true of the fiftieth day of Pentecost (Leviticus 23:21). 
 
61 Sarna concludes that “undoubtedly, the formula is a stratagem designed to outmaneuver the pharaoh’s 
intransigence, the only device available to a helpless people, wholly subject to a tyrant’s will.” See Nahum M. 





to this explanation. The overarching goal of the engagement with Pharaoh was not to merely take 
a religious vacation in the wilderness, but to actually escape from bondage. Nevertheless, what 
Moses and Aaron say regarding the feast in the wilderness is not false.62 Israel is called to 
celebrate festivals—but their feasting and their escape are one and the same. This is why the 
Sabbath becomes a permanent sign of Israel’s liberation. As Goizueta would likely point out, the 
Sabbath and the feasts were analogous to fiesta—not a means to liberation, but the reality of 
liberation itself. 
Because God demands Israel’s relief from oppression, God demands a feast. The divine 
imperative is needed because without it Israel will stand alone against the domineering power of 
Pharaoh. By appealing to divine authority, Moses and Aaron change the dynamics of the 
dialogue. It is no longer the Israelites against Pharaoh; now, as Carol Meyers observes, “God and 
Pharaoh are in a power struggle.”63 If Moses and Aaron had said, “Our people are tired and need 
a break,” their case would have gone nowhere. As the passage shows, even with their appeal to 
divine authority Pharaoh still detects the ultimate aim and responds accordingly: “Why, Moses 
and Aaron, do you make the people neglect their work? . . . you would give them rest from their 
labors!” Pharaoh has no interest in relieving the Israelites—overwork is built into his economic 
system. Only the intervention of what Benjamin would call “divine violence”—a Sabbath of 
forced inoperativity—will counter his oppressive sovereignty.64 
 
62 Even Sarna admits that “strictly speaking, the pretext that is given to the king is the truth, for earlier, in 
the encounter at the Burning Bush, God had told Moses that when He freed the people from Egypt they would 
worship God at that site” (Sarna, Exploring Exodus, 55). 
 
63 Carol Meyers, Exodus (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 67. 
 
64Benjamin contrasts “mythical violence,” which preserves the power of law in a bloody way, with “divine 




For this reason, inoperativity can and should be a matter of divine command. The 
“pharaohs” of the modern world—the capitalist imperatives to ceaseless production and 
consumption—do not respond to private, personal resolutions. Saying, “I need rest” will not 
carry weight against a system that tells me what I need. In a heavily market-controlled, social 
media-driven society, human beings cannot step outside the matrix of operative processes at will. 
Even vacations become alternative means to further economic boons—as well as exhausting 
ways of personally fulfilling one’s production-oriented identity, while leaving an enormous 
carbon footprint. Only explicit reference to sovereign authority enables inoperative individuals to 
confront this system with a different form of life. 
The primary way this happens is through community. Inoperativity that takes place only 
in individual spaces could succumb rapidly to market forces and the pressures of employers and 
competitive associates. This is why Sabbath should be practiced in a community that provides 
accountability and motivation. Sabbath-keeping communities are the means by which Sabbath 
“functions” politically, defending the rights of those persons denied inoperativity through 
Pharaoh-like forces. Such communities also offer a corrective to the wider world, challenging it 
with the liberative implications of Sabbath. By incarnating a divine imperative to stop, a Sabbath 
keeping community becomes, in Carl Raschke’s phrase, “a certain agency that has the force of 
God behind it.”65 The Sabbatical community envisioned here is different from the type of 
 
does nothing (it is not a violent act in the sense of taking life) it suspends the current legal order. See Walter 
Benjamin, “A Critique of Violence,” in Reflections: Essays, Aphorisms, Autobiographical Writings, trans. Edmund 
Jephcott (New York: Schocken Books, 1986), 277-301. 
65 Carl Raschke, Force of God: Political Theology and the Crisis of Liberal Democracy (New York: 





community Raschke proposes, because his community is visibly “operative,” while this is a 
community that does nothing—or lets be.66 Nevertheless, the Sabbath-keeping community is 
clearly an “insurrectionary force” in the sense that it creates a break in the standard political 
framework. 
In this sense, we may posit the necessity of a sovereign authority that tells Pharaoh-type 
oppressors to permit rest for human beings and the earth. This Sabbatical sovereignty is different 
from other kinds of sovereignty because instead of initiating a rupture in the political order for 
the sake of increased covetousness of space (Heschel), the Sabbatical sovereign opens potential 
for human beings and the earth to simply be. Any sovereign power who inhibits human 
flourishing through the command of a state of exception is thus not a Sabbatical sovereign. The 
types of authoritative commands issued from a Sabbatical sovereign must take the form of 
permissions—cessations of activity for the sake of letting people free. 
How would this logic of sovereignty apply to the situation of climate change and the calls 
for authority needed to curb it? If inoperativity is necessary for halting the steady progression of 
global warming, a Sabbatical authority would look for ways to enable people to be free for rest. 
Forcing people to rest would not work. An effort to construct any type of “blue laws” shutting 
down businesses on certain days would only harm those businesses and the people working for 
them, as well as poorer people struggling to survive in neighborhoods where such businesses 
 
66 Raschke draws on an interpretation of Augustine’s Civitas Dei to argue for a type of church that 
constitutes itself as an alternative, “insurrectionary” force that interrupts the politics of the state. This community is 
represented by “the saints.” As he puts it, “We live at a time when the baton of political theology passes to the 
saints, the revolutionary saints, the Christian insurgents, the visible signs of the operative and indefensible force of 
God” (Raschke, Force of God, 169). Although Raschke denies that this mentality leads to any form of 
“triumphalism,” it is difficult to see how such an insurrectionary force will not lead to a mirror image of the state 




operate. The inoperativity that would result would be a minor inconvenience to wealthy people, 
but would come at a cost to the most vulnerable.  
By contrast, a Sabbatical authority would “let be” by focusing on first providing people 
with the means necessary to rest. An economy that requires many single-parents to work 
multiple jobs per week in order to survive, curtailing the possibility of meaningful rest, is 
inadmissible. A Sabbatical approach to climate change would thus begin by asking what could 
be done to ensure that the poorest and most vulnerable have access to the resources they need for 
well-being.67 Only after this step is taken could there be any hope of terminating or reducing 
behaviors that require greenhouse gas emissions. Authority would exist not to make such people 
rest, but first to assert that they must be permitted rest.  
This distinction between forcing rest and allowing rest is vital, but it might seem to 
collapse upon close investigation. Like Moses and Aaron before Pharaoh, Sabbath-keepers today 
may validate their climate-protecting inoperativity by claiming that God requires a Sabbath—
that they are commanded by divine authority to rest. The important point is only that the 
command ultimately translates into an authoritative intervention on behalf of the poor. Here it is 
vital to recall that in both versions of the Sabbath command legislated in Exodus 20 and 
Deuteronomy 5, the imperative to provide rest is directed explicitly to those who own “gates,” 
property, servants, and livestock. The authority of Sabbatical politics leverages itself first on 
people who hold power over others. 
 
67 The question of the needs of the most vulnerable is central in several proposals for sustainable 
development overviewed by Monica Guillen-Royo, “Human Needs and the Environment Reconciled: Participatory 
Action-Research for Sustainable Development in Peru,” in Sustainable Consumption and the Good Life: 




In the context of climate policy, this would validate what some economists call “selective 
degrowth”—methods of reducing greenhouse gas emissions that may reduce economic gains, but 
do so in a way that improves the well being of poorer individuals within the grand scheme.68 For 
example, climate change policy can begin by reducing work in certain toxic, high-end fields 
(such as oil refineries) and open up other work areas that benefit poorer communities, such as 
investing in building newer, energy-efficient infrastructure.69 The “rest” of this economy would 
not be imposed on those for whom unemployment is particularly harmful.70 
Sabbath changes authority structures by orienting them toward permissions—maximizing 
the freedom of those oppressed by sovereign powers. In answer to the question of whether 
Sabbath may be politically imposed in order to address climate change, we may answer “yes and 
no.” No, Sabbath cannot be legislated as a ritual in which all must participate. This would violate 
its essence as an institution of freedom. On the other hand, yes, those who would forcefully 
maintain a state of perpetually accelerating activity must be forced to provide rest for those who 
work. This means that although no one may be coerced into resting on the Sabbath (just as no 
 
68 On this see Tim Jackson, “Let’s Be Less Productive,” New York Times, May 26, 2012; Juliet B. Schor, 
Plenitude: The New Economics of True Wealth (New York: Penguin Press, 2010); and Klein, This Changes 
Everything, 93.  
 
69 Phaedra Ellis-Lamkins advocates for this type of effort: “We need Congress to make the investments 
necessary to upgrade and repair our crumbling infrastructure—from building seawalls that protect shoreline 
communities to fixing our storm-water systems. Doing so will create family-sustaining, local jobs. Improving our 
storm-water infrastructure alone would put 2 million Americans to work. We need to make sure that people of color 
are a part of the business community and workforce building these new systems.” See Phaedra Ellis Lamkins, “How 
Climate Change Affects People of Color,” The Root, March 3, 2013. 
 
70 One of the ways this would be possible would be through closely studying the needs of people in 
impoverished economies. Any policy aimed at providing rest for such people would need to begin by providing the 
basic needs of such people. On this see Felix Rauschmayer and Ines Omann, “Well-Being in Sustainability 





one may be “coerced into being human”), coercive force may be employed to prevent authorities 
from suppressing the Sabbaths of others. This provides a “Sabbatical” ground for challenging 
economies in which constant work is necessary to survive. For example, a business that pays a 
wage so low that two such jobs would be necessary to survive (or maintain a family) in a 
particular city or region could be directly suppressing the Sabbath-keeping of others.71 
Legislation aimed at addressing this problem would be “Sabbatical.” The Earth’s Sabbath may 
also be infringed upon in similar ways, and warrant interventions (such as restricting the use of 
certain kinds of motor vehicles or limiting emissions at certain times). I will speak more about 
this in the next chapter. 
The question of whether force may be used in Sabbath taps into an ancient, ongoing 
tension in theology between divine grace and human works. If Sabbatical “force” is ultimately 
the work of divine grace, one must ask what role humans play in experiencing this grace. 
Stephen Duffy argues, along with most liberation theologians, that grace can be understood 
personally, socially, and at a transcendent level.72 Sabbath clearly is a form of grace that operates 
at all levels, including the social/political. However, this means there must be the possibility of a 
type of “political Pelagianism” in Sabbath-keeping in which human beings attempt to force a 
Sabbatical reality into existence, apart from grace.73 Duffy argues that it is possible to think of 
 
71 I make this statement with a tentative “could be” because there might be mitigating factors explaining the 
low wage. For example, the wage might be low because the overall economy is depressed to such an extent that this 
wage is the highest the employer could conceivably pay. This could occur in a region undergoing a natural disaster 
such as a drought or famine, or recovering from war. In these types of emergency situations, a low wage might not 
be directly anti-Sabbatical. 
 
72 See Duffy, Dynamics of Grace, 366. 
 
73 I use the term Pelagianism here in a loose sense, since the proper definition of the term is slippery. 




grace working “through” human actions for liberation (which would include Sabbath).74 This 
makes applying the term “Pelagian” to specific patterns of action incredibly difficult. Still, it 
seems clear that human beings can oust grace from Sabbath by forgetting that it is an institution 
of letting-be, a force of passivity, the ultimate goal of which is freedom. In the context of 
combating climate change, Sabbath is simply one way human beings and Earth can dwell 
together freely. There is a continual tension in this freedom between grace and human response. 
This is why a coercive effort to Sabbatically liberate those who are controlled by the sovereign 
domain of “thinginess” must constantly be vigilant lest it slip into a sovereign, dominating mode 
itself.  
 The way to avoid this negative form of sovereignty in Sabbath is to constantly keep in 
mind the nature of Sabbath itself—rest. This means focusing our attention on providing rest for 
those suffering the most from the ravages of industrial human activity. There is a sovereignty 
involved in Sabbatical political theology, but it is a sovereignty exercised for the poorest of the 
 
of Julian of Eclanum, whom Augustine fervently opposed. The term is now used generally to denote “works-
righteousness” or the view that human beings are essentially good and may save themselves through their own 
efforts, apart from grace. That this is actually what Pelagius thought is doubtful, as scholars note. See B.R. Rees, 
Pelagius: Reluctant Heretic (Suffolk: Boydell Press, 1988). Some contemporary political theorists use the term to 
describe a progressive view of the world which believes human beings hold the capacity to create ideal (or at least 
ever-improving) political structures. Nicholas Rengger points out that there are also political “anti-Pelagians” who 
cast aspersions on progressive theorists, claiming their ventures are inherently hubristic. See Nicholas Rengger, The 
Anti-Pelagian Imagination In Political Theory and International Relations: Dealing in Darkness (London: 
Routledge, 2017). Rengger’s depiction of these anti-Pelagians in political theology is rather gloomy and possibly 
pejorative (they are the ones who “deal in darkness”), because they seem to oppose human progress. In taking a 
stance against Pelagianism in the application of Sabbath, I do not intend to be “anti-Pelagian” in this sense. Because 
I hold that grace works in and through human actions, I interpret Pelagianism in this context not as a hopeful view of 
the human potential, but as an attempt to sidestep grace by forcefully controlling history through coercive means. 
 
74 Duffy writes, “It must be noted that the liberation of human freedom at all three levels is understood by 
liberation theology to be radically dependent on God’s grace. No quarter is given to Pelagianism. God is at work 





earth, and thus for the earth itself. As Delgado observes, “Justice for people and justice for the 
earth go together.”75 
Conclusion 
The type of inoperativity charted in the first three chapters of this dissertation holds 
immense significance for addressing political challenges. This chapter has shown how 
inoperativity could confront one central political problem—that of climate change. Our current 
ecological impasse emerges from human concepts of identity and authority; and Sabbath-keeping 
has the potential to alter these concepts by creating a different form of life. This type of Sabbath 
abrogates human identity distinctions vis-à-vis Earth, and reorients our concept of authority from 
coercion to “letting be.” 
As mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, the idea that Sabbath may play a role in 
addressing climate change is hardly one that I have pioneered. Several contemporary Jewish 
thinkers have issued calls for an implementation of Sabbath as an ecological form of healing. In 
the latter part of the last century, Norman Lamm exhorted ecologists to envision the ideal human 
future as a time of perpetual Sabbath, grounded in a distinctive “Jewish eschatology” which 
would be “not a progressively growing technology and rising G.N.P., but a peaceful and 
mutually respectful coexistence between man and his environment.”76 Jeremy Benstein has urged 
that Sabbath might create a counteracting spiritual force to human control of nature, realized 
 
75 Delgado, Love in a Time of Climate Change, 142. 
 






through purposeful non-intervention in the world.77 David Seidenberg has called for a Sabbath 
understood through the uniting impulse of kabbalistic tradition. Through this lens, he frames it as 
a “rehearsal for living sustainably and justly in relation to the Earth and all her species. When 
one rests on Shabbat by refraining from all the categories of work defined by rabbinic tradition, 
one effectively relinquishes the power to manipulate the environment.”78 Seidenberg thus finds 
Sabbath to be the climax of human-nature unification which he grounds in kabbalistic teaching. 
At a more practical level, prominent Jewish historian and activist Jonathan Schorsch, to give one 
example, has argued that a traditional rabbinic form of Sabbath observance could be utilized 
across monotheistic traditions as a time of earth-rest: 
In theory, more maximal Shabbat observance could produce a 14.3% (one-
seventh) reduction in carbon emissions without additional spending, new 
technologies, or unintended environmental consequences—one day out of seven 
where emissions are nearly eliminated. Observing a truly full weekly Shabbat, 
“doing nothing,” as it were, offers an effective action that one can take now to 
help heal our environment. Since the heavily environmentally damaging 
“developed” world is made up mostly of monotheists, the impact of eliminating 
most emissions once weekly would be particularly important.79 
 
By a “more maximal Shabbat observance” Schorsch means a form of Sabbath-keeping governed 
by rabbinical principles (particularly the prohibition on making a fire on the Sabbath). These are 
guidelines that many Reform Jews and Christian Sabbath observers do not follow. Admittedly, 
 
77 See David Benstein, The Way into Judaism and the Environment (Woodstock, VT: Jewish Lights 
Publishing), 182-188. 
 
78 David Morevach Seidenberg, Kabbalah and Ecology: God’s Image in the More-than-Human World 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), n. 1039. 
 
79 Jonathan Schorsch, “The Sabbath in an Era of Climate Change: An Ancient Jewish Practice May Help 






the practical possibilities Schorsch envisions are highly idealistic, perhaps absurdly so (though 
he is aware of this). Nevertheless, his proposal offers something lacking in many texts of 
religious ecological ethics: a concrete plan of action. Sermons, religious education courses, and 
small-group consciousness-raising studies can only go so far in fighting a nemesis as far-
reaching as climate change. Sabbath offers an approach that, as Schorsch notes, impacts one-
seventh of human existence.  
Of course, these outcomes are far from guaranteed, because the way religious rituals are 
practiced often differs greatly from the ideal. It is not clear if sabbatarian communities, even 
“maximal” ones, will choose to find in their ritual the ethical significance I have described here. 
Part of this challenge arises from the fact that ecologically-friendly Sabbath practices can hit 
practical roadblocks because they may require enormous life changes in order to maintain 
longstanding traditions. For example, many orthodox Jewish congregants refrain from driving on 
the Sabbath because this violates the principle of not lighting a fire on the Sabbath. But these 
communities also have a longstanding tradition of attending synagogue on the Sabbath. This 
necessitates living within walking distance of the synagogue. However, if another religious 
community were to advocate not driving on the Sabbath (when this has not been a traditional 
requirement of this community before), this would only be possible if congregants who live far 
from the synagogue/church/meeting house ceased attending, or moved closer to the building. It is 
highly unlikely that communities would make such a massive change. I will try to partly address 




 Also, in the United States at least, there is a strong taboo against recognizing the political 
ramifications of religious rituals, or even the overlapping concerns of ritual and politics.80 Part of 
this taboo arises from the positive caution we found in Goizueta’s work against making religious 
rituals instruments or political tools. Still, it is important for theologians and ethicists to 
recognize that Sabbath has the capacity to help meet the challenge of climate change. 
The analysis I have offered here could also be applied to other rituals of inoperativity. I 
have chosen Sabbath because of its historic, central significance in both Judaism and 
Christianity, as well as the time commitment involved (one-seventh of human existence). But 
other practices such as fiesta, the Christian and Jewish holidays, or Muslim times of prayer or 
fasting (such as Ramadan), not to mention various meditative or celebrative practices in eastern 
religions, traditional European religions, and indigenous American and Australian religions also 
say a great deal about human identity and authority, and could be immensely relevant to the 
problem of climate change. Of course, the contributions offered by each ritual would not be the 
same as those of the Sabbath, but—as we have seen with shmita and fiesta—the differences 
could be complimentary. 
Although the value of Sabbath as a climate-healing practice should be clear, I have not 
said much about the specific elements of such a practice. In the concluding chapter of this 
investigation, I will briefly lay out a few such elements, which correspond to the two facets of 
the climate problem analyzed here: identity and authority. 
 
80 On occasions when teaching undergraduates, I have pointed out the political significance of a religious 
idea or practice, only to have students react in disbelief that politics and religion could have anything to do with each 
other. As popular as political theology may be in certain sectors of the academy, my sense is that the basic premise 








THE CLIMATE HEALING SABBATH 
The paradox at the core of this dissertation—that ritual inoperativity accomplishes 
something immensely significant—should be clear at this point. If a ritual such as Sabbath can 
dramatically alter human conceptions of identity and authority, this constitutes nothing less than 
a transformation of political theology, inasmuch as political theory as a whole centers on 
conceptions of human identity and authority. Furthermore, given that the current ecological crisis 
emerges precisely from difficulties in these areas, Sabbath seems never more relevant than now. 
Therefore, at the very least, if one adheres to a theological method based on “critical reflection 
on praxis,” this type of ritual should become a central object of reflection.1 
Notwithstanding these enormous implications, a glaring problem may immediately come 
to mind: Many sabbatarians (though certainly not all) seem oblivious of the possible import of 
their ritual for addressing our current climate problem. While no statistical research has been 
done on the attitudes of Sabbath-keepers to environmental degradation, it would be surprising if 
 
1 Naomi Klein seems to indirectly call for a ritual such as Sabbath to address the current crisis, because of 
the lack of spiritual resources she finds available in the western world: “(T)he challenge goes deeper than a lack of 
institutional tools and reaches into our very selves. Contemporary capitalism has not just accelerated the behaviors 
that are changing the climate. This economic model has changed a great many of us as individuals, accelerated and 
uprooted and dematerialized us as surely as it has finance capital, leaving us at once everywhere and nowhere. These 
are the hand-wringing clichés of our time—What is Twitter doing to my attention span? What are screens doing to 
our relationships?—but the preoccupations have particular relevance to the way we relate to the climate challenge . . 
. Just when we needed to slow down and notice the subtle changes in the natural world that are telling us that 
something is seriously amiss, we have sped up; just when we needed longer time horizons to see how the actions of 
our past impact the prospects for our future, we entered into the never-ending feed of the perpetual now, slicing and 




such practitioners were likely to make any explicit connection between their ritual and what is 
perhaps the most significant political problem of our age. For most, Sabbath is a personal thing. 
Of course, a major part of the purpose of this dissertation has been to challenge the 
traditional standpoint that Sabbath is merely personal. From biblical, philosophical, and practical 
angles, we have seen that ritual inoperativity holds the potential to challenge political attitudes. 
Sabbath issues a soft-spoken, yet powerful summons to re-think what a person is and how a 
person should interact with others. It takes great mental agility to avoid thinking of these issues 
as political. Still, the fact that Sabbath-keeping seems practically bracketed from politics is a 
challenge. This challenge suggests a need to think about what a properly political Sabbath might 
look like, especially one that is kept with the problem of climate change in mind.  
This task is even more necessary because of the problem of authority and coercion raised 
in the previous chapter. If, as I argued, Sabbath may be seen as a divine imperative (of the same 
type as the injunction to Pharaoh to “let my people go”) we must ask, how is this imperative 
enforced? If sabbatical authority works through healing, how is this healing performed? A full 
exploration of the practical application of Sabbath to the current ecological crisis is outside the 
scope of the present work. Empirical research would need to be conducted in which communities 
actively orient their Sabbath-keeping towards the climate problem, and the process and effects of 
this Sabbath-keeping would need to be documented.2 For now, my purpose is to suggest features 
 
2 Some work has been done recently that suggests a model for this type of study. A Princeton dissertation 
by Nathan Stucky involved interviewing children and teenagers in order to ascertain the impact of Sabbath practices 
on their emotional lives and mental well-being. This type of work could be done with other sectors in relation to a 
climate-healing Sabbath as well. See Nathan T. Stucky, “Disorienting Grace: Sabbath, Youth, and the Potential of a 
Grace-Rooted Identity,” Ph.D. diss., Princeton Theological Seminary (2015). For another, earlier study that focuses 
more narrowly on mental health see Joyce M. Earickson, “The Religious Practice of the Sabbath: A Framework for 




of a climate-healing Sabbath which would make the idea reasonable. As observed in the previous 
chapter, many of my ideas are not new, but have already been suggested by Jewish practical 
thinkers. I aim to build on their insights by framing this type of Sabbath observance in an 
explicitly political/theological mold.  
Keeping in mind the characteristics of inoperativity charted throughout this dissertation, I 
will end with a few brief proposals for a type of Sabbath practice that could heal structures of 
ecological illness based in negative attitudes toward human identity and authority. Following a 
structure corresponding to the previous chapter, I will suggest practical ways Sabbath could 
impact identity formation, and then show how this would impact conceptions of authority. 
Remapping Identity through Sabbatical Community 
The goal of Sabbath, as developed in this dissertation, is not merely to take time off, but 
to develop a sabbatical “personhood” or identity. This means adopting a framework in which a 
human being is not reducible to a producer things and a manipulator of nature, but someone 
whose living is good in itself, as a form of praxis. The question is, then, how do we create such 
an identity? 
Human beings exist as social beings, and our conceptions of ourselves are molded by 
what we do collectively.3 A Sabbath that would have the capacity to heal our frameworks of 
 
See also the example of the Eco Synagogue research project discussed below in the section on “practical 
challenges.” 
 
3 This is a relatively uncontroversial perspective on human conceptions of identity, although it is possible to 
argue that human beings may conceive of themselves as “selves” without reference to others. For an overview of the 
communitarian versus individualist conceptions of selfhood see John V. Canfield, Becoming Human: The 





identity would need to be grounded in groups of human beings who share the same vision.4 
Without this communal element, a politics of Sabbath would be impossible. As Lacoste noted, 
master and slave must engage in inoperativity together if there is to be some type of political 
impact. This is not easy in cultures where religious rituals increasingly adopt a private, 
personalized character—where we say, “my Sabbath,” for example. Nevertheless, we must resist 
this religious privatization. Sabbath cannot be just any day that I choose to take time off. It must 
be a day in which human beings together seek to live a certain type of life. 
To create this communal style of Sabbath, different communities would need to develop a 
format of ecumenical and/or interreligious engagement in Sabbath-keeping. That is, they should 
strive to find a way to celebrate this ritual together. This is easier said than done, largely because 
different communities celebrate Sabbath on different days, and as noted above, it is crucial that 
Sabbath not be seen as just any day. Such confessional differences have historically produced 
immense dissension among Christian denominations, with different groups attempting to 
persuade other groups that their day is the right one. The solution to this problem is not to insist 
that Sabbath is a flexible arrangement, because that would lead to the privatization and 
personalization that de-politicize Sabbath and render it impotent for creating healing. A better 
approach would be for communities in which Sabbath is unimportant to join with other 
communities that already have deeply-established traditions of Sabbath rest. For example, in a 
town where Mennonites keep Sabbath fervently and regularly, it might make sense for another 
 
4 Robert Johann has gone so far as to argue that any practice aiming to have a moral effect must have a 
community as its locus, otherwise it becomes morally inert. See Robert O. Johann, “Person, Community, and Moral 
Commitment,” in Person and Community: A Philosophical Exploration, ed. Robert J. Roth (New York: Fordham 




Christian group that does not concern itself with Sabbath to begin practicing it in conjunction 
with the Mennonite community (or any other community present that devotes itself to Sabbath).5 
As a general rule, at least in the western world, Jewish communities have put more work into 
developing practical Sabbath-keeping approaches, and it is particularly important for other 
traditions to dialogue with them as they develop their practice.6 
When a group of people is formed who share the same motivation for developing an 
inoperative identity, they should begin practicing Sabbath in a way that affirms their harmonious 
relationship with nature, characterized by letting-be. For example, drawing on the common-meal 
tradition (which is a key part of Christianity, and also other religions), communities might 
practice a Sabbath in which they join together to eat food prepared from meatless or vegan 
sources or food that is sourced locally. The key to such a sabbatical ritual would be to 
characterize it not as a heuristic tool (although it would have that function) but as a way of living 
together—the point of life itself. In this way, sabbatical harmony with nature would not be the 
 
5 Here we cannot avoid commenting on the aged and ongoing Saturday vs. Sunday debate within 
Christianity. What to do when certain communities feel equally adamant that one of these days should be celebrated 
and not the other? Although this is a complicated issue, a healthy compromise may not be as difficult as one might 
think. Scholarly consensus at present indicates that both days originally held significance for many early Christians, 
with Saturday being the day of rest and Sunday being the “Lord’s Day”—or day of the Lord’s resurrection. The 
Lord’s Day was “actually a day of worship for centuries before it became a day of rest” observes Horace T. Allen, 
building on the classic study of the Lord’s day by Willy Rordorf. See Horace T. Allen, Jr., “The Lord’s Day as 
Anticipation and Promise in Liturgy and Word,” in Sunday, Sabbath, and the Weekend: Managing Time in a Global 
Culture, ed. Edward O. Flaherty and Rodney L. Petersen (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2010), 98; Willy Rordorf, 
Sunday: The History of the Day of Rest and of Worship in the Early Centuries of the Christian Church (London: 
SCM Press, 1968). Perhaps, given this ancient distinction between the purpose of the two days, Sunday could 
become a day of liturgy (which is not necessarily restful, as any clergy person will readily aver) and Saturday could 
become the day of rest? Such an approach might not work in all contexts—particularly where Sunday-worshipping 
communities already have long-running practices of rest on Sunday—but it could be helpful in others. 
 
6 This should be done while avoiding the problem of appropriation that may emerge in Jewish-Christian 
relations. What this means is that although Christians may learn about Sabbath keeping from Jewish communities, 
they should not seek to mimic the practices of Judaism in a way that suggests supercessionism or disrespect for the 




exception but the norm. In other words, the community leaders should emphasize that abstinence 
from earth-harming activities on the Sabbath is not a type of “fast” or periodic withdrawal from 
regular habits, but an attempt to live a new identity with new habits, and gradually to make the 
rest of life conform to the new identity. 
Several Jewish practitioners have considered approaches to Sabbath keeping that could 
reframe human identity in relation to the earth. Dan Fink argues that a key Sabbath practice vital 
to creating an improved ecological awareness is actually physically spending time in nature. Fink 
cites precedents from early traditions in which rabbis would greet the Sabbath outdoors, in fields. 
He also points to a kabbalist tradition that commands that Sabbath be welcomed in an open 
territory.7 Although this type of practice may not be helpful in areas with cold seasons or heavily 
urbanized areas, it could be useful in areas where access to nature-immersion and appreciation 
are possible. As a further development of this idea, churches or synagogues located in areas with 
fragile or threatened ecosystems could conduct their Sabbath communal meals out-of-doors in 
these settings, as a way of resting in solidarity with the earth. 
Another way communities could begin to foster a different type of human identity 
through Sabbath would be by explicit acts of rest-giving. In many Western cultures, rest is 
associated with increased consumption—long distance vacations, trips to amusement parks, 
recreational boating. Although it is indisputable that these activities are therapeutic and “restful” 
psychologically, they are forms of rest-taking, in that they benefit the consumer at the cost of 
 
7 See Dan Fink, “Shabbat and the Sabbatical Year,” in Ecology and the Jewish Spirit, ed. Ellen Bernstein 





increased strain on earth’s resources—a point also made by Pope John Paul II in Dies Domini.8 
These kinds of rest give rise to entire markets—the recreational and tourism industries—that 
play a major role in increasing greenhouse gas emissions. They craft identities focused on 
production—the production of fun. They also create and maintain hierarchies between people 
groups, with wealthier and otherwise privileged groups gaining access to the most pristine 
recreational opportunities, and their poorer counterparts being left out. 
By contrast, the healing Sabbath takes a different therapeutic approach. The emphasis of 
this kind of rest is on enabling whole communities and the environment itself to join in rest. This 
would mean finding ways to intentionally reduce consumption of fossil fuels on the Sabbath, by 
refraining from driving cars, or avoiding fuel-powered transportation entirely. The common 
meals eaten within communities could also be forms of rest-giving, especially in contexts where 
poorer members of the community might not have the resources to purchase more expensive 
locally-grown food.9 In areas where the climate is (already) warm, religious meetings or other 
events could be held outside, obviating the use of electricity for indoor lighting and air-
conditioning.  
 
8 See John Paul II, Dies Domini (The Holy See: Papal Archive, 1998), 82. As Donald Conroy observes, 
“Leisure and recreational activities are healthy for the human psyche; that is a given. But self-centered pleasure-
seeking activities which ignore the human impact on others and on the environment at large can clearly contribute to 
the degradation of other persons, societies, and the delicate ecosystems which sustain life.” See Donald B. Conroy, 
“Sabbath in an Age of Ecology within an Emerging Global Society,” in Sunday, Sabbath and the Weekend, 169. 
 
9 This could help to address some of the challenges of food justice noted by Eric Holt-Gimenez, “Food 
Security, Food Justice, or Food Sovereignty? Crises, Food Movements, and Regime Change,” in Cultivating Food 






Cultivating a rest-giving identity would also mean extending the reach of Sabbath outside 
of the boundaries of the local Sabbath-keeping community. This does not mean promoting 
Sabbath-keeping in an aggressive, evangelizing sense, but rather offering rest as an opportunity. 
For example, Sabbath keepers could use Sabbath-time to bring climate-friendly, healthful food to 
homeless or low-income communities whose diets might otherwise consist of heavily processed 
food. In cities, rest-giving could involve providing public transportation passes to those who 
need them. Volunteer groups could assist in “greening” houses in older neighborhoods, by 
installing solar panels and adding insulation. Other volunteers could refurbish bicycles to provide 
for lower-income individuals who might want to use this supremely ecologically-efficient mode 
of transportation, but not have the finances to acquire it.10 This would be “work” in the 
traditional sense, but it would be the same type of work that Jesus engaged in by healing on the 
Sabbath. As in Rav Kook’s understanding of the heter mekhira, these would be forms of activity 
that prepare the way for greater inoperativity. 
If communities embraced these practices, the hoped-for end result would not merely be 
the formation of “eco-friendly” clubs or churches, but assemblies of those who seek to define 
human beings differently. Presently within the western world there are socialist and free-market 
based organizations that seek to combat climate change through activism and “development.” 
While not condemning such organizations and their efforts, the purpose of a sabbatical 
community would be to find a different framework of existence altogether, a framework that 
 
10 In my experience working with homeless persons in Chicago, I have noticed that there are many 
individuals who would like bicycles for transportation, but are unable to afford them. A further structural problem 
that compounds this issue is the absence of bike lanes on most urban roads. Part of healing the earth could involve 





embraces human inoperativity in relation to earth. The activist approach and the inoperative 
approach are distinct, but not incompatible. In fact, one could argue that they may mutually 
support each other. Only when human beings properly understand their identity can they work to 
establish a social/political system that conforms to that identity.11 
Remodeling Authority through Sabbatical Resistance 
Once human beings grasp their inoperative identity through Sabbath, the question 
becomes how to preserve and protect that identity. This leads us to the issue of authority. As 
argued in chapter 4, Sabbath presents a different approach to authority—one oriented away from 
control and toward “letting be.” A climate-healing Sabbath would need to articulate this model 
of authority. In the context of the climate change problem, this type of authority manifests itself 
in sabbatical resistance. 
At first, this may sound like another way of describing coercive activism. Resistance may 
be an effort to gain power over others. Even when the resisters are oppressed persons who seek 
justice, there is always the possibility that once they gain a position of authority, they may cling 
to power for its own sake and become as dominating as the system they replaced. The 
sovereignty of Sabbath, as argued before, is different. Sabbath opposes any type of controlling 
power, even to the point of suspending itself when necessary. This means that sabbatical 
 
11 This connects to Rav Kook’s idea of a type of “soul” that is nurtured by inoperativity and enters into 
other aspects of human life. Following a similar line of thought, Michael Fishbane argues that “this mode of 
intentionality and attachment to God throughout the Sabbath day is not for itself alone. It must also serve lived life. 
One enters the Sabbath rest in order to cultivate a mindfulness of inaction that can gradually suffuse one’s entire 
consciousness (a kind of supernal soul added to our nature); and one may therefore hope to return to the workweek 
with this divine gift in one’s heart.” See Michael Fishbane, Sacred Attunement: A Jewish Theology (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 2008), 127. Although Fishbane does not express it explicitly, I find that his theology of 
Sabbath also embraces the paradox that I have articulated in this dissertation regarding Sabbath observance. That is 
to say, Fishbane argues that Sabbath is a complete “divestment” of labor and a form of total inaction, yet it is also a 




resistance is not an effort to make others keep a Sabbath. Although it might be tempting to think 
that government enforcement of a universal Sabbath would do wonders for ecology, such a 
political move would violate the essence of the day. 
The authority of sabbatical resistance is thus not the same type of authority that Pharaoh 
and his deities exercise. The sabbatical deity and the powers of Egypt clash precisely because 
their visions of government and authority are so radically different.12 This needs to be clearly 
emphasized, lest an image of “green totalitarianism” come to mind, in which religious authorities 
take it upon themselves to force everyone to rest, thus wreaking havoc on independent industries 
and poorer persons who must work extended hours in order to make a living.13 Authorities must 
be pressured to allow others to rest, in the same way that they must be pressured to allow 
freedom of speech or religion or other fundamental human rights. If resting is a fundamental part 
of being human, there is no value in forcing it on people. The only imperative is to make it 
 
12 As mentioned in the previous chapter, Brueggemann is clear about this. Speaking about the identity of 
the sabbatical God, Brueggemann points out that “this is the God ‘who brought you out of the land of Egypt, out of 
the house of slavery.” Thus the Sabbath commandment is drawn into the exodus narrative, for the God who rests is 
the God who emancipates from slavery and consequently from the work system of Egypt and from the gods of 
Egypt who require and legitimate that work system. It is, for that reason, fair to judge that the prohibition against the 
‘the other gods’ in the first commandment pertains directly to the gods of Egypt (see Exod. 12:12) and other gods of 
the same ilk in Canaan, or subsequently the gods of the great empires of Assyria, Babylon, or Persia. In the narrative 
imagination of Israel, the gods of Egypt are stand-ins for all the gods of the several empires. What they all have in 
common is that they are confiscatory gods who demand endless produce and who authorize endless systems of 
production that are, in principle, insatiable. Thus, the mention of ‘Egypt’ brings the God of Israel into the orbit of 
socioeconomic systems and practices; and inevitably sets this God on a collision course with the gods of insatiable 
productivity.” See Brueggemann, Sabbath as Resistance, 2. 
 
13 Along these lines, it deserves reiteration that the Sabbath commandments are always addressed to those 
who own slaves, property, and livestock—not to those who work for such individuals. Thus the commands are about 
the human responsibility to give rest, not force other people to rest. As Brueggemann observes, the command of 
Sabbath is to “sponsor a system of rest that contradicts the system of anxiety of Pharaoh.” See Brueggemann, 





available. Of course, doing so will inevitably create a clash of values with a system bent on 
continuing activity.14 
What, then, does sabbatical resistance look like? At its core, it is the same activity 
mentioned above that fosters a sabbatical identity: rest-giving. Those who are keeping a climate-
healing Sabbath must look at the world and ask themselves, “In what ways are people or the 
Earth being barred from rest? How can that rest be restored?” The authorities in whose hands 
Earth’s well-being lays—the fuel companies, transportation industries, and conglomerates of 
diverse markets—do not readily surrender permission for earth’s rest. A Sabbath that aims at 
healing will make space for resisting the agendas of these authorities. 
In part, resistance to these ecological Pharaohs is already built into the structure of 
Sabbath, in that simply by doing nothing one is defying the ceaseless market imperative to spend 
more. From the perspective of a Marxist analysis, in which capitalist economies inherently 
oppose any types of inoperativity and seek to fill time with as much production as possible, the 
simple act of doing nothing must invite some type of inherent opposition, if only through social 
disapproval.15 On this account, we could say that many sabbatarian communities engage in acts 
 
14 The fact that within the context of modernity every economic system has been focused on ever-
increasing productivity indicates in my mind that the potential for a green totalitarianism which uses Sabbath as a 
coercive force is virtually nonexistent. Communist systems, though predicated on a philosophy which seeks to 
escape labor oppression, have been just as focused on increasing production and dominating the environment as 
capitalist systems. It seems straightforwardly evident that any economic system driven by acquisitiveness will find 
no space for rest, and thus will have no interest in enforcing a Sabbath. I mention the potential for a sabbatical 
totalitarianism only to allay the fears of those who have mentioned such a theoretical possibility, specifically many 
Seventh-day Adventists, beginning with their founder Ellen G. White. On this see Dennis Pettibone, “The Sunday 
Law Movement,” in The World of Ellen G. White, ed. Gary Land (Washington, DC: Review and Herald Publishing, 
1987). On the various ways in which a type of totalitarian Sabbath has been predicted by Adventists see Reinder 
Bruinsma, Seventh-day Adventist Attitudes toward Roman Catholicism, 1844-1965 (Berrien Springs, MI: Andrews 
University Press, 1994). 
 
15 According to Ana Levy-Lyons, “Marx describes how technology, rather than freeing us from labor, 




of resistance to ecological devastation without even being aware that they are doing this. For 
example, despite the large influence of the pioneering Jewish ecology movement, it is probably 
safe to say that most Orthodox Jewish communities do not walk to synagogue Saturday morning 
with the conscious awareness that their refusal to drive constitutes an affront to the schemes of 
ExxonMobil or BP, even though if everyone followed their example by not driving on Saturday 
these companies would certainly feel a punch.  
In more intentional ways, Sabbath could function as a boycott of activities and products 
that prevent Earth’s rest. As mentioned above, the communal gatherings could feature food 
drawn from sustainable, climate-friendly sources, which would reinforce the notion that Sabbath 
is a day for creating rest not only for ourselves, but also for our atmosphere and the various 
ecosystems that sustain it.16 If done well, such communal meals would also have the effect of 
showing that a sustainable diet can be both enjoyable and conducive to the highest levels of 
human flourishing. This is immensely important in combating culturally-induced assumptions 
that certain products (such as meat) are commodities that humans cannot live without, or at least 
not live comfortably. By providing people with concrete examples of climate-friendly living, a 
communal Sabbath would accomplish much more than simply telling congregants to “eat less 
 
‘close the pores’ of time.” See Ana Levy-Lyons, “Sabbath Practice as Political Resistance: Building the Religious 
Counterculture,” Tikkun 27, no. 4 (Fall, 2012): 16. Levy-Lyons argues that simply by doing nothing, a Sabbath 
keeper creates a culture which strangles the capitalist mindset. While I agree with Levy-Lyons’s fundamental point, 
I would argue that we must involve in our Sabbath keeping a more direct challenge to systems of labor, precisely 
because these systems harm and oppress others. One cannot keep a Sabbath while forgetting one’s neighbor who is 
trapped in slavery. If we forget this resistance component, Sabbath runs the risk of becoming a bourgeois privilege. 
 
16 Arguing from the common meal tradition of Eucharist described in 1 Corinthians 11, Michael Northcott 
argues that just as the first Christians protested the Roman economy through their eating, modern Christians should 
eat in a common way that challenges the western economy of earth devastation. See Michael S. Northcott, A Moral 





meat.”17 Sabbath keepers could also make their practice a form of resistance by publicizing it—
making it a time of “conspicuous nonconsumption.” It would be a time of “living ‘as if.’”18 By 
showing the world the value of inoperativity in the fulfillment of human life, Sabbath-keepers 
would present a clear challenge to the dominant system.19 
Beyond boycotts, sabbatical resistance also allows for confronting powers that enforce 
the consumption status quo. The Climate-Healing Sabbath could be a day in which communities 
could mobilize to protest new drilling and fracking operations, or the construction of new natural 
gas pipelines.20 The rationale for this resistance is not that oil companies need to keep Sabbath. 
Rather, the point is that such organizations must not prevent others from keeping Sabbath. By 
continually ravaging the Earth they are causing it to face a never-ending strain, which also results 
 
17 This is an important point, because some research published by a group of Dutch scientists suggests that 
public efforts to cajole meat-eaters into eating less meat because of climate change may actually have an adverse 
affect, by causing them to dismiss climate science entirely. These researchers argue that efforts to reduce meat 
consumption should be multi-leveled (including references to health and overall well-being). It seems that a helpful 
part of such an approach to reducing meat consumption would be providing an experiential awareness that a meat-
free diet can be easy and satisfying. See Joop de Boer, Hanna Schosler, and Jan J. Boersema, “Climate Change and 
Meat Eating: An Inconvenient Couple?” Journal of Environmental Psychology 33 (2013): 1-8. 
 
18 This calls to mind Goizueta’s “life in the subjunctive” as well as the litany of practices Anne Marie 
Dalton and Henry Simmons describe in their chapter “Living ‘as if’,” in Ecotheology and the Practice of Hope (New 
York: SUNY Press, 2010), 105-126. 
 
19 It is significant than in his ground-breaking work on nonviolent resistance as a response to climate 
change, Kevin O’Brien emphasizes that one of the most important features of successful nonviolent resisters (here 
he focuses on the examples of John Woolman, Jane Addams, Dorothy Day, Martin Luther King, and Cesar Chavez) 
is “joyful living”—“we need to enjoy good food and good jokes.” See Kevin J. O’Brien, The Violence of Climate 
Change: Lessons of Resistance from Nonviolent Activists (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2017), 
198, 200. Any movement that seeks to resist a negative way of life by providing an alternative must demonstrate the 
attractiveness of that alternative, or face popular extinction. 
 
20 This raises the question of whether faith communities should focus on global issues (campaigning for 
international treaties, for example) or address their attention to more parochial aspects of the ecological crisis 
(protesting the practices of a local company). Although I do not have space to fully address this issue, I can point to 
the work of Michael Northcott, who has argued that faith communities work best when they address local issues, not 
to exclude broader problems, but to appeal to their most immediate range of influence. See Michael S. Northcott, 





in a restless existence for people living in climate-affected areas. Using Sabbath as a time for 
opposing the politics of climate-oppression is thus not an act of “using religion to meddle in 
politics” or violating the separation of religion and state. It is just the opposite. By their 
aggressive and uninhibited domination of nature, western corporations are violating the Sabbaths 
of others. How can an indigenous community in the Amazon find rest or keep a Sabbath when it 
has been displaced because of deforestation or water pollution and its members have been forced 
to work long hours in factories or in the same industries that destroyed their community? How 
can refugees from a catastrophic draught in northern Africa be able to keep a Sabbath when their 
very survival is at stake? Privileged westerners cannot keep a Sabbath authentically while 
forgetting the plight of these other communities.21 
Incorporating resistance into Sabbath observance may not mean directly engaging in acts 
of civil disobedience or political campaigning on the day. There is a delicate balance to be 
aspired to here. This balance hinges on the paradox of inoperativity—it does nothing and yet 
accomplishes something. Although rest-giving is a key part of Sabbath, and this means that 
Sabbath keeping should confront that which opposes rest, the seduction of “functionality” may 
be difficult to resist if activism becomes the primary purpose of Sabbath. Sabbath-keeping 
communities may decide that resistance should be something that happens on other days of the 
 
21 Theologians such as Jim Antal and Larry Rasmussen have argued that earth and its resources should be 
viewed as “sacramental” in a proper sense. See Larry Rasmussen, Earth-Honoring Faith: Religious Ethics in a New 
Key (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013), 257; Jim Antal, Climate Church, Climate World: How People of 
Faith Must Work for Change (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2018), 110-111. Under this logic, acts of 
defamation to the Earth are anti-religious acts. Under the same logic, any acts that systemically prevent Earth from 
resting, or keep it in a state of ceaseless activity, are similarly anti-religious. This is an important point, because in a 
real sense, the imperative to constantly increase production and nature-domination is also a religious imperative, 
arising from the religious structure of capitalism. The ecological crisis of global warming is thus a religious conflict 





week. Resisters may reference Sabbath as a reason for a particular policy of letting the Earth rest, 
as did a community of Scottish Presbyterians who led a campaign against a new quarry that was 
to be built on their island of Harris in the Hebrides.22 Sabbath itself may not be used as a 
challenge to ecological destruction, but it could serve as a motivation for it. 
The key to maintaining the legitimacy of this challenge would be to insist on the 
significance of this Sabbath as an end in itself. We return here to the caution that emerged in our 
analysis of Goizueta’s work: Sabbath functions to heal the planet, but only if it insists on being 
truly inoperative. While emphasizing the purpose of Sabbath as resistance to carbon emissions 
and other forms of ecological exploitation, we would need to remember that Sabbath is always 
only about living a fully human form of life. Resistance plays a role in this, but it must never 
take center stage, or turn us away from the basic practices of eating, celebrating, and resting 
together. The idea of Sabbath as resistance is to complete these practices by generating the anti-
oppressive impulse that is already contained within them. 
Realistic Challenges 
The idealistic practical framework I have articulated here is not without its potential 
problems. Certain Jewish communities have already put “boots to the ground” (to use an 
admittedly faulty metaphor for Sabbath) in developing an ecologically friendly Sabbath practice, 
and future efforts in this endeavor need to take their experiences into close consideration. Jewish 
 
22 According to Michael Northcott’s description of the situation, a company (Redland Aggregates) sought 
to obtain a license to build a “mega-quarry” on the island, but were opposed to local residents who claimed that the 
expansion of the industry in the area would disturb their Sabbath rest (their branch of Presbyterianism focuses 
extensively on strict Sabbath-keeping). Although Northcott reads the scenario as an endorsement of local, or 
parochial, methods in ecological resistance, it could also serve as an example of the power of rest-giving as a tool in 
resistance. See Michael S. Northcott, Place, Ecology, and the Sacred: The Moral Geography of Sustainable 





thinkers have also developed practical ways of using Sabbath to create an environmental 
awareness that extends beyond the day itself.23 As already noted, at the end of the previous 
chapter, it is tricky to develop a Sabbath practice that is ecologically powerful but also 
practically realizable.  
One of the key areas of difficulty arises from the use of technology. In a popular article, 
Yonatan Neril extols the benefits of refraining from technology use on Sabbath:  
Shabbat offers great potential to reduce consumption and thereby benefit the 
natural world. The act of shutting off a computer or car for a day contains 
environmental meaning far beyond the energy saved from not using these devices 
for one day. The deeper significance of the act centers on the reorientation that 
can occur from outward focus to inward focus, from reading from screens and 
Blackberries to reading from scrolls and books, from communicating via 
technology to communicating face to face.24 
 
There does seem to be immense potential for a change in worldview resulting from a technology-
free day. However, as western culture’s social life continues to be embedded in technological 
systems, fully removing oneself from technology may seem practically impossible, if other 
aspects of Sabbath are to be maintained. To point out one instance of this, if Sabbath is to be kept 
“together” in social solidarity, this requires clear communication and careful orchestration. 
Today, we accomplish all these tasks through technology. If, for example, I live in an upstairs 
apartment and I wish to have a group of friends come over for a Sabbath dinner, the only way 
 
23 See, for example, Lydia Roussos, “Sustainable Shabbat Ideas Can Help Environment All Week,” The 
Wisconsin Jewish Chronicle, March 31, 2008, https://www.jewishchronicle.org/2008/03/31/sustainable-shabbat-
ideas-can-help-environment-all-week/. Based on my own survey of research, the majority of practical reflections on 
how Sabbath observance can be implemented with an ecological mindset within Judaism have been written at the 
popular level. To my knowledge, no official or academic publications have been written on how to develop a 
Sabbath for climate change within Judaism. 
 





they may be able to contact me to open the door is through cell-phone texting. In an urban 
setting, almost any group activity requires technology if it is to be carried out smoothly. 
Sabbatarians who have reasonably close immediate family may seek to spend Sabbath only with 
their family, and this might be easily facilitated without cell phones. But for most single adults, a 
technology-free Sabbath will be an isolated Sabbath. For such persons, a conflict emerges 
between the identity-forming impact of togetherness in ecological Sabbath-keeping and the 
identify-forming benefit of abstaining from technology. 
Another problem concerns the nature of communal Sabbath meals. Again, Jewish 
communities keeping Sabbath in an ecologically-friendly manner have already thought through 
how such meals may be conducted. The Jewish environmental organization Hazon has published 
a booklet giving recommendations on creating a practical form of communal meal which is also 
earth-friendly.25 The authors go through recommendations of eating lower on the food chain, 
choosing local produce, and being cautious of what types of dairy products and eggs to use (if 
they are used at all). However, there are areas of potential difficulty that arise throughout the 
booklet. One of them concerns the use of dishes. In order to avoid waste, washing dishes seems 
like an obvious choice (in order to refrain from using disposable plastic).26 However, washing 
dishes with hot water may violate a key Sabbath proscription for some Jewish communities.27 
 
25 See Hazon, Hosting a Sustainable Shabbat Dinner (New York: Hazon, 2011). 
 
26 For one perspective firmly against using any plastic for Jewish Sabbath meals see Raphael Zarum, “Why 




27 The problem with dish washing for more traditional forms of Judaism is that it often involves hot water, 




Furthermore, washing dishes hardly seems restful, and leaving dishes in the sink for hours until 
after Sabbath may create unnecessary stress. The Hazon authors therefore recommend using 
compostable dishes and related items. But they note that these may only be eco-friendly if a 
composting facility is available, and not all biodegradable items are regulated; thus companies 
might not be honest about their products’ level of biodegradability.28 Thus, although the idea of 
an ecological Sabbath meal may seem easy, the reality can be different. 
The problem of a Climate-Healing Sabbath meal has also been addressed by a Jewish 
association of environmentally-concerned synagogues called Eco Synagogue. A group of 25 
synagogues affiliated with this organization who met together in May of 2018 decided to 
perform a case study to discover how smoothly a “Green Kiddush” meal could be carried out.29 
The participants focused on the basics of climate-friendly food—vegan/vegetarian items, locally-
sourced whenever possible, use of glassware rather than disposables. Overall, their report 
deemed the event a success. However, they were honest about the difficulties. These included the 
fact that because no absolute “mandate” had been given to any of the families who brought food, 
they could not prevent a family who wanted to bring fish dishes from doing so.30 Sometimes 
arranging items with a low-carbon footprint meant driving more to bring them to the synagogues, 
 
for some communities). See https://www.chabad.org/library/article_cdo/aid/1232465/jewish/Can-I-wash-dishes-on-
Shabbat.htm. 
 
28 See Hazon, Hosting a Sustainable Shabbat Dinner, 12. 
 
29 See Eco Synagogue, “NNLS Green Kiddush Case Study,” https://ecosynagogue.org/nnls-green-kiddush-
case-study/. 
 
30 This is a micro-level example of the problem of authority and coercion in Sabbath keeping. Because 
Sabbath rest is a free decision, communities can only offer so much demanding accountability to those who wish to 
keep Sabbath in a less environmentally friendly way. Thus it seems that before existing sabbatarian communities can 
move toward more overtly earth-healing Sabbaths, there may need to be extensive educational work done in the 




a defect the organizers admitted with admirable candor. Another challenge the organizers 
discovered was that not necessarily all vegetarian “green” food is particularly sustainable. A 
centerpiece of most vegan meals is avocadoes, and unless one lives in warm locales with 
avocado orchards nearby, avocadoes will almost always require extensive shipping. 
There are numerous other complexities that could be described with keeping Sabbath 
with positive ecological intent. Many of these difficulties seem like minor issues, but the plethora 
of them means that tough decisions will need to be made by communities who wish to create 
such a Sabbath practice. The point of citing these is not to cast a dim light on my proposal, but to 
recognize that practicing this type of Sabbath in the current world will require ongoing dialogue 
and innovation. 
As I assess these challenges, two major pitfalls seem possible. One is excessive laxity 
about the importance of insisting on earth-healing practices. When hard changes need to be made 
and complexities arise, it may be tempting to cut corners. This is where a strong sense of 
tradition may be helpful. The other, opposite pitfall would be a tendency toward judgmental 
behavior and a hard-line stance on miniscule matters that could divide communities. It seems 
evident that if a form of inoperativity that can address climate change is to gain wide acceptance, 
it will need maximal unity and collaboration among people of different traditions. In particular, 
because Jewish sabbatarians seem to have done the most extensive groundwork in practically 
enacting ecological Sabbath practice and negotiating the difficulties thereof, Christian 





The Climate-Healing Sabbath would cultivate an inoperative human identity as well as a 
“letting be” model of authority through community engagement. By dwelling with others who 
celebrate praxis—the innate goodness of life—Sabbath keepers would challenge the standard 
mindset that gives rise to climate change. Rituals of rest-giving and resistance would gradually 
create a sabbatical world within the present world. This type of Sabbath is consistent with the 
paradox of inoperativity: It aims at doing nothing, but in the process accomplishes significant 
political goals. 
Such a Sabbath might look something like the following. The beginning of the day would 
be occupied with rituals that emphasize solidarity and togetherness. For Christians, this might 
include liturgies, sermons, and prayers that draw on ecological themes of wholeness and the 
common good, directed toward faith in a better world. Special care should be taken to ensure that 
congregants find this to be a time of joy and hope, even in the face of ecological crisis.31 These 
rituals would be followed by (or integrated with) acts of resource-sharing, such as through 
common meals. Here coordinators would emphasize the rest-giving and resistance aspects of 
eating, using sustainable food items and making the food freely available to all who wish to 
participate.32 After this, participants could spend time focusing on outward-directed rest-giving, 
 
31 Of course, there are different kinds of hope. The type of hope emphasized here would not be the type that 
looks forward to a new earth as a unilateral act of divine intervention, but a hope that summons human beings to live 
the new earth now. As Jonathan Moo and Robert White point out, the biblical type of hope is always linked with 
practical love. See Jonathan A. Moo and Robert S. White, Let Creation Rejoice: Biblical Hope and Ecological 
Crisis (Downers Grove: Intervarsity Press, 2014), 167. 
 
32 Even though adding a charge to the common meal would make funding it easier, this would take away 
from the rest-giving aspect of the ritual. Furthermore, outsiders and persons from low-income backgrounds (the 
homeless, single-caregiver families, youth, the elderly, etc) should be particularly welcome to participate, especially 




through acts of resistance to ecological domination. This would be an appropriate time for 
demonstrations, protests, and other public activities raising awareness of those who are kept from 
rest because of human activity. This would also be a good time for practical acts of mercy like 
those mentioned above, such as repairing bicycles, tending community gardens, distributing 
climate-friendly food, or otherwise acting on behalf of those negatively affected by climate 
change.33 Such acts would not initially seem inoperative, but they would constitute a “suspension 
of the suspension,” paving the way for rest for others. The day would conclude with more ritual 
celebration, expressing joy and thanks for the goodness of life. The core theme of the day would 
be an interwoven thread of gratitude and expectation. Leaders should emphasize that the day is 
not a duty to be fulfilled, but an expression of the pinnacle of human existence. 
As emphasized above, the day would also need to be carried out in conjunction with other 
communities. For Sabbath to gain wide acceptance, some level of visibility and opportunity for 
mimesis would be necessary. Sabbath, like most rituals, thrives on collaboration and cooperation. 
Western culture, however, tends to privatize and individualize rituals. It is imperative for 
communities to devote themselves to creating community across boundaries on Sabbath. Jewish 
communities should be particular reference points to this end. 
Of course, the concepts behind a Climate-Healing Sabbath are applicable in other rituals 
besides the traditional Jewish or Christian Sabbath. One can easily imagine the same ideas 
entering into rituals surrounding Ramadan, Christmas, or Easter. As long as human beings come 
 
 
33 See examples of these types of actions in Roger Gottlieb, A Greener Faith: Religious Environmentalism 




together in a spirit of genuine inoperativity, devoting themselves to a practice of uninhibited 
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